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***Socialism, Nationalism and European
Integration:
The Development of Theory and Practice***

by

Dimitrios G. Zevgolis

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Durham

Department of Politics

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ABSTRACT

Dimitrios Zevgolis

Socialism, Nationalism and European Integration: The Development of Theory and Practice

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Durham 1999

The late twentieth century has seen a triple crisis on the left: a crisis of socialism in all its mainstream expressions, a crisis of the state, but also a reaffirmation of the appeals of nationalism. The thesis is an attempt to examine the relationship between these developments in the context of the process of European integration. It starts with the difficult relation between socialism and nationalism, from the founding fathers of scientific socialism, through to their followers in the so-called *golden age* of socialism, and the practice of the Internationals. It looks briefly at the way the German SPD and the French Socialists reacted to the process of European integration, showing the predominance of national interests, which combined with the internal party problems and socialist beliefs, resulted in a confusion manifested in their rhetoric and vocabulary. An account is offered of some socialist thinkers who paid attention to European integration in the 1970s. The French Rocardians, Ernest Mandel and Johan Galtung are shown to have failed to understand the importance of nationalism and remained preoccupied with statism. The exception is Altiero Spinelli, who, as both thinker and practitioner, developed a unique non-doctrinaire vision of socialism, coupled with an understanding of national differences. His federalism and his pro-European stance incorporated notions and ideas that were to dominate the socialist discourse of today. Finally there is an examination of issues that currently dominate the discussion about the future of socialism. These can be divided into arguments about the state, the working class and the new radicalism, and democracy and the ideas of choice, rights, autonomy and the market. Spinelli had touched upon all these issues with a particular reference to European integration and opened up for socialists the European horizon. In conclusion, it is argued that while European integration is not a socialist enterprise, it might be used to further its aims.

No material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other university

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*For my wife Catherine and my daughter Ersy.
They have felt my long absence more than anybody else.*

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Finally, all shortcomings and failures are mine and mine alone.

INTRODUCTION

The global political landscape has undergone massive changes since 1945, in particular with the phenomena of decolonisation and globalisation. The rate of change in many respects has intensified in the last ten years. On the European scene, the process of European integration gathered a new momentum in the eighties and the idea of a united western Europe seemed closer than ever. In addition, the year 1989 signified, after seventy years, the end of what was known as existing socialism in the eastern half of the continent. As Nairn has remarked, there were three major strands in this upheaval against communism. There was a democratic rebellion against one-party autocracy, there was an economic revulsion against the command economy, and last but not least, there was the re-emergence of national identity.¹

The present thesis is an attempt to discuss the relation between nationalism and socialism, in the light of these developments, i.e. the end of communism, the process of integration in Western Europe and the process of disintegration in the East. The closing decade of the twentieth century has witnessed rapid transformations of the way we understand the operation of these two ideological traditions. Much of our traditional understanding of socialism revolved around two interrelated types of regime ~ the communist command economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe and the mixed economy welfare states of Western Europe. We have seen the end of the communist era in what used to be described as Eastern Europe, but also the rise of assertive forms of nationalism in that region. At the same time, the existing practice of social democracy in Western Europe has come under a series of pressures. The

¹ Nairn, T. Faces of Nationalism: Janus revisited, (London, Verso, 1997) , pp.57-8

popular socialist political movements have seen their working class base of support increasingly questioned, and the traditional statist welfare objectives reconsidered. And the developing process of European integration has undermined the very states which are required to deliver social democratic policies and legitimate them through membership of national political communities. The possible replacement of nation-states by supranational political authorities, perhaps in the form of a federal United States of Europe, raises major issues which socialist theorists and politicians have to confront.

So the major thrust of this thesis is to reconsider the relationship between nationalism and socialism, with particular reference to European integration and the changing political agenda of which this is a key part. This requires an examination of the way various socialist parties and thinkers have reacted specifically to this process of integration. But it also involves some assessment of the wider global setting to see how the socialist understanding fits with the reality of the modern world.

The approach in this thesis has been to consider socialism as an ideology and as a practical application. The analysis follows the framework on ideology developed by Manning and Robinson.

Political ideology is not the systematic investigation of our political life in a way which is rationally superior to, or supersedes, what in the past has been relied upon in determining the form of political life. It is the form of language which has always made the construction or reconstruction of political life possible or impossible.²

² Manning, D.J. & Robinson, T.J. The Place of Ideology in Political Life, (Kent, Croom Helm, 1985), p.121

I see socialist ideology therefore as the language which can make possible the construction or reconstruction of political life. My aim is to provide a synthesis for understanding the new socialist language, a language that can facilitate the construction of a socialist polity in the contemporary world. One of the major points that has struck me throughout the preparation of this thesis has been certain broad similarities and parallels between socialism and nationalism. Their philosophical roots are the same, their practices are similar. Both, nationalism based on Kant and socialism based on Marx, regard human history as a long process of struggle. They both need an actor in history. For nationalism the actor is the nation, for socialism traditionally it has been the class. They both see mankind as divided, the first into nations, the second into classes. As far as their practice is concerned, violence, collectivism, and belief in, and glorification of, the state are fundamental to both. It should not be surprising then that the dividing line between them is blurred. And if one substitutes class for nation it becomes even more so. It follows therefore that the state figures prominently in my discussion. The development of socialist strategies about the state as a means and as an end has also been one of my guidelines.

The main elements of the argument of the thesis may be summarised as follows.

It is contended that from the founding era of socialism, both its theorists (especially Marx and his successors) and its political leaders have generally failed to understand the power of nationalism. Their preoccupation with economic factors and with the state and political structures led to failures both at the theoretical and practical level in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Since then European

integration has become an important new phenomenon affecting the power and role of nation-states, which has required analysis and action by socialists. In fact both the German SPD and the French SFIO/PS dealt with European integration in accordance with perceived interests emanating from the two nation-states, rather than for specifically socialist reasons. Socialist theoreticians were slow to recognize the new phenomenon, and three of the theoretical approaches (Rocardiens, Johan Galtung and Ernest Mandel) towards European integration each failed to provide a satisfactory analysis ~ through a combination of factors including the failure to appreciate nationalism or national questions, and partly because they too were preoccupied with “statism”. On the other hand, one figure, Altiero Spinelli was successful, and that this was both because of his appreciation of nations and the importance of federalism, and because he was flexible and non-doctrinaire in his understanding of socialism. Since Spinelli’s analysis, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and growing criticisms of the strategy and achievements of traditional Social-Democracy have given rise to various new approaches in left-wing theory. These include new discussions about agencies of transformation, and the relationship of traditional socialist values to democracy and the market. For European socialists it is increasingly evident that the existence and development of the European Union in a more interdependent world must be the terrain where debates about such values must be conducted if they are to be realised.

The organisation of the thesis follows a plan to allow this set of arguments to be described and developed in detail. The first chapter is an examination of the difficult relationship between socialism and nationalism. The theoretical foundations of

nationalism and socialism are examined, and the failure of socialism to appreciate the nationalist phenomenon in theory and in practice during the period of the Socialist and Communist Internationals is illustrated. Having established these themes, in the second chapter there is an examination of the way socialist parties have reacted to the process of European integration since 1945. Because the nation-state has been heavily relied upon by socialists as the unit of change, any attempts to unite the European continent have always been looked upon by the socialist parties through the looking glass of their respective national states. The parties chosen for consideration are the German SPD, and the French socialists (SFIO and later PS). There are good reasons for doing so. They are parties from the two most important original member states in European integration. France and Germany have been the major actors in the process of integration in western Europe after the second World War. Both parties have had a long intellectual tradition and have produced constructive debates regarding the theory of socialism from the period of the First International onwards. And both, although not at the same time, have been in office during important phases of the integration process, so they had the opportunity to have a substantial input in European policy formation in their respective countries, either while in office, or while in opposition. Moreover, the way both responded to European integration was in accordance with perceived interests emanating from their respective nation-states. Although it is not part of the purpose of the thesis to review the academic literature on theories and explanations of European integration, it is worth noting that these findings on the behaviour of political parties fit well with the 'domestic politics' model advanced by Bulmer and others.³

³ Bulmer, S. "Domestic politics and European Community Policy-Making", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.XXII, no.4 (June 1983), pp.349-63. In many respects this model is a subset of

In the third chapter the ideas of several individual socialist theorists on integration in Europe are investigated. They have been chosen because they represent different schools of socialist thought and some variety of practical experience. So by examining their work we get a fuller picture of the socialist response to the process of integration in Europe as it had developed by the 1970s. Galtung was chosen because he was an academic. We deal therefore with an intellectual who was not a practitioner of politics and who had the ability, free from the daily problems and responsibilities of actual politics, to follow his line of thought without any party obstacles. Mandel, an active Trotskyist internationalist and prolific theorist, had served as the leader of the Fourth International. We have here therefore a theoretically sophisticated active politician, but one who in effect worked within a revolutionary sect and thus was outside the conventional traditional party mechanisms. He represented a strand of socialist thought that had not been put into practice and was not associated with any of the governments or the regimes in either half of the continent. Finally, the French Rocardians were chosen because they are a classic example of the traditional socialist believers who had inherited the Jacobin assumptions about the power of the nation-state, but nevertheless later had to revise their ideas when Rocard himself served as Prime Minister. As we shall see, all three approaches failed to provide a satisfactory analysis because they were unable to appreciate nationalism and because they spent most of their time dealing with the "state". The fourth chapter deals with the exceptional case of Spinelli, whose achievement was significant because he appreciated the importance of both, nations

the influential intergovernmental school, represented by works such as the historical approach in Milward, A. The European Rescue of the Nation State (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), and from international political economy in Moravcsik, A. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach" Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. XXXI no. 4 (1993) pp.473-524.

and federalism, and combined this with a non-doctrinaire understanding of socialism. His was an independent mind, and his case is particularly interesting because he had the opportunity to try to put his ideas into practice when he served as a European Commissioner and as an MEP. He is the connecting link between old and new socialism. Socialism in a transformed world is the topic of the fifth chapter. It attempts to reflect the substantial and rapidly developing recent literature in this field. This long chapter is divided into three sections. They correspond to the three directions socialist thinking has been developing the last few years. These three directions are interrelated and form a network of ideas which had to be treated together. The three sections are as follows: new socialist ideas about the unit of change; reconsiderations of the agent of transformation; and the essential distinguishing qualities of socialist theory and practice. The issues of globalization, the search for a new social base, and the establishment of a new synthesis of values to include the ideas of participation and the market respectively, figure prominently in these discussions.

The thesis examines the relationship between the idea of the nation-state and socialism, following it through a series of studies of the reactions of socialists to the process of European integration, and culminating in recent debates about the future of socialism. How can the dynamics demonstrated in the process of European integration contribute to this broader debate? This is a major question and in the conclusion some provisional answers will be offered.

CHAPTER ONE

Nationalism and Socialism: Dangerous Liaisons

INTRODUCTION

The present chapter examines the difficult relationship between Nationalism and Socialism. Firstly, it examines the history and the philosophical origins of nationalism from its early days to the end of the imperial era. Then it looks at the classical socialist thought which largely ignored nationalism. It discusses the post-Marxian socialist thinkers and their inconclusive attempts to tackle nationalism. Finally, it examines some issues of socialist practice from the First to the Third Internationals.

1. NATIONALISM

*Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as brothers into the fellowship of the Peoples. You are the bastards of humanity. Soldiers without a banner, Israelites among the nations, you will find neither faith nor protection; none will be sureties for you.*⁴

Nationalism is a doctrine about man, society and politics, which emerged in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although it seems to have been developing in the west, and in France in particular, since the end of the Middle Ages. Originally, as Berlin observed, it took the form of the protection of customs and privileges of regions, corporations, states and ultimately nations, from the dangers posed by some foreign power, universal or supranational authority.⁵

Nationalism is, first of all, a political doctrine which seeks the merging of the political and the national beings⁶. According to Kedourie⁷ the fully developed doctrine claims that mankind is naturally divided into nations identified by distinct detectable features and that national self-determination is the only legitimate type of government. It purports to offer a guide-line for measuring the unit of population

⁴ Mazzini, J. "The Duties of Man", in Mazzini, J. The Duties of Man and other essays, (London, J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd., 1907), p.53

⁵ Berlin, I. "The Bent Twig: a Note on Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, no.1 (October 1972), p.15

⁶ Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983). Greek edition, translated by D.Lafazani, Ethni kai Ethnikismos, (Athens, Alexandria, 1992), p.13

⁷ On nationalism see Kedourie, E. Nationalism, (London, Hutchinson, 1966). There other authors who adopt different lines. See for example Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), and Minogue, K.R. Nationalism, (London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969) amongst others.

proper to have a government specifically of its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state and for the correct organization of international society.⁸

Nationalism was neither left, nor right since these are concepts that appeared later in the course of European history. Its philosophical origins are to be found in the thought of Kant (1724-1804). For him, morality is an objective requirement independent from knowledge, and based on a universal moral law. This he called the categorical imperative, and it is only when our will is guided by it that we can be free in the strictest sense. Therefore, this Kantian formula of the free autonomous will, makes the individual the master of the universe. In his treatise on *Perpetual Peace* (1794) he listed the requirements for a stable international order. The first was that all states should be republican, i.e. that the laws should be the expression of the citizens' autonomous will. The second was that international law should be based on a federal system of free states. And third, that the common law will be limited to the principles of hospitality which allows foreigners the right to visit one country, but not to reside there permanently.⁹ Thus, Kant's ethical theory was translated into a political one. A few points should be noted here. From the first requirement it seems that Kant believed that the majority of citizens would never consent to a war, a claim that has yet to be verified. And from the third it seems that he advocates the culturally pure state. The great majority of the population should, for Kant, be made up of citizens, and not foreigners or slaves. For him nature has introduced various languages and religions to prevent the amalgamation of different nations.¹⁰ Three years later in *The Metaphysic of Morals* Kant transformed self-determination into a dynamic doctrine

⁸ Kedourie, E. *Nationalism* (London, Hutchinson, 1966), p.9

⁹ Kant, I. "Zum ewigen Frieden", in *Kants Werke* (VIII), (Berlin, Ak.-Auszg, 1968) Greek edition *Gia tin Aionia Eirini*, (Athens, Alexandria, 1992), pp.36-53

¹⁰ Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden", pp.63-4

by suggesting that in both, the individual and society, virtue is achieved through struggle. For J.G.Fichte, Kant's account of the possibility and the limits of human knowledge was not adequate, and he argued that the world can be nothing more than the product of a universal consciousness, transcending all individual human beings, and as such is more important than all its constituent parts. This, translated into a state theory, means that the state is more important than its parts, i.e. the individuals. It is clear therefore, that since pure freedom means complete absorption to the whole, for Fichte and the other post-Kantians, individual freedom can be secured only if individual life is completely regulated by the state which is perceived as the embodiment of the collective.

The state-compact is, therefore, a compact which each single citizen enters into with the actual Whole, which Whole results from the agreements of the single individuals with each other, and whereby he becomes One with this Whole in regard to a certain part of his rights, receiving in return the rights of sovereignty.¹¹

In such a way the categorical imperative can be achieved only through society. This theory strongly resembles Rousseau's notion of the General Will. But whereas Rousseau never offered a systematic theory of the state, Kant's followers saw it as the fulfillment of human destiny.

Observing the conditions of the various German states in the early 1800s, which denied opportunity to bright young people of lower social origin like themselves, the post-Kantians developed a detestation for the favoritism associated with the absolutism of the era. In his lectures on *The Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806) Fichte argued that, the state should capitalize on the abilities of all citizens by abolishing favoritism, in order to increase its own internal strength, and assigned to

the state the role of the promotion of culture, which he regarded as the process whereby man becomes really man.

Schiller in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, written in 1795, advocated the harmonization of every man's existence with the archetypal man who is represented by the state. The latter, as representative of the whole must eradicate individualism.¹² Commenting on the Europe of his day, he mourned the separation of enjoyment from labour and the fragmentation of the state, the church, the laws and customs, and above all of society into individuals.¹³ Later this theme was to be echoed in Marx's theory of alienation. The cure for that, according to Schiller, should be the state, which was called to create human freedom, but not from the outside and in the material sense, but in the spiritual sense and from inside. By merging their individual wills with that of the state the people find freedom, by complying with the actions and the laws of the state. Through it man realizes himself. What he calls 'the aesthetic state' asserts the will of the whole through the nature of the individual.¹⁴ As we shall see, this glorification of, and reliance on, the state has been the cornerstone of much socialist practice and policy, in both, its orthodox and revisionist varieties this century. And although the various advocates of decentralised socialism do not share this characteristic, they remained a minority voice with little influence on mainstream political parties and governments of the left.¹⁵ This march to self-

¹¹ Fichte, J.G. *The Science of Rights*, trans. by A.E.Kroeger, pref. by W.T.Harris, intro. by C.Sherover, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p.230

¹² See Schiller, F. *Über Die Aesthetische Erziehung Des Menschen*. I have used the Greek edition *Gia tin Esthitiki Paideia tou Anthropou* (Athens, Odysseas, 1990) pp.78-84

¹³ Schiller, *Gia tin Esthitiki Paideia*, p.91

¹⁴ Schiller, *Gia tin Esthitiki Paideia*, pp.167-8

¹⁵ As Nairn has noticed anarchism does not suffer from this effect. Since the principle of anarchism is that all state forms are an inhuman curse, nationalism becomes irrelevant. Marxists cannot take this course of sublime evasion because they "think politically" and admit that the Revolution will, temporarily at least, take the form of a state. T.Nairn, "Internationalism: a critique", p.37, in Nairn, T. *Faces of Nationalism: Janus revisited*, (London, Verso, 1997)

realization is not an easy one. As we have seen, for Kant, to reach autonomy man must strive against the heteronomous natural inclinations.

The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of duty and to the morality of the will.¹⁶

The Kantian notion of struggle reasserts its position. This struggle accounts for the passage from barbarity to civilization. For Kant, as later for Marx, human history is a long process of struggle, although for the first it is a struggle between good and evil as found in man himself, whereas for the latter it is a struggle between classes. And even though man might want peace, this is contrary to nature, since it is only through war that he can achieve the life of reason. Again, violence is the common denominator ~ as war for Kant, and class-war for Marx. Therefore, a universal community is undesirable, and unnatural, as it can only be a despotic one, contravening nature's will. In order to prevent the realization of this universal community, nature has introduced linguistic and religious differences among the nations of the earth. The conflict between these nations advances, though not directly, the self realization of humanity as a whole.

In 1774 Herder¹⁷ wrote his *Another Philosophy of History*, introducing the idea of diversity. He expanded on that with the *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, published between 1784 and 1791. For him diversity is a basic feature of the world and it is manifestly a divine creation. Connected with this is his theory of language, as expanded in his *Treatise upon the Origin of Language*, written in 1772.

¹⁶ Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason, trans., ed., and intro. by L. White Beck, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 144

¹⁷ See Ergang, R.R. Herder and German Nationalism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1931) and Berlin, I. Vico and Herder: Two studies in the history of ideas, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1980)

Language was born with man's attempts to express his feelings towards the things and events he encounters in his life. As such language is perceived as distinct, as the product of a particular history and the legacy of a distinctive tradition.¹⁸ This is taken to imply that every individual national culture has a value of its own, which has to be kept pure and undiluted. This view of language as being associated with distinct cultural communities indeed goes back to Herodotus, who held that the Greeks constituted one people because they were of common descent, and they had common religion, customs, ways of life, and finally, common language.¹⁹ The combination of these elements, of individual fulfillment through assimilation to the state, of struggle, of self-determination and of diversity, created the modern nationalist doctrine. In nationalism language, race, culture, and occasionally religion, form distinct components of the original national whole. Nationalism divides humanity into separate and distinct nations which should constitute sovereign states. The members of a nation reach freedom and fulfillment by emphasizing their own exclusive national identity and by sacrificing their individuality for the greater national totality.²⁰ Nations can be defined on the basis of the will of the group to form a unit, and on the basis of the common culture, at a time that these two come together and meet the political unit.²¹

Hobsbawm has observed that the nation was equated to the state, for the first time, in the French Declaration of Rights of 1795 which stated that,

¹⁸ Kedourie, Nationalism, p.62

¹⁹ Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) , pp.58-9

²⁰ Kedourie, Nationalism, p.73

²¹ Gellner, Ethni, p.106

*Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is inalienable.*²²

At that time the main national characteristic was the promotion of the common, as opposed to the particular, interest, and the common good against privilege. From this revolutionary-democratic point of view, as suggested by the 18th century American use of the term, ethnic differences were, in common with later socialism, seen as marginal.²³ At the time when the doctrine of nationalism was developed the continent was in turmoil. The French revolution of 1789 killed the monarchy and the old social order, and introduced the principle of right of secession for communities and individuals, as well as the principle that state and linguistic boundaries should coincide. These had revolutionary consequences. Language came to be seen as a basic national characteristic. For Fichte language constitutes an internal national boundary, and any attempt to mix different linguistic groups will result in national confusion and disturbance.

In 1796-97 General Bonaparte invaded Italy and occupied Venice. From there he sent agents to the Ionian islands to raise up the islanders against their Venetian rulers, by reminding them of the glory of ancient Greece and urging them to revive it. When he became emperor he continued this tactic. Nationalism had entered the vocabulary of European politics for good, and later Mazzini became its best known advocate.²⁴ He founded *Young Italy*, a secret society to promote Italian unification by means of guerrilla warfare which he regarded as the best method to achieve national liberation from foreign rulers. In the organization's Manifesto he offered his credo:

²² quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations, p.19

*Love of country, abhorrence of Austria, and a burning desire to throw off her yoke, are passions now universally diffused, and the compromises inculcated by fear, or a mistaken notion of tactics and diplomacy, will be abandoned, and vanish before the majesty of the national will. In this respect, therefore, the question may be regarded as lying between tyranny driven to its last and most desperate struggle, and those resolved to bravely dare its overthrow.*²⁵

In 1857 he drew up a map of the future Europe of nations that comprised only twelve states and federations, applying the nationality principle to nations of a certain size only, in order for them to be economically viable.²⁶ Hobsbawm calls this the *threshold principle*.²⁷

As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the nation in popular proto-nationalism is closely associated with a set of characteristics. These include language, ethnicity (usually connected with common origin and descent, seen as the source of the common characteristics of the members of an ethnic group), religion (with Poland and Ireland providing examples of the link between the latter and national consciousness), and the awareness of being part of a lasting political entity.²⁸

As we have seen nationalism as a product of the French revolution spread to the rest of the continent, in Germany, Italy, Greece and other parts of the Ottoman empire. At roughly the same time, the new world witnessed the emergence of what Anderson calls Creole nationalism. Influenced by the European enlightenment and squeezed by the tightening of Madrid's control, South and Central American landowners fought for national independence and re-defined the large, non-Spanish speaking

²³ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, p.20

²⁴ For more about Mazzini see Mack Smith, D. *Mazzini*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994)

²⁵ Mazzini, G. "Manifesto of Young Italy", in Mazzini, G. *Selected Writings* ed. by N.Gangulee, (London, Lindsay Drummond Limited, 1945), p.128

²⁶ Mazzini, J. *The Duties of Man and other essays*, (London, J.M.Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1907)

²⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, p.31

²⁸ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, p.63

populations of the colonies, as fellow-nationals.²⁹ And in Africa, according to Oliver, nationalism was introduced by the colonial masters who looked for something equivalent, in broad terms, to what they understood in the nineteenth century by the term nation.³⁰ Between 1880 and 1914 nationalism underwent a triple transformation as it abandoned the threshold principle of the liberal era, ethnicity and language came to be recognized as the main criteria of potential nationhood, and nationalism was increasingly associated with the political right³¹. Nationalism reached its peak with the application of the Wilsonian principle of nationality at the Versailles settlement, following the Great European War of 1914-18. For Anderson this brought the age of high dynasticism to an end as by 1922, Habsbourgs, Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone, and the League of Nations, which included non-Europeans, replaced the Congress of Berlin. Thereafter the nation-state became the legitimate international standard, so that in the new organization even the surviving imperial powers were emphasizing their national, rather than imperial, identity. The Second World War signified the peak of the nation-state and by the mid-1970s even the Portuguese, the last remaining Empire was confined to history.³²

²⁹ Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities*, (London, Verso, 1991) p.50

³⁰ Ascherson, N. "Africa's Lost History", *The New York Review of Books*, Vol.39, no.11 (11 Nov. 1992), p.28

³¹ Hobsbawm, *Nations*, p.102

³² Anderson, B. *Imagined*, p.113

2. MARXISM AND NATIONALISM

Marxism and nationalism coincided in chronological terms. Marx was born near the beginning of the nationalist era and the *Communist Manifesto* was published in the nationalist year 1848. It offered the credo of Marxist proletarian internationalism. Since society, in the capitalist world, is divided into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which are hostile to each other, there are no boundaries of nationalist nature between workers of different nationalities. All workers are united in their struggle against their common enemy. This universal proletarian solidarity renders all wars anti-proletarian in the sense that where all profits go to the capitalists, it is the workers that must bear the human and material cost. Therefore it is in the interest of the working class to prevent war from taking place.

According to Connor, whereas for nationalism the most fundamental cleavages of mankind are the many vertical ones separating people into ethnonational groups, for Marxism, in contrast, they are the horizontal class distinctions that cut across these very groups. Consequently for a nationalist, in contrast to a Marxist, in conditions of social tension the national consciousness would prove more powerful than class awareness.³³

Marx did not offer a systematic theory of the national question and he did not develop a proletarian strategy in this domain, since for him, as well as for Engels, both nations and nationalism were relegated to the superstructure. The nation was for the founders of Marxism, a vehicle, an economic unit, and national differences were

going to vanish as the bourgeoisie was developing a world uniformity in the mode of production. It has been estimated that by Roux that only 2 to 3 per cent of their writings deal with nationalism, and this is even more marginal from the qualitative viewpoint.³⁴

Avineri has distinguished two different *paradigms* in the Marxist treatment of the subject.³⁵ One, the pre-1848 or pre-modern paradigm, to be found in the Manifesto, and which characterizes the cosmopolitan and internationalist heritage of the socialist movement.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at last, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

*In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put to an end, the exploitation of one nation by another will so be put to an end. In proportion as the antagonisms between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.*³⁶

The second is the post-1848 or bourgeois paradigm, which sees nationalism as a superstructural expression, as a *building block* of capitalism.

In his early period writings on Ireland Marx elaborated three themes that became very important for the Marxist theory of national self-determination and which refer to

³³ Connor, W. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, (Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984), p.5

³⁴ quoted in Fisera, V.C. & Minnerup, G. "Marx, Engels and the National Question" in Cahm, E. & Fisera, V.C. (ed.) Socialism and Nationalism Vol.1, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978), p.5

³⁵ Avineri, S. "Marxism and Nationalism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.26 (1991), pp.639-40

proletarian internationalism. One, only the national liberation of the oppressed nations will erase national divisions and antagonisms and will unite the workers of both nations against the capitalists. Two, by oppressing another nation the bourgeoisie reinforces its ideological hegemony over the oppressing nation's proletariat. Three, bourgeois ideological, economic, political and military domination is undermined in the oppressor nation, by the emancipation of the oppressed one.³⁷

Connor has summarized the implications of the classic position of Marx and Engels on nationalism. Nations and nationalism are products of the capitalist era, and therefore part of the superstructure based upon this particular economic system. Nationalism is a temporary political phenomenon that will disappear along with capitalism. It can be a progressive force, before a society's development, but it is a reactionary one afterward. In both its forms nationalism is in essence an ideology in the bourgeoisie's service, first helping to destroy feudalism and then obstructing the workers from realizing their own interest. This device, nevertheless, can not work in the long term since loyalties are determined by economic realities rather than by ethnonational sentiments. Any movement, nationalist or not, must be supported if it represents the most progressive alternative. Communists themselves must remain above nationalism. Endorsement of national self-determination may be a good strategy but the decision about it must be made on an individual basis. The ultimate criterion on whether or not to support a national movement is its relationship to the broader demand of the whole international movement.³⁸

³⁶ Marx, K. & Engels, F. "The Communist Manifesto", in Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, (Glasgow, Fontana, 1984), pp. 67-8

³⁷ Lowy, M. "Marxists and the National Question", New Left Review, no.96 (March/April 1976), p.83

³⁸ Connor, National Question, pp.11-4

An issue that should be stressed here is the significance of the abortive 1848-9 revolutions. The defeat of the German national democratic movement was a disappointment for Marx and Engels who had counted upon it. In France the armed confrontation between the bourgeois state and the proletariat made clear the distinction between democracy and socialism and exposed the weakness of the notion of class partnership.³⁹ Marx condemned all liberals as cowards and saboteurs. And in the light of the 1848 events he progressively renounced the entire previous notion of the seizure of power by an elite, and dismissed the idea of collaboration with the bourgeoisie. It can be said that this distinguishes the earlier from the later phases of his thought and, to a degree, provides some of the grounds which were to be exploited in the subsequent division between communism and social democracy. The founders of scientific socialism were not consistent in their terminology. Changes and ambiguities within the work of Marx have been exploited in different ways. On the one hand the communists based their strategy on the idea of the party as a small group of committed individuals holding absolute power and educating the proletariat. On the other hand, the social democratic strategy of moving slowly and cautiously through recognized parliamentary institutions and trade unionism could be presented as the legitimate child of the master's post 1848 analysis.⁴⁰ Finally, the revolutionary failures led Marx and Engels to advance the theory of the *non-historic* nations⁴¹ (a Hegelian notion), i.e. those which have not been able to form national states and are therefore underdeveloped in capitalist terms. Such underdeveloped nations like the Southern Slavs, the Scots, the Basques etc. are intrinsically counter-revolutionary.

³⁹ Lichtheim, G. A Short History of Socialism, (London, Flamingo, 1983), pp.59-65

⁴⁰ Berlin, I. Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 3rd edition, (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.174-188

⁴¹ For a discussion see Rosdolsky, R. Engels and the "Nonhistoric" Peoples: the National Question in the Revolution of 1848, trans. and ed. by J.P.Himka, (Glasgow, Critique Books, 1987)

Consequently, their pro-independence movements should be discouraged because they would delay the forthcoming proletarian revolution as their national survival could occur only by moving backwards to the pre-capitalist period of national formation.⁴²

As Lowy observed, while the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* offered the foundation for proletarian internationalism, it failed to provide a concrete political strategy for the nation state and the national question.⁴³ According to Nairn, ...*the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historic failure.*⁴⁴

This failure has influenced the whole socialist movement, as dominated by Marxism, ever since. But on this issue Marx did not differ significantly from most of his socialist precursors and contemporaries. The early socialists shared his dislike of, and relative lack of interest, in nationalism. Saint-Simon described the nation as follows:

*The nation holds as a fundamental principle that the poor should be generous to the rich, and that therefore the poorer classes should daily deprive themselves of necessities in order to increase the superfluous luxury of the rich.*⁴⁵

He believed that the spread of industry was making the nations increasingly interdependent, and classes rather than nations, were coming to have more in common. His *industrial class*, composed by both proletarians and capitalists, was destined to create a new peaceful international order since its class interests could not be served by war. Therefore war was destined to disappear together with feudalism.

⁴² Nimni, E. *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, (London, Pluto Press, 1991), pp.30-1

⁴³ Lowy, *Marxists*, p.83

⁴⁴ Nairn, T. "The Modern Janus", *New Left Review*, no.94 (Nov/Dec. 1975), p.3

For Proudhon war was the result of the class dominated political order, as social classes are equally warlike.

*Our fundamental proposition is that the primary cause of all disruption and war is endemic to society, and that this cause is poverty. Nations and corporations, individuals and governments, commoners and nobles, proletarians and princes-all suffer hardship.*⁴⁶

Peace will come with the erosion of class domination and the abolition of its expression, i.e. the state. Although he did not belittle patriotism, he was afraid of strident nationalism that destroys narrower loyalties and strengthens the state at the expense of other social associations.⁴⁷

There have been offered two explanations for this lack of treatment of nationalism by Marx. Although they might at first sight seem contradictory, I believe they are in essence complementary. Enlightenment rationalism and Hegelianism are the two dominant themes in classic Marxist thought. For Berlin, on the one hand, the heritage of the Enlightenment is to be blamed for the absence of a serious and coherent Marxist theory of nationalism. Together with the French Revolution of 1789 it made men very conscious of change and provoked interest in the laws that governed it.⁴⁸ Condorcet went as far as to attempt the application of mathematical methods to social policy that would usher in that a reign of virtue, knowledge and happiness in order to end cruelty, misery and oppression.⁴⁹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century Saint-Simon, a follower of Condorcet, foresaw the revolutionary role of

⁴⁵ Saint Simon, H. Comte de "First extract from the Organizer", in Saint Simon, H. Comte de Selected Writings, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1952), p.72

⁴⁶ Proudhon, P.J. "The Economic Resolution of Conflict", in Proudhon, P.J. Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (London, MacMillan, 1969), p.209

⁴⁷ Plamenatz, J. Man and Society, Vol.2 (Essex, Longman, 1963), pp.120-5

⁴⁸ Berlin, "The Bent Twig", p.11

applied science and industrial organization and the human domination over nature. For Marx, the Saint-Simonian administration of things would be then achieved by the productive forces of society, the relationships of which were the main factors that determined the social relationships which constituted the so-called superstructure.⁵⁰ Under these circumstances Marx-Engels, and most nineteenth century socialist thinkers, although aware of the existence of nationalism ignored it as something in the verge of extinction.

For Pelczynski, on the other, this so-called *blind spot* is the product of the Hegelian heritage in Marxism.⁵¹ The origins of Marxism are to be found in Hegel's philosophy, which, in turn, is partly a reaction to Kant's philosophy. For Hegel most of the individual's right and duties, as well as interests and claims, are connected with his participation in lesser associations which constitute the Civil Society. This is the link between the individual and the state, the latter being the object of a person's supreme duty. Since the state provides the only standard of right there is no morality between states.⁵² He regarded the state as the means by which the nation emerges, which is the synthesis of the different artistic, religious and cultural traditions in which mind exhibited itself. For Hegel,

*A Nation that has not formed itself into a state-a mere Nation-has strictly speaking no history, like the Nations which existed in a condition of savagery.*⁵³

⁴⁹ Berlin, "The Bent Twig" , p.12

⁵⁰ Berlin, "The Bent Twig" , p.13

⁵¹ Pelczynski, Z.A. "Nation, civil society, state: Hegelian sources of the Marxist non-theory of nationality", in Pelczynski, Z.A. (ed.) *The State and Civil Society* , (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984) , p.262

⁵² Peters, R.S. "Hegel and the Nation-State" in Thomson, D. (ed.) *Political Ideas* , (Middlesex, Penguin, 1969) , p.133

⁵³ quoted in Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State" , p.138

According to Peters, Marx borrowed the Hegelian assumption that there is a dialectic development in historic change which has an *essence*.⁵⁴ But he substituted the Hegelian view that history exhibits “mind clothing itself with the form of event” and developing towards the absolute, with the view that it presented the human effort to manipulate nature by productive techniques and the different types of social organization which for him, kept pace with these developments by some kind of pre-fixed agreement.⁵⁵ He transformed the Hegelian notion of nations as fundamental expressions of “the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind” into the notion of social classes accomplishing a historic target. Marx moreover, in correspondence to the Hegelian idea that the individual’s and the state’s interests and ideals were identical, perceived the individual’s interests and ideals as identical to those of his social class. Accordingly, for Hegel’s perception of permanent war among states and of the non-existence of inter-state morality, he substituted his perception of the inevitable class-war, seen as the motor of social change, and of the non-existence of inter-class morality. Finally, whereas for Hegel history presented a dialectical progression of ideas towards the absolute, for Marx it presented a progression towards a classless society.⁵⁶

Pelczynski observes that Marx and Engels embraced only one, the conception of civil society, out of the four main elements that constitute the nationalist part of the Hegelian social and political philosophy. The other three were the conception of the state as a politically organized nation, of world history as the formation, development, decline and dissolution of political communities which are in some sense nations, and of the self-realizing spirit which, through the activities of

⁵⁴ Peters, “Hegel and the Nation-State”, p.140

individuals and the spatial and temporal interactions of national communities, develop to full consciousness.⁵⁷

For Hegel civil society has a universalistic and homogenizing tendency, which is reinforced by the conception of universal human rights, and which leads to an antagonistic relationship between civil society and the nation. Even though civil society helps man to become an individual by promoting his personal happiness, it is not adequate since it disregards his capacity for public action on behalf of common ideals and interests. The latter is satisfied by the individual's membership of a national, community which itself must form a constitutional state, where the constitution ensures the identification of the individual with the national spirit.⁵⁸ The Hegelian notion of nationhood, in contrast to the above mentioned German Romantic one, is thus seen as essentially political.

In the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx made three significant points. Firstly, he asserted the predominance of the civil society over the state, which are both seen as different forms of social life. For him a democratic state is essentially a non-constitutional one, since a state is impossible without the people who as a whole determine the common good and the general interest. Secondly, he dismissed the Hegelian idea of bureaucracy as a *universal class*, since he regarded direct democracy as a more adequate form of political life. Thirdly, the young Marx preferred a direct participatory, rather than a highly institutionalized, form of political life. As he put it,

⁵⁵ Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State", p.140

⁵⁶ Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State", pp.140-1

⁵⁷ Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.263

⁵⁸ Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", pp.265-6

*The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individual's social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution to this antagonism. The prehistory of human society closes with this social formation.*⁵⁹

Marx sees civil society as the main source of egoism and conflict. For him, therefore, real community life, which cannot be found in a democratic republic, will be brought about with civil society's abolition, and this is the task of the proletariat. For Hegel economic life exists in a broader ethical, religious, legal and political context, and economic relations are subordinate to, and determined by, social reality as a whole.⁶⁰ In *The German Ideology*, which was completed in the summer of 1846, Marx and Engels, in Hegelian terminology, made clear their differences with Hegel by stressing the centrality of the economic aspect of society, which was to become the central focus of their theory. For them History can be divided into periods corresponding to the different methods of production and forms of division of labour predominant in each of them. Consequently they came to the conclusion that all true history is that of the civil society,

*Our conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the simple material production of life, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this (i.e., civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history.*⁶¹

In this narrowed sense then, as Pelczynski has stressed, Marx saw civil society, as the aggregate of productive relations, which, in historical terms, was preceding the state and became the basis of all political and governmental institutions. He made

⁵⁹ Marx, K. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), Preface, pp.21-2

⁶⁰ Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.273

therefore a treble modification of Hegel's notion as he dehistoricized the concept, narrowed down the meaning of civil society, and reversed its relation to the state. In the course of history men manifest their basic character as members of society, i.e. as producers and exchangers, whereas their political awareness and national qualities do not constitute critical features of this character. In all historical stages the idea of political community and national identity has been an "illusion and false consciousness."⁶²

By founding their theory on Hegel's notion of civil society the founders of scientific socialism failed, by leaving it outside the framework, to pay sufficient attention to the national factor in history. By rejecting the conception of the state as a sovereign national community, they deprived their theory of a sound theoretical basis since they did not take into account the idea that state power might be, in the modern age after the French Revolution, increasingly a product of historically formed nations, or of groups who think of themselves as such. This state power protects national self-assertion and values.⁶³ It is worth noting here Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as recent examples of the vulnerability of states that are not perceived by their subjects to be the products of historically formed nations. And though they emphasized the advantages of a global community, they ignored the question whether such a society could ever be perceived by its citizens as a community and whether it could ever become a meaningful focus of loyalty and unity as nation states have managed to do.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Marx, K. & Engels, F. "German Ideology", in Feuer, Marx and Engels, p.298

⁶² Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.275

⁶³ Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", pp.275-6

⁶⁴ Pelczynski, "Nation, civil society, state", p.277

Debray has offered a novel explanation for this lack of a Marxist theory of the nation. For him the nation has been Marxism's guilty conscience, and the absence of a theory of the nation is to be explained by the fact that Marx himself never offered a concept of nature. Since he only had concepts of what people produce he could not conceive of a concept of what humans do not determine, of what produces humans itself, and this in turn explains the nonexistence of a Marxist theory of politics and culture, as both happen inside the nation state.⁶⁵ It must be noted here that this comment is contentious. For Schmidt, this is only the case at first sight, and the fact that Marx rarely referred to nature as such in his work does not mean that it plays an insignificant role in his theory for society. He saw nature from the beginning in relation to human activity.⁶⁶ It plays an important role in his philosophical materialism, and

*since this relationship between man and nature is the precondition for the relationship between man and man, the dialectic of the labour-process as a natural process broadens out to become the dialectic of human history in general.*⁶⁷

It can be said therefore, that for a variety of reasons which are intrinsic to his method of analysis, Marx failed to understand the power of popular nationalist feelings and the importance of such a political identity. The location of the fundamental explanatory factors in the economic sphere of society, and the understanding of the state as an expression of class power, did not provide room for the recognition of a possibly autonomous role for the phenomenon of nationalism. As a result, his followers faced a serious problem in developing a satisfactory theory of nationalism.

⁶⁵ Debray, R. "Marxism and the National Question", New Left Review, no.105 (Sept./Oct. 1977), pp.30-1

⁶⁶ Schmidt, A. The concept of nature in Marx, (London, NLB, 1971), p.15

Moreover, since in subsequent practice the capture of state power has been the only route to the implementation of socialist objectives, socialists have found it difficult to justify the national underpinning of the very instrument that could help them realize their “utopia”. Marx’s successors did not manage to solve the problem as we shall see in the next section.

⁶⁷ Schmidt, The concept of nature in Marx , p.61

3. POST-MARXIAN THINKERS AND NATIONALISM

Nimni has argued that the main European Marxist discussions of the national question are characterized by three *parameters*, which explain the absence of a concrete socialist treatment of the nationalist phenomenon and are apparent in all Marxist studies of the subject.⁶⁸ One is the theory of the universal evolution of the productive forces. This refers to an understanding of social transformation as a process that can be explained with universal laws of historical development. The second is the theory of the economic determination of the forces of production, which is a kind of economic reductionism. This appears in two forms. In the work of Marx-Engels and of leading figures in the Second International, on the one hand, as *epiphenomenality*, i.e. an attempt to explain all aspects of the superstructure as reflections of the economic base. And in the policies of the Third International, on the other, as *class reductionism*, i.e. a belief in the social classes as the only historical subjects.⁶⁹ Finally, following from the previous two, a *eurocentric bias* in the construction of a universal model of development based on the European experience.⁷⁰ The only attempts to break with them are the works of the Italian Antonio Gramsci and the Austrian Otto Bauer.

As Absalom has noted, Gramsci nowhere confronted the nationalist problem as such.⁷¹ For Gramsci the proletariat can achieve predominance and become

⁶⁸ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.6

⁶⁹ The political problems of the Second and the Third Internationals are discussed below in section 4.

⁷⁰ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, pp.6-11

⁷¹ Absalom, R. "Gramsci's Contribution to the Debate" in Cahm, E. & Fisera, V.C. (ed.) *Socialism and Nationalism* Vol.1, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1978), p.27

hegemonic only by forming alliances with the other sections of the working population. The term hegemony signifies the dominance of a class through all social, political and ideological spheres, and not only in the economic one, and its ability, because of that, to encourage other classes to see the world in terms favorable to this dominance.⁷² This implies a dissolution of class identities, thus escaping to a degree, class reductionism, since his conceptualization of main features of the political sphere from without this model constitutes an attempt to transform the Marxist understanding of the national problem. Discussing the Italian Southern Question Gramsci perceived the disparity between the country's north and south as a failure of the bourgeoisie to become a national class. Consequently, the working class is invited to become, through the endeavors of the Communists, the leading class which in cooperation with the peasants and other subordinated classes will build a *national popular bloc* and define a *national collective will*.

*The proletariat will destroy the southern agrarian bloc to the extent to which, through its Party, it succeeds in organising even larger masses of peasants in autonomous and independent formations.*⁷³

The formation of a national consciousness is fundamental to the creation of a truly modern national state, a revolutionary act itself.⁷⁴

The problem with this analysis though is that always the leading element in the hegemonic relation must be either of the main classes, thus the freedom from the class-reductionist model becomes more limited. Moreover, Gramsci remained

⁷² Scruton, R. A Dictionary of Political Thought , (London, Pan Books, 1983) , p.200

⁷³ Gramsci, A. "The Southern Question" , in Gramsci, A. The Modern Prince and other writings , (New York, International Publishers, 1957) , p.51

insensitive to the plurality of the national phenomenon, and the existence of various ethno-national groupings within the same state, since he took as given that nations and states always coincide.⁷⁵

In Habsburg Austria the nature of the multinational state forced the socialists to move forward from the class reductionist model in order to address the burning issues confronting them. The acute national animosities of the dual monarchy and their disastrous effects on the empire's political life, combined with the growing nationalist feelings among members of the socialist party forced the latter, with some reluctance though, to engage in experimental attempts in dealing with the nationalist puzzle, since they realized that without understanding it their political prospects were gloomy.⁷⁶ As a result the Austrian party was organized along language divisions, which in turn gave it a federalist structure dominated by cultural pluralism. Their proposal was to preserve the empire by transforming its hegemonic nature into an internationalist national-cultural federation. This could be done by a two tier representation system, a territorial and a national-cultural one, to prevent the economically more powerful German-Austrians from dominating the other nationalities.⁷⁷

Well known members of the Austro-Marxist school included Julius Deutsch, Karl Renner, Max Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, and the most important of all, as far as the national problem is concerned, Otto Bauer.⁷⁸ The school's most important

⁷⁴ For a detailed account of Gramsci's thought see Femia, J.V. Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary process, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981). For a brief introduction see Joll, J. Gramsci, (Glasgow, Fontana, 1977)

⁷⁵ Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, p.15

⁷⁶ Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, p.129

⁷⁷ Avineri, "Marxism", p.652

⁷⁸ See Bottomore, T. & Goode, P. (ed.) Austro-Marxism, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978)

characteristics were, a combined attempt to deal with complex theoretical and political issues that defied simple explanations, an engagement in a serious argument with non-Marxists, and finally the rejection at the political domain of the reform-revolution dichotomy as exhausting all categories of political activity.⁷⁹

The work of Otto Bauer on the national question is one of the lost gems of European Marxist thought, despite the fact that in his *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1907) two conflicting lines, one of a dogmatic Marxist and one of an independent and innovative thinker, can be detected.⁸⁰ In his work Bauer attempted to comprehend the concept of the nation as the result of a combination of social forces. For him the *concrete expression* of a national community is the *national character*, i.e. the set of physical and spiritual features and the similarity in the orientation of will, as found in every member of a particular national group which is not the causal factor, but the concrete manifestation of the national existence.⁸¹ What makes a national community distinct, and binds its members together, is the result of the same historical forces and common and communitarian experience ~ what he calls community of fate.

*The nation can thus be defined as a community of character that grows out of a community of destiny rather than from a mere similarity of destiny. This is also the significance of language for a nation. It is with the people I stand in closest communication with that I create a common language; and it is with the people with whom I share a common language that I stand in closest communication.*⁸² (sic)

⁷⁹ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p. 133

⁸⁰ Bauer's "Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie" has never been fully translated into English ninety years after its original publication. Only extracts of it have been included in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) *Mapping the Nation*, (London, Verso, 1996), pp.39-77. Extracts from the same work have also been included in Woolf, S. (ed.) *Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the present*, (London, Routledge, 1996), pp.61-84

⁸¹ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, pp.146-9

⁸² Bauer, O. "The Nation" in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, p.52

In his terminology the proletariat is not a community of fate as the latter signifies not only the experience of the same historical circumstances, but this experience in a situation of common reciprocal interaction. Living in a permanent reciprocal relation generates the national community and expresses itself in an inter-subjective bond which forms every individual national identity.⁸³ This interaction is only achieved through the common language, which is a precondition of such relationships. The disintegration of the shared language will result into a similar fate for the national community. This stress upon cultural phenomena is what sets him apart from Lenin and Kautsky.

*The community of communication is a close one only as far as the community of language extends. Communication community and language reciprocally determine each other: language is the condition for all close communication, and for this very reason the necessity of communication generates common languages, while the break-up of the communication community language too gradually differentiates.*⁸⁴ (sic)

For Bauer there are three kinds of national cultural community. The first, as represented by the Teutons in the period of clan communism shows a nation all members of which share the same blood origins and culture. The second is represented by a society based on social class differentiation. And finally there is the socialist society of the future where the nation is composed by common education, work, and cultural enjoyment.⁸⁵

It is clear then, that Bauer's theory represents a serious attempt to break free from the Marxist economist strait-jacket since his theory appears to provide a plausible

⁸³ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, pp.156-7

⁸⁴ Bauer, "Nation", p.53

⁸⁵ Bauer, "Nation", pp.55-6

explanation for the existence of nations and asserts that with the creation of the classless society the expansion and differentiation of national communities will be an indispensable tool for the realization of the socialist dream. This was Bauer's independent and innovative face. Unfortunately the attempt was inconclusive since he also attempted to marry it with other more traditional Marxist tools of analysis.

His historical analysis of the national phenomenon is characterized by the assertion that in every historical nation, with the exceptions of the German primitive community and the future socialist society, there are two classes. Those who hold political power and control the means of production, and those who despite the fact that their toil sustains the culture and lifestyle of national classes, are excluded from national life. Since for Bauer the cultural unity of the ascendant classes institutes the nation, then the history of the national community is the history of the rotation of the various ascendant classes. Consequently, the developmental logic of the forces of production explains the process of national integration. Moreover, since through the process of historical development different dominant classes incorporate groups that previously were secondary to the national community, then it follows that the working class will gradually be incorporated into the national community during the capitalist period.⁸⁶ The establishment of socialism will, with the abolition of the class system, result in the integration of the whole population into the national cultural community.

*Drawing the entire people into a national cultural community, the attainment of full self-determination by the nation, growing mental differentiation of the nations - this is what socialism means.*⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism, pp. 167-8

⁸⁷ Bauer, "Nation", p. 50

Bauer argued that against Engels' forecast, the non-historical nations had become more revolutionary than the historical ones. For him there are non historic nations of two kinds, the ones which do not have what he calls *high culture*, and the ones which although they have been advanced in the past are at present stagnating.⁸⁸ Non-historic nations have been brought to historic life by industrial capitalism and as a result national rivalries become more acute since *national hatred is a form of class hatred*.⁸⁹ This is the dogmatic face of Bauer, since this part of his analysis introduces a hierarchy of nations explained in terms of a Marxist class reductionist model. And whereas in the previous part he was very close to breaking with it, in his attempt to construct universal laws of national development corresponding to stages of capitalist development, he lapses back to mainstream Marxism.

It appears then that even such relatively creative members of the Marxist theoretical tradition as Bauer and Gramsci, who had an unusually high level of interest in the contribution of cultural factors, found it difficult to escape from the intellectual tradition they had inherited. Despite a few notable attempts, they never managed to understand and come to terms with nationalism and popular adherence to the nation-state. Yet this was a problem area for the growing socialist movements in the period of the Socialist Internationals. As we shall see in the following section, the leaders of socialist parties, who claimed to possess a sophisticated theoretical armoury for economic, social, and political analysis, were faced with urgent political decisions which revolved around issues of nationality and state. What decisions should be taken, and how could they be justified within the ideological framework where socialist politicians were operating?

⁸⁸ Ninmi, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.169

4. NATIONALISM AND SOCIALIST PRACTICE

The difficulties with the Marxist non-theory of nationalism can be underlined by the problematic relation between socialism and nationalism. An examination of particular events in socialist history will illustrate this point.

On September 28, 1864 the *International Workingmen's Association*, known as the First International, was founded in London. Its founders, as Lichtheim commented, were groping towards an original international working class organization. It was mainly an Anglo-French affair with a social-democratic type program drafted by Marx himself, the Inaugural Address, in an attempt to accommodate the five national sections (English, French, Italian, German and Polish), which had very little in common.

To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes. They seem to have comprehended this, for in England, Germany, Italy, and France there have taken place simultaneous revivals, and simultaneous efforts are being made at the political reorganisation of the working men's party.

One element of success they possess-numbers; but numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combination and led by knowledge. Past experience has shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, p.171

⁹⁰ Marx, K. "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association", in Marx, K. & Engels, F. *Collected Works*, Vol.20, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1985), p.12

It was the beginning of a difficult relation.⁹¹

Mazzini was represented at the founding meeting, but this was not the only paradox in the history of an organization striving to eradicate nationalism. Apart from their industrial concerns, one of the main interests of the British and French trade unionists that were prominent in the association's creation, was the support of the Polish, Hungarian and Italian nationalist causes.⁹² At the meeting Professor Beesly, a Comtean Positivist, called for an Anglo-French alliance to secure and maintain liberty at a global level, and with Marx's agreement, condemned British policy on India, China, Japan and Ireland. Nevertheless, in the report in the Beehive, the official organ of the London Trade Council, the reference to Ireland was omitted, as it came up against the traditional dislike of British workers for the Irish. In 1870 the International broke with the Beehive, partly because the newspaper systematically suppressed or ignored the General Council's resolution on Ireland.⁹³

From 1865 to 1870 the International was ravaged by the disputes between *mutualists*, *collectivists* and *communists* and the rivalry between Proudhonists and Blanquists in France. In 1870 Marx welcomed the Franco-Prussian War because he thought that a Prussian victory would result in a set-back for the French Proudhonists, on one hand, and the German domination of the international socialist movement, on the other.⁹⁴ In July 1870 the SPD abstained from voting the war credits against France. The 1871 Paris Commune had a devastating effect and in the 1872 Hague Congress socialists split from anarchists when a narrow majority of the association's General Council accepted Marx's proposal to transfer its seat to New York. At around the same time

⁹¹ Lichtheim, Short History, p.172

⁹² Lichtheim, Short History, pp.173-4

⁹³ Lichtheim, Short History, p.179

Marx broke with the British Trade Unionists, most of whom had joined the Liberals of Gladstone. The International passed away in Philadelphia, in 1876.⁹⁵

As the various working class movements began to gather strength they started thinking of creating an International organization. Following the demands of the older Liebknecht, at that time in charge of the International relations of the German Social Democratic Party, the party congress at St.Gallen in October 1887 decided to work towards a new International congress. The Second International was created at the Marxists' meeting in the Salle Petrelle, in Paris on July 14, 1889. From the very beginning the Germans, the most solidly based and united delegation dominated the organization. Liebknecht was the moving spirit of the Congress and he and the French socialist Edouard Vaillant were elected joint presidents. This was seen as underlining Franco-German socialist solidarity and proletarian unity.⁹⁶

The congress helped to break the isolation in which socialist leaders had lived after the Paris Commune and provided an opportunity for the exchange of information of mutual concern. But although the representatives of the suppressed nationalities, like the Polish, proclaimed their international faith, the Germans found it difficult to treat more backward people as equals. As the international situation was not yet alarming, the Congress managed to pass unanimously a resolution about war and peace which condemned standing armies and called for national defense by means of the people in arms. The first cracks appeared when the French socialist Raymond Lavigne proposed that the Congress should declare that workers in every country should celebrate the May 1 of next year as a holiday, so that an international demonstration

⁹⁴ Feuer, p.27

⁹⁵ Lichtheim, *Short History*, p.183

⁹⁶ Joll, J. *The Second International: 1889-1914*, (London, RKP, 1974), pp.36-7

in favour of the eight-hour day, among other demands, could take place. The Belgians and the Russians abstained from the voting and Bebel and Liebknecht added an amendment that the demonstration's extent should be decided individually in each country. But even this unclear statement was a real test of the International's effectiveness, one that disclosed the perplexities of coordinated international operations, as arguments about its interpretation at the 1891 and 1893 Congresses watered down the character of the original resolution.⁹⁷ It must be noted as well though, that fear of repression by the authorities in some countries was a major obstacle to organizing such an event. In any case, at the end the Germans had their way and the celebrations were relegated to the evening of the day, thus losing their effectiveness as at least a symbolic demonstration of international solidarity. Gradually, due to their organization, the Germans achieved a leading position in the International, so that the association's Congresses became more like the Congresses of the German SPD.

At the Brussels 1891 Congress, at the same time that anti-Semitism was emerging in both Germany and Austria, an American group raised the question of the position of the Jews. The Congress decided not to discuss this question because this would constitute a deviation and would divide the proletariat which should only be concerned with the class problem. This attitude was to be maintained about all national problems. This refusal to discuss the Jewish question and the continuous rejection of nationalist struggles deprived the socialist movement of the support of many Polish and Czech workers. It is worth noting here that at the Erfurt Congress of the German SPD, in the same year, Bebel had declared that in the case of a Russian

⁹⁷ Joll, Second International , pp.36-49

attack on Germany the Social Democrats would support their country. Moreover, when the Congress came to the discussion of organizing international trade union activity it met the indifference of the average trade union member who was not interested in international action. Even though an International Trade Union Secretariat was established in Germany in 1901, it never acquired much influence. And for Joll this dependence on the unions made the international May Day demonstrations less impressive than expected and prevented the formation of an effective anti-war policy.⁹⁸ It was clear that socialist movements which were organised within a framework of nation-states believed that their international commitments must be reconciled with their domestic national interests.

Opening the Second Congress of the International in Zurich, in August 1893, the Swiss chairman declared that it was

*a little blueprint of the United states of Europe and the future world republic.*⁹⁹

Nevertheless when Domela Nieuwenhuis introduced a motion calling for a general strike and refusal of service by conscripts on the outbreak of war, it failed to gain considerable support and was rejected. And three years later celebrating the socialists' success at the French municipal elections of 1896 Millerand, an independent socialist, stated:

*We shall at no moment forget that at the same time as being internationalists we are Frenchmen and patriots. Patriots and Internationalists, these are the two titles which our ancestors of the French Revolution knew how to link nobly.*¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Joll, Second International , pp.68-70

⁹⁹ Joll, Second International , p.71

¹⁰⁰ quoted in Joll, Second international , p.82

How this was to be achieved never became clear. The left in France had established a republican tradition which combined patriotism and internationalism by assuming the role of standard-bearer for the doctrines of 'liberty equality and fraternity.' But as we have seen, for Marx such slogans had become the increasingly empty rhetoric of bourgeois ideology. Socialists had to recognize the economic interests of the proletariat, and their political movements had to be based upon these real interests rather than such appeals. And since the existing system of states was a target for revolutionary action it was difficult to find arguments for the proletariat to act in their defence. The same set of dilemmas seemed to apply to the vexed question of socialist participation and co-operation with the state.

The success of mass social democracy in Europe gave birth to reformist political practice, and to revisionism which was the parallel theoretical development in reaction to this growth. Its chief exponent was Eduard Bernstein who attacked the Marxist economic theory and attempted to modify Marxism's materialism. For him evolution, instead of revolution, was the key to socialist success, working within, exploiting and adapting the existing structures of the state by concerted and persistent action.¹⁰¹

The connection between reformism and internationalism was made by Guesde who claimed that the International's *raison d'être* would disappear with the participation of socialists in national governments, as all ministers, even the socialist ones, would have to vote for the military budgets. Hence socialists should not participate in bourgeois governments. At the Amsterdam Congress of the International, in August

¹⁰¹ see Bernstein, E. *The Preconditions of Socialism*, ed. and trans. by H. Tudor, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Tudor, H. *Bernstein's preconditions of Socialism: the first crisis of Marxism*, Durham Research Papers in Politics No.1, (Durham, 1993)

1904, the Germans attempted to solve the revisionist debate on the international level in the same way they had solved it at the national German level. This met the resistance of Jaures who accused the German party of imposing its will on other countries. An amendment to allow for local variations in different countries was rejected. This Congress marked the highest point in the International's influence as it managed to lay down rules of political behavior and persuade one of its most important members to accept them. But this success, although impressive, included some apparent dangers as the Germans managed to impose their policy on the other European Socialists, a policy they themselves were the first to abandon in 1914 and 1918.¹⁰²

The Socialist attempt to prevent the war was made even more difficult by the existence of universal compulsory military service. The aim of socialists in Europe therefore was to abolish the standing armies and replace them with people's militias. In all discussions of the problem though, what became clear was the necessity of national defense. Under these circumstances therefore, traditional national animosities were allowed to resurface, with Jaures abandoning his internationalism and justifying French socialist resistance to a German attack, whereas for Bebel in 1891:

*The soil of Germany, the German fatherland belongs to us the masses as much and more than to the others. If Russia, the champion of terror and barbarism went to attack Germany to break and destroy it...we are as much concerned as those who stand at the head of Germany.*¹⁰³

¹⁰² Joll, Second International, pp.97-107

¹⁰³ quoted in Joll, Second International, p.114

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was the first important war between countries represented in the International, and according to Kublin, the stand taken by the Japanese and Russian socialists at this occasion is perhaps the crowning success of socialist internationalism¹⁰⁴, as members of the International from both countries concerned proclaimed the united opposition of the working class of their respective countries to the war. On March 13, 1904, the Japanese socialists issued a proclamation of sympathy with their oppressed Russian comrades, who in turn, answered in a similar tone.¹⁰⁵ At the Amsterdam Congress of the International Katayama and Plekhanov, the Japanese and Russian representatives respectively, shook their hands in a symbolic gesture of proletarian internationalism. Nevertheless the significance of this gesture was very limited. Although Katayama had claimed that he was not interested in the war's outcome at all, he was actually looking forward to a Japanese victory regarding Czarist Russia as a despotism.¹⁰⁶

At the same time nationalist sentiments surfaced in every part of Europe, thus highlighting the tension between socialist theory and practice. As Poland provided a cheap labour army for German industry the anti-Polish feelings of the German workers were intensified. In Austria the failure of the Social-Democrats to abandon their German character and to become an international party dealt another blow to socialist internationalism. Finally colonialism presented a major obstacle to the realization of the International's scope. On the one hand the socialists from the imperial powers, Britain and Holland, were put into a difficult position, and on the

¹⁰⁴ Kublin, H. "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War", Journal of Modern History, Vol.22, no.4 (December 1950), p.322

¹⁰⁵ Kublin, "Japanese Socialists", p.330

¹⁰⁶ Kublin, "Japanese Socialists", p.335

other, the right of the SPD was calling for a German entry into the colonial league, in order to sustain the living standard of the German workers.

From 1904 onwards the European socialists were very much concerned with the prevention of war. The use of the mass strike as an anti-war weapon was discussed at the German party's 1905 congress in Jena. Following the growing disagreement between the party fractions, the resolution was a compromise that left the question vague and satisfied nobody. The 1906 resolution did not make the situation any better. At the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of the International the divisions over the question of the mass strike became apparent. The French were pressing for the adoption of an active anti-war policy and the Germans were maintaining that the question should not be discussed any more, as already the mass strike had been rejected twice at the Zurich (1893) and the Paris (1900) congresses and, as we have seen above, it was watered down at the Amsterdam congress. For Joll the German position on the matter can be explained by what he saw as the strong links between the German society and the SPD. This made any attempt against the first dangerous for the latter as well. At the end the Stuttgart resolution was the result of a compromise between the opposing fractions. It contained something to please everybody and committed nobody to anything, by avoiding any specific commitments to a general strike, or any other action, while not specifically ruling it out. This resolution was to be the guide-line of socialist anti-war action. The national tensions were to emerge again at the next congress of the International, at Copenhagen in 1910. The Serbs accused the Austrians of inaction against the annexation of Bosnia, and the Germans were openly suspicious of the British as the Labour Party in Britain had, by supporting the Liberal government of the day, indirectly voted for

rearmament. The 1912 German elections produced a Reichstag with 110 socialist deputies after the party received one third of the votes with a program based mainly on domestic matters and omitting any important foreign policy issues. This highlighted the fact that while the SPD was the International's *great hope and power*, the opposite was not true.¹⁰⁷

In the meantime the younger Social-democrat leaders, Eduard David and Gustav Noske, had become more positive about the government's naval policy and from 1907 onwards Noske was, although still in a minority, advocating support for the military budget in the interests of national defense. Meanwhile, as the Germans were rejecting mass strike, the Belgian social-democrats disregarded the International's rules and, by means of the general strike of 1913 and the alliance with the Liberals, won universal suffrage. As Germany and France were the only major states with an important socialist party, and the relations between the two countries had been hostile for a long time, the fraternity and solidarity between the two parties became very important. Yet in 1913 both failed to prevent the escalation of the animosity that led to the war, especially at a time when the socialist parties of the small countries were turning to them for direction. When the first Balkan war broke out in 1912 it caused great alarm and preparations were made for an extraordinary congress of the International which took place in Basle, Switzerland, in November of the same year. For Joll this marked the zenith of the International's optimistic self-confidence and manifested the unfounded trust in the organization's actual existence, as war over the

¹⁰⁷ Joll, Second International , pp.139-146

Balkans seemed to have been prevented following anti-war action throughout the continent.¹⁰⁸ In July 1914 these fantasies turned to dust.

On August 4, Haase sacrificed his own beliefs to the solidarity of the party and followed the majority in declaring in the Reichstag the party's support for the war effort. In Austria the situation was not very different as the Social-Democrats also voted for the war credits after declaring their solidarity with the Serbian working class. And in France the socialist deputies unquestioningly voted the credits on the afternoon of Jaures' funeral. In Italy the party was divided over the issue but the majority opposed the war, thus abiding by their obligations as members of the International. In Belgium Emile Vandervelde, the International's president joined the national government. It was only in two of the countries involved in the war, Russia and Italy, that the socialist representatives remained faithful to their commitments as internationalists and voted against the war credits. Perhaps, as Debray has subsequently argued, the Italian and Russian responses are to be explained by the fact that Italy at that time was a young state, the product of a fusion of several entities and without a single and strong national feeling, and Russia was simply not a nation-state at all.¹⁰⁹ But the predominantly Marxist based socialist theories which were utilised in 1914 had no adequately accepted conceptual apparatus to explain the crisis and suggest clear lines of common action. Thus the Second International came to a sad end. The 1917 unsuccessful attempt for another International Socialist Congress marked the official burial of the Second International. According to Joll, the Germans' attempts to impose their theories and rules of action, or inaction, on the other member parties, however well intentioned, destroyed the Second International,

¹⁰⁸ Joll, Second International, pp.147-159

just as Marx and the Bolsheviks did to the First and Third Internationals respectively.¹¹⁰ But to argue that the Germans were responsible for the International's collapse is misleading. August 1914 signified the end of the Internationalist illusion and proved the tenacity of the nationalist feelings. What is of significance is to identify the shortcomings of the Marxist analysis of nationalism and the proposed responses to such crises.

For the International class consciousness and proletarian internationalism were the safeguards against nationalism, and in order to counteract capitalism's inherent militarism the International worked out a number of proposals: the abolition of secret diplomacy, the replacement of the permanent armies by militias, the promotion of general disarmament and, after a French proposal at the London 1896 Congress, the establishment of an international tribunal. But when it came to putting the above mentioned resolutions into practice, there was no organization to co-ordinate the various national parties' activities and to ensure continued international action. This was the first major obstacle to the application of a joint socialist internationalist policy. The second was, as we have already seen, the disagreement between the SPD and the main French Socialist group.¹¹¹

For Haupt, the inability of the International to oppose the war was the result of the contradictions, and the theoretical inadequacies, which prevented the organization from adopting a concrete pacifist strategy which was free from ambiguities. When in the summer of 1914 the pressure of events forced the socialists to choose between internationalism and patriotism, these very contradictions and vagueness led them to

¹⁰⁹ Debray, "Marxism", p.35

¹¹⁰ Joll, Second International, p.3

¹¹¹ Haupt, G. Socialism and the Great War, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), pp.12-7

betray their internationalist credo and ally themselves, with a very few notable exceptions, with their respective national governments. Even as late as July 1914 the International Socialist Bureau meeting failed to address the issue as war seemed to the socialist leaders an impossibility. And the German social democrats who had spent so much time on the anti-war propaganda and the theory of imperialism never seriously considered socialist action in the event of war. Moreover, despite the fact that socialists kept on mentioning the revolution that would follow the war as a propaganda tool, they never elaborated on it.¹¹² Hence, with the war looming, they were reduced to passive followers of events.

The interpretations of this failure can broadly be divided into two categories. One is the Leninist theory which condemns the leadership for betraying the workers, who consequently failed to demonstrate their internationalism. The second, in contradiction to this, regards the social democratic position not as a betrayal of the popular feelings, but as a true expression of the nationalist sentiment that was prevailing among the working classes of the different European nations at the time. The Leninist interpretation has missed the point, because by finding a scapegoat, it avoids dealing with the problem of nationalism itself. As Haupt has observed, the workers' movement's superfluous internationalism, blinded by its own ritual, language, and imagery, failed to address the gut feelings of Jacobin patriotism or innate Russophobia.¹¹³

The Zionist socialist thinker Chaim Arlosoroff blamed the vague internationalism of the Marxist tradition which, although it continually emphasized international solidarity, never produced a concrete study of institutions and behaviour patterns.

¹¹² Haupt, Socialism, pp.219-21

Thus, the political movement was left with no understanding of the workers' very real attachment to their national culture and heritage. Despite some working class alienation from society, its elites and its high culture, they were still bound to the language and culture of their national environment.¹¹⁴

Among the thinkers who devoted much thinking and energy to the national question Rosa Luxemburg figures prominently and demonstrates precisely this weakness and confusion. For her a partnership on equal terms between socialism and nationalism was out of the question. She argued that if the workers were to defeat the middle classes and its ideology, national boundaries and identity could not be acknowledged to be durable political and cultural divisions within the working class. Reformism is intrinsically bound with nationalism. Nationalism advocates the unification of conflicting interests, and when pursued by the socialist movement, generates a basic interest in status quo preservation.¹¹⁵ She denied that there was any right to freedom from national oppression, and was against the right of nations to self determination. As she stated:

*When we speak of the "right of nations to self-determination", we are using the concept of the "nation" as a homogeneous social and political entity. But actually such a concept of the "nation" is one of those categories of bourgeois ideology which Marxist theory submitted to a radical revision, showing how that misty veil, like the concepts of the "freedom of citizens", "equality before the law", etc. conceals in every case a definite historical content.*¹¹⁶

Not nations but only the workers have rights. As a result then,

¹¹³ Haupt, Socialism, p.230

¹¹⁴ Avineri, "Marxism", pp.653-4

¹¹⁵ Bronner, S.E. Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times, (New York, Columbia University Press), pp.17-21

¹¹⁶ Luxemburg, R. "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" in Luxemburg, R. The National Question, ed. and intro. by H.B.Davies, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976), p.135

*Social Democracy is called upon to realize not the right of nations to self-determination but only the right of the working class, which is exploited and oppressed, of the proletariat, to self-determination.*¹¹⁷

She even went as far as to criticize Marx for having endorsed Polish independence since it would in essence result in consolidating the grip of the nobility and later the bourgeoisie. She opposed the creation of new small states, even in the case that the working class would support such a move. Yet in her *Junius* pamphlet, which she wrote anonymously while in prison in 1916, she adopted a more moderate line and while recognizing the right of independence for every people, she also held that national wars were impossible and that self-determination was unattainable in capitalist conditions. Such a position revealed the lack of a theory which could have any practical application in the foreseeable future. Luxemburg grossly miscalculated the power of nationalism and her theory was incapable of dealing with the centrifugal tendencies of the contemporary multinational state.¹¹⁸

Lenin's ideas on nationalism were exposed in the pamphlet on *The right of nations to self-determination*, written in 1914, and originally intended as a reply to Luxemburg. Their differences can be summed up in the following way. Whereas Lenin emphasized the right to national self-determination, Luxemburg at that point denied it altogether. The role of the bourgeoisie in modern nation building was seen as vital for Lenin, but as minimal for Luxemburg. In her thought there was some place for federation and autonomy, something on which Lenin was ambiguous. Against Lenin, Luxemburg took self-determination to mean the self-determination of the proletariat

¹¹⁷ Luxemburg, "Right of Nations", p. 140

¹¹⁸ Davies, H.B. "Introduction: The Right of National Self-Determination in Marxist Theory - Luxemburg vs. Lenin", in Luxemburg, *The National Question*, p. 10

only. And finally, unlike Luxemburg, Lenin appreciated the power of national fragmentation.¹¹⁹ He defined national self-determination as follows:

*Consequently, if we want to learn the meaning of self-determination of nations not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the historical and economic conditions of the national movements, we shall inevitably reach the conclusion that self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, the formation of an independent national state.*¹²⁰

For him the national question is confined to the domain of political democracy. His concept of democracy though was never separated from the class struggle. He never attempted to define the nation since his most urgent task was to liberate the working class from the grasp of the bourgeoisie. Being a practitioner himself, Lenin did not want to grant to his enemies the opportunity to capitalise on the workers' desire for national self-determination. He allowed therefore, and sometimes supported the right of the oppressed nations to self determination in order to prevent national oppression.

*If we do not raise and advocate the slogan of the right to secession we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the despotism of the oppressing nation.*¹²¹

He had though reservations on whether the actual secession, as well as the right to secede, should be supported.¹²² Lenin, with regard to the right to self determination, divided the nations into three categories. These were the capitalist western countries, Eastern Europe (including Russia, Austria, and the Balkans), and semi-colonial

¹¹⁹ Davies, "Introduction", pp.11-2

¹²⁰ Lenin, V.I. "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in Lenin, V.I. The Essentials of Lenin in Two Volumes, Vol.1, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1947), p.565

¹²¹ Lenin, "Right of Nations", p.577

countries (like China and Turkey) and colonies proper. He supported the right of the nations falling in the last two categories to self determination. Lenin's fundamental approach follows the Marxist line. Its priority is international socialism and self determination movements were to be supported if they furthered the socialist cause. Moreover, the guideline of his thought is that large economic units are preferable to small ones as far as economic development is concerned. It follows then that the claims of subordinate nations against large nation-states should not be supported.¹²³ A few more points about the Leninist treatment of nationalism should be stressed. Unlike Bauer, Lenin paid no attention to national culture. He divided capitalism into two periods, that of the formation of the bourgeois democratic state, and that of internationalisation during which the confrontation between the international capital and the international working class intensifies. In countries that are still in the first phase, i.e. that of the formation of the bourgeois democratic state, nationalism could be seen as a progressive force. This corresponds to his second and third categories of country described above. But for countries that are in the second internationalisation phase, that is western capitalist countries, nationalism is a reactionary force that hinders the building of a strong international working class movement. While it appears that the Leninist treatment of nationalism provides clear criteria in principle, it shows the same essential features as previous Marxist analysis. The evaluation of any particular nationalist issue is subject to a test based upon a combination of economic development and contribution to a progressive revolutionary potential. Nationalism is still seen as a secondary derived phenomenon, and Lenin appears to have no appreciation of or explanation for the popular devotion to the nation and

¹²² Minnerup, G "The Right of Nations to Self Determination: Bauer, Stalin, Lenin" in Cahm & Fisera, Socialism and Nationalism , pp.24-5

democracy, which had been embraced by the working class. As Schwarzmantel has pointed out, it is not clear in practice who is going to decide on the application of the theory of self-determination at any particular time.¹²⁴ In fact, the practice in this area of Leninists (which is discussed briefly below) appears to have been dictated by the same imperatives which struck leaders of the Second International. Practical tactical decisions became simply clothed in theoretical language.

If Marx-Engels devoted only 2 to 3 per cent of their work to nationalism and Lenin about ten times that, the National question covers more than half of Stalin's total work.¹²⁵ His *Marxism and the National Question*, written in 1913, has been seen as the most methodical demonstration of the Leninist thesis on nationalism. He offered a definition of nationalism, similar to that of Bauer's.

*A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.*¹²⁶

As Minnerup has noted, there are two problem with such a definition. Being based on language, economy etc. it allows the nationalist to conduct the debate on familiar territory, thus disarming Marxism in contrast with the bourgeois nationalist. Furthermore, the theoretical yardsticks used to define the fairness of national liberation fights can sometimes create a loophole out of the pledge to the right of

¹²³ Schwarzmantel, J. *Socialism and the Idea of Nation*, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.174

¹²⁴ Schwarzmantel, *Socialism*, p.181

¹²⁵ Fisera, V.C. & Minnerup, G. "Marx, Engels and the National Question", in Cahm & Fisera, *Socialism and Nationalism*, p.5

¹²⁶ Stalin, J.V. "Marxism and the National Question", in Stalin, J.V. *Works*, Vol 2 1907-1913, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), p.307

self-determination.¹²⁷ Stalin allowed for the right of nations to secede. In his own words:

*The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.*¹²⁸

It is not clear how this view can be reconciled with the prevailing Marxist theoretical approaches. Stalin's subsequent performance when in power suggest that his theoretical formulation had little connection with political practice.

Lenin and Stalin were both more important as practitioners rather than as political theorists, and in the history of the Third International we can see the continuing problems of maintaining any consistent approach to internationalism. Founded by the Bolsheviks in 1919, with other groups and parties playing a secondary role, it remained until its dissolution by Stalin in 1943 essentially a tool in the hands of the Soviet leadership, lacking any truly international character.¹²⁹ There have been identified three periods of Comintern history. In the first the Comintern was a revolutionary tool, in the second it was a tool in the domestic factional struggles, and in the third it was a tool of Soviet foreign policy.¹³⁰ Throughout its life the organization's policies were a reflection of the apparent duality of the Russian reality of the period which, on the one hand saw Russia as the heart of the world

¹²⁷ Minnerup, "The Right of Nations", pp.23-4

¹²⁸ Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question", p.321

revolutionary movement, and on the other, saw it as a state in a hostile global environment.¹³¹

Soviet foreign policy between 1921 and 1939 was defensive in essence, although the country's self-defense demanded the encouragement of foreign communist movements which had demonstrated some potential. At the same time the perceived danger from France and Britain led the International to the promotion of the class war dogma, directed as much against non-communist parties of the left as the political right. But a number of developments from 1931 onwards, such as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the departure of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations in 1933, and the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact between Japan, Germany in 1936, and Italy's adherence to it in 1937, led to the abandonment of this line. In 1933 the USSR established relations with the USA, next year joined the League of Nations and concluded "mutual aid" pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. Later the same year and in support of the Soviet drive for collective security, the Comintern called on member parties to establish "Popular Fronts" to resist Japanese militarism and Nazism. The change of direction in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939, creating an alliance with a bitter ideological enemy, was only explicable in terms of a calculation which gave absolute priority to the security interests of the USSR.¹³² Carr saw Soviet foreign policy, after the Brest-Litovsk treaty, as being based on two opposite motives, the promotion of proletarian revolution in the capitalist world and the economic and political need to

¹²⁹ In the early 1920s Friedrich Adler attempted, without success, to re-unite the Socialist and Communist Internationals in what came to be known as the "Two-and-a-Half International".

¹³⁰ Borkenau, F. World Communism, (Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1962), p.419

¹³¹ Brown, A. et al. (ed.) The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.470

¹³² Brown, Cambridge Encyclopedia, p.473

maintain regular relations with these very states.¹³³ The doctrine of socialism in one country meant that the Soviet regime did not regard the world revolution as the primary condition of its existence any more. The twenty-one conditions of 1920 initiated the so-called *bolshevization* of the foreign communist parties and the process was concluded with the consolidation of Stalinism in Russia, to the point that Moscow was able to impose the leaders of its choice on the member parties. The extent to which foreign communist parties had become blind instruments of the Soviet foreign policy is best highlighted by the case of the German Communist Party (KPD) and its changing attitudes towards the SPD during the years before Hitler's accession to power.¹³⁴ The dissolution of the Communist International by Stalin in 1943 as a gesture of reassurance to his western allies was merely the final symbolic act in this policy.

One point to be stressed once more, is that to hold the Russians solely responsible for the failure of internationalism during these years is to miss the real issue. Although it is true, as became clear above, that the member parties of the third international were very much controlled by Moscow, and consequently by Russian national foreign policy, they were not immune to nationalism themselves. As Slavin has demonstrated, the French communists during the Rif war of 1924-5 abandoned any internationalist ideals, and shared the common French dislike for Muslim North Africans.¹³⁵

The gap between socialist theory and nationalist practice became increasingly evident. In practice socialist political leaders did grasp the importance of nationalism

¹³³ Carr, E.H. The Twilight of Comintern: 1930-1935, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1982), p.3

¹³⁴ see Carr, Twilight

and exploited it. All the 'socialist' regimes that were established in the course of the twentieth century in the Third World, from Cuba to Vietnam, were in various ways the result of the association of nationalists and Socialists, in the revolutionary anti-colonial movements. According to Debray, the only socialist revolution not apparently connected with a nationalist struggle was October 1917 in Russia. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks were able to gain significant mass support only after the national defensive struggles of 1919 and 1941. Moreover, the triumph of Stalin over Trotsky can be seen as the triumph of Great-Russian nationalism over internationalism.¹³⁶ Thus nationalism seemed to make realizable the hitherto utopian revolutionary dream. And although in theory and rhetoric socialists might have remained internationalists, it was the nationalist popular feeling that mobilized mass support for the revolutionary cause. The dividing line between the two opposing doctrines was not clear. The socialist vehicle was powered by the nationalist engine. And the colonial nationalism appeared to be compatible with the creation of state socialist regimes.¹³⁷ Most strikingly, in the real world socialists might even have to envisage the outbreak of armed conflicts between socialist states, as between Cambodia and Vietnam in 1978-79.

¹³⁵ Slavin, D.H. "The French Left and the Rif War, 1924-25: Racism and the Limits of Internationalism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.26 (1991), p.7

¹³⁶ Debray, "Marxism and the National Question", pp.33-4

¹³⁷ Ehrenreich, J.H. "Socialism, Nationalism and Capitalist Development", Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol.XV, no.1, (Spring 1983), p.2

CONCLUSION

Nationalism represents socialism's greatest failure. The lack of treatment of the national problem by the founders of scientific socialism has been attributed to the combination of Hegelianism and rationalism that run through Marx's thought. For Marx-Engels nations and nationalism were relegated to the superstructure. So, without a coherent legacy handed down from them, their successors were left with no solid base on which to build a proper treatment of the issue. This failure to understand the power of nationalism is obvious in the theoretical work of many influential Marxists like Luxembourg, Lenin and Stalin. Although the nation and democracy were considered to be capitalist products, they were in fact valued and partly conquered by the working class. The attempt by Gramsci to deal with nationalism remained inconclusive. The only socialist who came very close to producing a coherent theory for the national problem was Bauer but he never managed to break completely free from the Marxist dogma. The failures of the Internationals to become real vehicles of socialist internationalism highlights this great lack of understanding. As towards the end of the nineteenth century the nation-state became the agent of social policy and the provider of welfare rights, the European working class felt that there was something worth defending in the nation. The events of 1914 showed that in times of conflict national affiliations are stronger than class ones. The Third International became the instrument of Soviet foreign policy, thus dealing a further blow to socialist internationalism.

The first half of the twentieth century saw an enormous multiplication in the number of nation-states in the global system. Socialism had yet to produce a convincing theoretical understanding of the national question. But in practice socialists had learned to coexist with, work within, and exploit the opportunities offered by the forces of nationalism and the political and administrative structures of the state. However the second half of the century has seen a new dynamic, the development of European integration, which faced socialists with a further set of theoretical puzzles and practical dilemmas. Just when they had adjusted to the practice of nation-state politics, the state functions and powers were to be increasingly absorbed in a complex new supranational system of governance. The range of responses is explored in the following chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

European Integration and Western Social-Democracy

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I examine the way the German SPD and the French Socialists reacted to the process of European integration from 1945 to the Single European Act. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section examines the attitudes of the SPD towards European integration. In the second section the French Socialist Parties are reviewed. I am trying to identify any similarities in the way the two parties under consideration followed the developments of integration in Western Europe, given the fact that they were two of the most important socialist parties in Europe, with strong theoretical armoury, operating within the context of the two countries that have shaped the process of post-war integration.

1. THE GERMAN SOCIALDEMOCRATS-SPD.

The Socialdemocratic Party of Germany (SPD) is the longest surviving Western European socialist party and one of the most influential. This, combined with the weight Germany carries in European, and indeed global affairs, make the party a vital component of any discussion of European integration from a socialist point of view.

The SPD traditionally complied with the West European Socialist norm of emphasising the domestic rather than the foreign aspect of policy. When it did expound foreign policy views they were governed by the idea of class consciousness in foreign affairs, supranationalism, belief in international co-operation, and anti-militarism, although the first had been frequently modified by Marxist Russophobia, and the last two by Lasallean etatism. Before 1914 some enthusiasm for European unity, perceived mainly as a Franco-German affair, was confined primarily to the right-wing revisionist intellectuals associated with the journal *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. The first World War acted as a catalyst bringing the idea of European integration to the forefront of German socialist thinking. The notion of European integration was mentioned in the party's Heidelberg Basic Programme of 1925, which was drafted by Hilferding. Towards the end of the decade though, it was fading. After 1933 the party struggled to accommodate internationalism and patriotism, and Europeanism was relegated to lesser importance as the prime target was Hitler's dictatorship. The fall of France reinforced the belief that the nation-state had outlived its usefulness and that a federation would be a viable solution to Europe's political and economic problems. The meeting of a *Socialist Vanguard Group*, comprising representatives of the SPD and various socialist splinter groups,

in London during Easter 1942 agreed that Europe should no longer be organised on a nation-state basis nor should be it divided into spheres of influence. A federal union should be the economic and political task. A socialist economic and social programme should be produced. Europe should be dominated neither by an Anglo-American axis, nor by the Soviet Union. A socialist Europe would contribute towards Soviet security. Indeed British socialists should support European integration, and all politicians, but socialists in particular, must work for a European future.¹³⁸

In the war years all prominent German socialists in exile envisaged a democratic, demilitarised, socialist Germany in a democratic socialist European federation. This was an idea similar to those expressed at the Draft Declaration of the Resistance Movement, as we saw in the previous section. Hilferding for example, anticipated a central authority responsible for defence, foreign, and economic policies. He called for a revitalised League of Nations responsible for the

*co-ordination of foreign policy. This implies at the same time a certain limitation of the sovereignty of the member states. It is conceivable that this goal may be reached if the Allies' victory is on a big enough scale.*¹³⁹

In Spring 1940, the young Willy Brandt envisaged the future united Europe.

*Bringing about a united states of Europe raises the question what kind of society there will be in the various countries when the war is over. A democratic and federal solution of the European crisis depends primarily on whether the essential revolutionary changes involved in the destruction of capitalism and imperialism are in fact carried out.*¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Paterson, W.E. The SPD and European Integration, (Farnborough, Saxon House Studies, 1974), pp. 1-3

¹³⁹ Hilferding, R. "Comments on the Question of War Aims and of the Problem of the United States of Europe" in Lipgens, W. (ed.) Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol.2, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) pp.566-8

¹⁴⁰ Brandt, W. "The War Aims of the Great Powers and the New Europe" in Lipgens, Documents, Vol.2, p.570

In the summer of 1945, before political parties were officially permitted, Schumacher attempted to revive the SPD, which

cannot imagine a new Germany as an isolated and nationalist Germany, or as anything but a part of Europe. But Germany must not be a pariah in Europe; it must enjoy equal rights. A party like the SPD, which has been denounced by the senseless nationalist-infiltrated section of its own people because of its internationalism, can make this demand openly and with clear serenity...

Europe is not only a system of political balance: all its parts are economically dependent on one another, and in the last resort it is a social unity too. As time goes on, European forces will be more and more devoted to these aims. In so far as a German contribution is possible, the SPD will strive to provide it.¹⁴¹

Such an idea justified their objection to the annexation of parts of their country by the allies and their opposition to the idea of the collective guilt of their compatriots, while at the same time dressing their argument in internationalist clothes. At the same time the German Social Democrats in the UK issued a report which proposed a mixed economy directed by a Central *European Economic Committee* and administered on a daily basis by a *European Economic Commission*. Such an arrangement allowed for a coal and steel community, an agricultural authority, central banking and credit institutes and a monopoly commission thus anticipating the Schuman Plan.¹⁴²

According to Lodge the European policy of the SPD since 1945 had been governed by six main themes; the peaceful reunification of the German nation; the nation's right to freedom, democracy, and self-determination; co-operation between the European states in order to lessen the East-West tension; equality of status for the Federal Republic in its relations with its Western European Partners; the foundation

¹⁴¹ Schumacher, K. "Consequences of German policy" in Lipgens, W. & Loth, W. (ed.) Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol.3, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1988) pp.458-9

of Western security on a strong Atlantic relationship; collective security arrangements for central Europe as part of a Europe-wide co-operation and as a way of eliminating intra-German and East-West divisions. Moreover, the party's attitudes towards the Federal Republic's participation in West European integration can be explained by, the emphasis on the doctrine of status equality for all partners in the process, the wish that socialism be the main centre of activity in a united Europe, and finally the party's belief that it had a legitimate right to govern.¹⁴³

Writing in April 1946, Schumacher defined Germany's relations with Europe.

*The whole of Europe must be internationalised, not just parts of Germany; and Europe must become socialist as well; Our continent has long been a single unit from the political, economic and social points of view. Today Germans have to contend not only with the inheritance of the Third Reich but also with the fact that there is no common United Nations policy towards Germany. The political, social and psychological consequences of this fact are disastrous. German social democrats want to see Germany as a single state, a national and political whole, but not in the form of a new nationalism. Our aim is that Germany should in due course become a member, on a footing of equality, of the United States of Europe.*¹⁴⁴

The same motive can be detected in the Programme adopted by the party at its first post-war congress in Hanover, in May 1946.

Just as socialists in all countries stand for the independence of their native land, so do German social democrats. But they know that the unrestricted sovereignty of national states is a thing of the past. The whole Europe, not only parts of Germany, must be internationalised.

*German social democrats want a United States of Europe, a democratic and socialist federation of European states. We want a socialist Germany in a socialist Europe.*¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration* p.4

¹⁴³ Lodge, J. *The European Policy of the SPD*, (Beverly Hills, SAGE, 1976), pp.5-6

¹⁴⁴ Schumacher, K. "Continental Democracy" in Lipgens & Loth *Documents*, Vol.3, p.463

¹⁴⁵ "SPD: Political Principles" in Lipgens & Loth *Documents*, Vol.3, p.469

The dominant theme of German post-1945 politics had been the four-power occupation and subsequent division of the country. It follows therefore that politicians were looking at European integration through the lens of division. This was even more acute in the case of the Social Democrats since 50 out of the party's 131 deputies in the first Bundestag were refugees from the East. Moreover many party leaders had been exiles during the Hitler years. Under these circumstances, they were striving to confirm their national identity with their compatriots. And this was obvious in their attitudes towards German unification and European integration. Another major determinant of party position was the election of Kurt Schumacher at the party's leadership. He came from Kulm near Danzig, an area traditionally associated with German national consciousness and anti-clericalism, which made him suspicious of the motives of the three allied commissioners and Adenauer, all of whom were Catholics. Furthermore, he placed himself in the Lassalean and Jauresian, rather than the Marxist-internationalist, tradition of socialist thought and frequently distinguished between patriotic and aggressive nationalism. This made him perceive German unification rather than European integration to be his fundamental task. His speeches were a mixture of nationalism and socialist internationalism. His popular nationalism was an attempt to attract electoral support and to protect democracy by emphasising German national rights. Thus he attempted to hinder the emergence of totalitarian nationalism, a view that determined his relations with other countries. Between 1945 and 1949 Schumacher's views on European integration can be divided into two phases, although the ideas of German unification and equality remained constant. From 1945 to 1947 he saw a neutralised Germany as a major actor in a

Europe organised on a classical balance of power lines. In 1947 and 1948 he perceived Europe as a third force between the two superpowers.¹⁴⁶

An explanation of Schumacher's stance can be found in his experiences in the Weimar Republic and the Nazi era that taught him not to underestimate the nationalist emotions of the Germans. His obsession with the mistakes of the past led him to try to make the SPD play the role he thought it ought to have played in the Weimar Republic. Moreover, his deep mistrust of all communist proposals can be traced back to his personal encounters with the communists in the Weimar era. Finally, he never forgot the fact that during the Weimar era the party was blamed by the voters for the national political and economic instability.¹⁴⁷

An alternative approach to Schumacher was offered by the small, but prestigious group of Lander politicians in the party who closely identified with the policies of the allies and attempted to maximise economic benefits at the expense of ideological coherence. They were convinced Europeans and most of them joined the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (MSEUE). The guiding light behind this movement was Philip, whom we will meet again in the next section. One of them, Kaisen, against the official party line, even participated at the 1948 Hague Congress for the United States of Europe. The most prominent Socialist to distance himself from Schumacher's line was Carlo Schmid. He saw a united Europe realising its potential as a third, not necessarily socialist, force between the two super-powers. This was to be encouraged despite the fact that Germany's division prevented her from joining the European integration process.

¹⁴⁶ Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration*, pp.6-10

¹⁴⁷ For a discussion see Edinger, L.J. *Kurt Schumacher: A study in Personality and Political behavior*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965)

*A third power is necessary to prevent the world from being torn apart, but Europe can only become that power if it puts its house in order: in other words, its component states must abandon the principle of sovereignty, on which politics have essentially been based in modern times, in favour of a supranational community.*¹⁴⁸

Since a free market was already operating, the Socialist opposition to the way the Federal Republic was created, focused on foreign policy with a nationalist rhetoric. This was appealing to refugees, but at the same time was antagonistic to West German participation in various European institutions.¹⁴⁹

Although Schumacher welcomed the Marshall Plan the first moves toward Western European co-operation were not received equally positively as the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the establishment of the International Ruhr Authority (IAR) were aimed against a revived Germany. It was with reference to German entry to the latter that the first clash between the CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats/ Christian Socialists) government and the SPD occurred. It was the positions taken and the arguments employed in this case, in relation to the country's sovereignty in particular, that anticipated later debates about entry into European institutions. The first German reaction to the IAR, in 1948, had been invariably adverse and Adenauer attempted to build a united front against it. Nevertheless, although the SPD was opposed to it the party leadership was not willing to adopt a common position. Schumacher was ill and the party bureaucrats did not want to tie the leader's hands in the future. Following the reversal of Adenauer's negative stance, after his accession to the chancellorship, Schumacher, without the parliamentary group's approval, committed the party to uncompromising opposition to the authority. Since in his eyes French policy was

¹⁴⁸ Schmid, K. "German-French relations and the third partner" in Lipgens & Loth Documents, Vol.3, p.504

¹⁴⁹ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.12-4

designed to gain control of German steel industry, Schumacher was particularly opposed to Adenauer's call for French investment in the sector. Moreover, he perceived West German entry to the IAR as legitimising foreign interference and restricting German freedom of action with particular reference to nationalisation. And contrary to his usual view, Schumacher at the Bundestag's first foreign policy debate argued that the process of integration in Western Europe should be encouraged even without British and Scandinavian participation. This should be a union of peoples and not of heavy industries. Finally, when the DGB (German trade Unions) Executive despite some reservations declared its support for the plan Schumacher was forced to compromise. Nevertheless, his style of opposition had already aggravated some party members. The most prominent dissident was the Minister President of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen. He was a member of the party executive and a convinced European who had gone as far as to join Andre Philip's MSEUE. Kaisen advocated co-operation with the bourgeois parties and separation of the questions of German reunification and European integration. He whole-heartedly supported the latter. He accepted German membership of the IAR, and called for a relaxation of the nationalist tone of socialist rhetoric. Kaisen was eventually defeated at all levels and lost his seat on the executive.¹⁵⁰

The conflict intensified with Socialist opposition to West German entry into the Council of Europe. This reflected its continuing obsession with the problems of unification and Gleichberechtigung. The opposition was based on the issues of equality and the question of the Saar. The suggestion that both the Saar and the Federal Republic should be given associate Council membership provoked socialist suspicions of French policy towards Germany. French policy was perceived as

¹⁵⁰ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.22-33

aiming at German fragmentation. Consequently, Schumacher rejected Adenauer's acceptance of the plan on the grounds that this could indicate German acceptance of unequal status and its own division. On the other hand Schmid wanted not a little Europe but a supranational European federation based on a directly elected parliament. Such a federation should have responsibilities for foreign, defence, traffic, and even some financial affairs. He gave the Council of Europe a cautious welcome and, against the majority opinion, proposed associate membership for Germany. Moreover, against Schumacher, Hermann Brill suggested the separation of the question of Saar from entry to the Council. Again opposition to the leader came from the Lander politicians with some, like Willy Brandt, being in favour of entry and others such as Otto Bach against because the new organ did not go far enough towards a united Europe. At the May 1950 SPD Congress in Hamburg, policy towards the Council of Europe was debated. Against the party leader, Brandt found it

hard to say that we should not go to Strasbourg because it only represents a makeshift Europe. The West, if it were better organized, would still be a makeshift Europe, and the task of creating a true Europe beyond the coastal strip facing the Atlantic would still exist¹⁵¹

The Congress eventually adopted by an overwhelming majority Schumacher's position (It is interesting to see how the French socialists reacted to the establishment of the Council, and this will be discussed in the next section of the present chapter). Finally, in the Bundestag on 15 June 1950, the government's policy was approved by 218 votes to 151 against and 9 abstentions.

The Schuman Plan was announced on 9 May 1950, when the inability of French policy to contain German development was becoming manifest. The objective behind

¹⁵¹ Brandt speaking in the May 1950 "SPD Congress at Hamburg: Debate on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Council of Europe" in Lipgens & Loth Documents, Vol.3, p.546

the plan was to bring closer France and Germany. Schumacher gave it a cautious and reserved reception at a press conference two days later. The plan's basic idea was approved by the SPD leader but his support was restrained by a number of reasons: his views on how the proposed internationalisation of German coal and steel resources would affect prospects for their nationalisation; his suspicion of French intentions as facilitating German inequality; and his dislike of unification plans which did not include Britain and the socialist northern European states, and which were established upon an authoritarian system of integration.¹⁵²

On 16-17 June 1950 the Socialist International met in London to discuss the Schuman initiative and the negative attitude of the British Labour party towards it resulted in a cooler SPD reception. In May 1950 in the statement by its National Executive Committee (NEC), the Labour Party had dismissed European Unity. After reaffirming the primacy of democratic socialism and of the interests of the British people, the statement stated that,

*no Socialist Party with the prospect of forming a government could accept a system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a supra-national European representative authority, since such an authority would have a permanent anti-Socialist majority and would arouse the hostility of European workers.*¹⁵³

The SPD only agreed to sign the communique with several reservations and on the understanding that the Ruhr authority would be abolished and Germany would be given equal status.

Two months later, on 14 August 1950, at the seventh sitting of the Council of Europe, Professor Nolting speaking on behalf of the SPD subjected the plan's

¹⁵² Lodge, European Policy, pp.11-2

approval to three preconditions. Production should be unrestricted. Arrangements should be made to ensure that all participating national economies start off at the same level and with equal chances of development. (This implied that the IAR would be abolished and that production quotas would be lifted.) And finally, that trade unions should be represented both in the negotiations and the final institutions. As far as the institutional question was concerned, Nolting was against the introduction of a council of ministers, as proposed by the Benelux countries, and in favour of a supranational High Authority and a strong parliament. As the Schuman Plan came closer to realisation Schumacher's attitudes became more negative and on 20 April 1951 the SPD executive published a seven point memorandum. It was argued that there must be complete equality in the institutions and workings of the proposed community. All democratic European countries should be members, including Britain and Scandinavia. There must be planning both at the national and the community level. The importance and volume of production must be the basis of representation in all international institutions. The executive should be controlled by a democratic parliament. Power politics should not interfere with the development of national economies. And finally, that workers should be granted equality of representation.¹⁵⁴

Although at the local level some party members were in favour of the plan, the strongest opposition to Schumacher came from the trade union leaders. The opposition of the party leadership to the ECSC continued until 1953. But once the Community was established the SPD indicated its acceptance by taking up its seats in

¹⁵³ "European Unity - A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party, May 1950" in Kitzinger, U. The Second Try: Labour and the EEC, (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1968) p.69

¹⁵⁴ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, p.55-57

the Common Assembly in which it participated constructively. For Paterson the change of the SPD position from neutrality to firm opposition was due to four main reasons: the non-participation of Britain, with a Labour government in office, which would make any transition to socialism in Germany more difficult; the party wide suspicions and prejudices against France; the advice of party experts like Henssler, Baade, Nolting and Agartz who suggested that the plan would deny German economic equality; and the connection established between Adenauer, French agreement to the plan and the European Defence Community. And although the reunification issue, the Saar, and the shadows of the occupation regime, were marginal themes which would have been ignored if Britain had joined, the basic tactic of an opposition with a nationalist tone remained the same.¹⁵⁵

The invasion of South Korea by the communist north was the catalyst that brought the question of West German security to the focus. Schumacher's reaction to the American suggestions of rearmament was to dismiss the parallel between the German and Korean situations and to stress instead the social danger. For him poor social conditions offered the best chance for Soviet expansion. When Andre Philip proposed at the Council of Europe the creation of a European army Carlo Schmid, speaking on behalf of the SPD, rejected the idea. If the Allies were really short of modern weapons then West German troops could not be equipped. Such a move would give Stalin a justification for invading and would be unacceptable to Germany's neighbours. The army would acquire too much power in the weak Federal Republic. If a European army preceded a European government it could only be a coalition army. Instead he called for the raising of living standards and the creation of a European political authority. At a press conference on 23 August 1950 Schumacher

¹⁵⁵ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.65-6

explained the party's position on the proposed remilitarisation. He considered not only the military, but also the political consequences of such a development, and argued that West Germany alone, or even a Pan-European force for that matter, could not make a significant defence contribution. What was needed was the power of the United States to prevent Germany from becoming the initial battleground. Shortly afterwards, at a Party Executive meeting to discuss the defence question, Schumacher outlined the three paramount goals in the SPD defence policy. These included the promotion of the social aspects of democracy, a constant fight against authoritarianism in governmental policy, and Germany's restoration to a full place in the international scene.¹⁵⁶

The March 1952 Soviet proposals on German unity and the establishment of a neutral state led to a hardening of opposition to the EDC. The SPD stressed the importance of reunification. On April 25 Schumacher wrote that for the Social Democrats German unity takes priority over West European integration. Nevertheless, on 19 March 1953 the relevant treaties were passed by a simple majority of the Bundestag. Less than two months later, on 11 May, the socialist, and some other members of the Bundestag appealed to the Constitutional Court to decide on the constitutionality of the treaties. They based their appeal on the grounds that any German military contribution constituted a revision of the Basic Law. As such it had to be ratified by a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. The numerous legal arguments were rendered irrelevant by the Federal Election of September 1953 which resulted in the SPD losing control of the one third of the assembly's seats. Meanwhile, party unity on the issue of opposition to the EDC came under pressure. The view of preserving the status quo and continuing with the Occupation Statute, expressed by Dr. G.Luetkens,

¹⁵⁶ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.72-5

was challenged by Carlo Schmid who emphasised the substitution of collective security for integration into the Western Alliance. A small group led by Klaus Peter supported the treaties. The differences were voiced at the September 1952 Dortmund Party Conference. The conference resulted in victory for Schmid. The party called for a system of collective security to replace the EDC. It called for the abolition of national sovereignties and integration on an equal basis. It also called for the broadening of the process of integration to include more members than the original six. Finally, the social aspects of integration were incorporated in a criticism of the Coal-Steel and Defense Communities.

On May 15 the Bundesrat adopted the treaties by 23 to 15 votes. At the third reading in the Bundestag on 19 May 1953 Ollenauer, who had succeeded Schumacher, made West German participation to the EDC conditional to a number of conditions. The FRG should be allowed to work for German unity. Freedom and equality should be the cornerstones of the new Europe. The FRG should be as secure as the other members. The UK, Denmark and Norway should participate. And domestic social welfare standards should be safeguarded. Finally the treaties were ratified by 224 to 166 votes.¹⁵⁷

The most significant occasion of the SPD campaign for the second Bundestag was the presentation, on 28 August 1953, of the party document *Die Europapolitik der SPD*. It was primarily concerned with the condemnation of the ECSC, while the EDC treaty was criticised but no alternative was offered. The SPD defeat at the September election, despite Reuter's appeal for a clear definition of positive politics, did not result in a revaluation of policies. Ernst Reuter was the lord mayor of Berlin, and an

¹⁵⁷ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.94-5

advocate of German-French understanding. The definite primacy of reunification was restated.

It was the rejection by the French National Assembly of the EDC treaty on 31 August 1954, together with the popularity of the idea of Euratom and the establishment of the WEU, which eliminated any prospects for actual opposition to European institutions. These reasons, along with the increased prosperity, led Ollenauer, who had succeeded Schumacher, to drop his predecessor's emphasis on socialism at home. So opposition shifted to gradual support of European integration. In any case opposition to rearmament was expressed in numerous ways until 1958.

On 20 November 1954 speaking to the parliamentary party Ollenauer renounced German membership of the WEU, despite seeing it as an improvement from the EDC, on the grounds that it would jeopardise German unity. As we will see in the next chapter, the SFIO Germanophobes were persuaded to vote for the WEU treaty as it was the only way to prevent German reunification. Nevertheless, the signing of the WEU Treaty separated defence from European policy. As a result, it was made possible for the SPD leadership to support integration. The failure of the *Paulskirche* movement which discredited the militants and facilitated collaboration with the government, resulted in a change in the SPD's European policy. At a meeting in Paulkirche in Frankfurt, Ollenauer, Reuter and Heinemann, amongst others, launched a *German Manifesto* with a more pro-integrationist character. They called for an end to military integration with the West because it would hurt German unity. But this was not the only cause for this change of heart. It was further facilitated by a number of reasons: the pro-European attitude of the trade unions; the relaxation of tension over the Saar; the influence of the European Assemblies; the failure of the earlier

policy which was at odds with popular German opinion; the strong Europeanism of certain party functionaries which culminated in the November 1953 Frankfurt meeting, where 120 delegates adopted a pro-European communique; the Messina Resolutions which appealed to the SPD; and last, but not least, the influence of Monnet himself.¹⁵⁸

The change in the party's attitudes was signalled by the entry into Jean Monnet's Action Committee, in October 1955. This signalled a reversal of priorities, as reunification was relegated to a secondary issue in the SPD's European policy. From now on, as Monnet wrote,

*the German social democrats became the most dedicated advocates of the Community, which they had opposed at its creation.*¹⁵⁹

So the party lost all taste for opposition on European issues. On the proposed Economic Community, its attitudes on economic organisation were similar to those of the socialist parties of the other member countries and indistinguishable from those of the CDU's left. And as we saw earlier, Spaak, who headed the committee that was established at Messina, was a socialist. The commitment to reunification weakened to a simple wish so that all that survived of Schumacher's heritage was a bitter suspicion of the French among some party members. On 24 June 1957 the SPD Parliamentary Party decided to support ratification and on 5 July the Bundestag, by a large majority, ratified the Rome Treaties. The Bundesrat, unanimously, followed suit two weeks later.

In his analysis of the party's European policy between 1949 and 1957, Paterson observed that it was determined mainly by domestic considerations and no European

¹⁵⁸ Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, pp.115-25

institution had a major impact on policy formation. It was rather the lack of progress towards German reunification that facilitated the change in party direction.¹⁶⁰

Since all foreign policy questions were dependent on their repercussions on *Deutschlandpolitik* the SPD viewed negatively the process of European integration. It was forced to change this attitude as European integration became more popular in both the ideal and the practical levels. Long term devotion to a unified Germany was not abandoned however. From a socialist point of view, the SPD's future positive contribution to European integration was to be the interest in the Third World and, more important, the concentration on democratic norms.

The party's very positive attitude towards European integration during the 1960s was an interplay of internal and external factors; the rise of the reformists in the party and the adoption of the Godesberg Program in 1959; the adaptability which resulted in bipartisanship in the form of the coalition government; and finally, the choice of Willy Brandt as the prospective chancellor candidate for the 1961 general election.¹⁶¹ Following the signing of the Rome Treaties, and up to 1973, the SPD's European policy had been dominated by four themes: the feud between the Community institutions and President de Gaulle, changing attitudes to the institutional form of the Communities, the position of third countries, and the relationship between its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik.¹⁶²

Adenauer's identification with Gaullist policies was criticised by the SPD in the name of the values it had previously attacked, i.e. European integration and fixed attachment to Atlanticism. In this the SPD was close to the SFIO position. The

¹⁵⁹ Monnet, J. *Memoirs*, trans. by R. Mayne, foreword by R. Jenkins, (London, Collins, 1978), p.432

¹⁶⁰ Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration*, pp.130-1

¹⁶¹ Lodge, *European Policy*, p.26

¹⁶² Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration*, p.141

Franco-German Friendship Treaty, negotiated at the time of the French veto on the British application to join the Community, was perceived as endangering European integration and Atlantic solidarity and omitting German reunification, which could only be achieved with American help. But a different and contradictory perspective was offered by Brandt who, in May 1964, supported the Gaullist attack on supranationality for facilitating East-West rapprochement as a strong Community would not be welcomed by the eastern block.

Throughout the period the party had been preoccupied with the promotion of the democratic principle in the European institutions. It was the SPD which engineered the European Parliament resolution for the direct financing of the Community which sparked the 1965 crisis. While in power, as the junior partner in the Grand Coalition of 1966-9, the party's European policy was formed by Brandt. As foreign minister he was more interested in promoting *Ostpolitik*, and therefore preferred pan-European institutions to the Western Federal model.

The party's opposition to de Gaulle involved a very positive attitude towards Britain and the US. The identification with the US can be explained by various motives. The position of Berlin and other strategic questions were one of them. Moreover, German survival was dependent upon British and American military support. On the domestic electoral front now, at a time when Adenauer was identifying with de Gaulle, the SPD could exploit German pro-American feelings. Finally, the party's lack of commitment to the farmers who were not SPD supporters, made the CAP not a vital issue. At the same time, the commitment to British entry can be explained by the desire for EEC-EFTA rapprochement.

Finally, three periods of Social-Democratic policy have been identified. In the first years of the Federal Republic *Westpolitik* and *Ostpolitik* were seen as interconnected. After 1959 the SPD emphasised the *Westpolitik*. And in the mid-1960s Brandt's perception of a European Peace Order meant that the importance of the EEC should be relegated to a secondary position since a strongly supranational Community would hinder the development of East-West relations.¹⁶³

Discussing the SPD's European policy in the 1960s, Lodge observed that it had remained devoted to its major long-term aim although the stress had shifted from reunification of the two German states to the concept of preserving the central unity of the German nation.¹⁶⁴ As Paterson has noticed, SPD support for European integration was primarily highlighted in the early 1960s for two reasons. The Berlin crisis had destroyed the *Deutschlandpolitik*, and leading SPD parliamentarians saw a pro-European policy as a way of achieving a coalition with the CDU/CSU. After 1966 though Brandt was forced to re-examine his policy because, although he did not view the *European Peace Order* as an alternative to the Community, such a policy towards the East affected the *Westpolitik* by marking a change in the single-minded quest for Western unity.¹⁶⁵

In the seventies the attitudes of the SPD towards Community political integration oscillated between support for the idea of a federal Europe and pragmatic co-operation. This incoherence mirrored the scepticism as to how the participation of the Federal Republic in a federal, as opposed to confederal Community, might affect its capacity to sustain interest in the concept of maintaining German national unity.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration*, pp.144-51

¹⁶⁴ Lodge, *European Policy*, p.36

¹⁶⁵ Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration*, pp.181-2

¹⁶⁶ Lodge, *European Policy*, pp.40-1

The recession in the early seventies led Brandt to advocate the idea of a two-speed Europe. His successor, Schmidt, continued to avoid supranational political integration that could entail substantial reduction of the national government's power to control the process itself. The SPD policy towards integration was contradictory. On the one hand, the party accepted the renaming of the Davignon committee the 'political committee' as the committee was seen as symbolising cooperation and not institutionalisation of political integration. On the other hand, it also accepted the intensification of summitry and the regularisation of *European Councils*, which demonstrated the intention of national governments to cooperate in solving problems within a supranational framework. The party's support of the Community's external solidarity was prescribed by the conviction that national interests, if justified by the Community's support of parallel and identical ones in partner states, promote the fulfilment of German national wishes. Moreover, the 1972 agreement between Heath and Brandt for a community policy on international monetary problems was made on individual national monetary considerations.¹⁶⁷

Similarly, as far as democracy in the EEC is concerned, established SPD domestic preoccupations were extrapolated to the Community. These included democratic control over political decision makers and codetermination in industrial matters. Also included were social welfare, economic democracy, and equality of opportunity. On the promotion of a common social policy, two German national interests met. There was the concern lest the flow of *hot* money to West Germany interfere with national stabilisation measures and antagonise EMU prospects and the German workers. And the unions' projected, to the Community level, their concerns with inflation control

¹⁶⁷ Lodge, *European Policy*, pp.44-7

and job security. These led them to demand the right to be consulted prior to mergers.¹⁶⁸

Moreover, the SPD was clear only in respect to supporting a general connection between the advancement of economic and political democracy. Although the proposition that the European Parliament should be given powers to compensate for the diminution in the control powers of the national parliaments was given verbal support, the shortage of relevant proposals meant that the party leadership was happy with the continuation of national executive control over Community decision making. Brandt's chancellorship, despite the party's good intentions with regard to the acceleration of the process of European integration, was characterised by basic incompatibilities in its approach to the problems posed by the Federal Republic's integration in the Community and the desire for German reunification within the environment of East-West co-operation.¹⁶⁹

As Telo has noted, Brandt could not be accused of nationalism. As a result he was free to promote policies that were free of any old nationalistic element. So, given the fact that there was a progressive evolution in this direction for some time, the SPD's opposition to European integration turned to positive support.¹⁷⁰ In his first term as Chancellor, Brandt paid less attention to European integration than Ostpolitik. Following the conclusion of the main treaties with the East, Brandt shifted his emphasis to the West. In his second Governmental Declaration of 18 January 1973 he stated that his paramount aim would be European Union, but albeit an economic one

¹⁶⁸ Lodge, European Policy, pp.53-5

¹⁶⁹ Lodge, European Policy, pp.63-7

¹⁷⁰ Telo, M. "The SPD: Between Europe and Modell Deutschland", Telos, no.80 (Summer 1989), p.131

in inter-governmental terms.¹⁷¹ The final objectives of his European policy remained vague. His failure to live up to his rhetoric by making the necessary financial sacrifices weakened the appeal of the European ideal to the party and the German people in general.

The SPD's concern with the problem of pan-European co-operation and collective central European security can be explained by the wish for German reunification by means of civilian power and in terms of West Germany's geopolitical position. German reunification had to be achieved with a delicate balance taking into account both internal and external factors and concerns. German rearmament would be difficult to digest, so the solution was to be found in the stressing of Germany's role as a civilian power, and by collective management of Germany's defense problem. So while in office Brandt supported the development of the Community's defense dimension. At the same time though he was conscious that any moves in that direction could be seen by Moscow as a continuation of the policy of strength. Brandt claimed that the West was obliged to work for German reunification. This could only be done by means of Europeanization of the German problem. And this because by surrendering reunification to operational causes concerned with European integration and peace preservation, the Germans have made sacrifices for Europe. This of course was a plea for self-justification with little appeal in other member states. German unification would not have been a very popular idea throughout the continent at the time.

*(T)he preservation of peace has precedence over the question of the nation. This is a service which the German people renders the European peoples.*¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ This can be associated with the growing authority of Schmidt in the party and the government.

¹⁷² quoted in Lodge, European Policy, p.74

The Europeanization of German reunification has partly been realised by placing it within the environment of a central European collective security system. Meanwhile alignment with NATO continued to be the *sine qua non* of the SPD's European policy. Moreover, whereas the idea of a central European nuclear-free zone was given some thought in the early 1970s, it never became a central one since it could be seen as threatening FRG's solid NATO links.

With the SPD in power we can distinguish between the Federal Government's European policy, and the party's policies developed with reference to its programme for the construction of a model Europe. The government's predominance over the party can be verified by the relative overshadowing of Brandt by Schmidt, in the European context, since the latter replaced the first as chancellor. The SPD attitude on Europe has remained, in broad lines, the same since the change took place.

Schmidt's elevation brought a change more in emphasis than in substance with a concentration on Westpolitik as West German prosperity was linked with western developments. As Friedrich put it, Schmidt has always been *European* out of German national interest, and *Atlantic* for Europe's sake¹⁷³. His government's declaration of May 17, 1974 is indicative of his European motivations:

*For we know that our wealth depends also on the well-functioning and the continuation of the European Community and the Common Market.*¹⁷⁴

Schmidt's perception of Europe was founded on an accommodation between individual nation-states, unlike party declarations of the mid-1960s which were calling for an extension of the Commission's powers. Party pronouncements on

¹⁷³ Friedrich, P. "The SPD and the politics of Europe: from Willy Brandt to Helmut Schmidt", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.13, no.4, (June 1975), p.434

¹⁷⁴ quoted in Friedrich, "SPD and the politics of Europe", p.435

Europe at the time were confined to a few very cautious and short-term statements in the context of world politics and economy. And unlike Brandt, who was more accommodating towards his Community partners, Schmidt was prepared to use German power to the advancement of both the Federal Republic and the Community. He managed to accelerate Community economic and political integration, and he generated further spillover by emphasising a minimum, co-ordinated, if not integrated approach to economic and monetary problems.¹⁷⁵

Schmidt's preoccupation with realistic issues was apparent despite the fact that the *Second Draft of an Economic-Political Orientation Frame for the Years 1975-1985*, adopted by the party leadership on 1st February 1975, asked for the transfer of sovereign rights to democratically organised supranational institutions, and for the direct elections to the European Parliament which should be entrusted with controlling powers. As Jenkins mentions in his European Diary, Schmidt was favourable to Jenkins' proposals for a substantial increase in the Communities' borrowing role.¹⁷⁶

The change of emphasis is clear when one considers Brandt's promise, at the 1970 Saarbrücken congress, to make Europe the world's socially most advanced large area. In the same spirit one can see the 1973 congress resolution which demanded a link between economic and social progress and called for the wage-earners' interests to become central in the Community's work. Schmidt's policies can be characterised by the belief that partnership offers the best opportunities. By making the EC part of his

¹⁷⁵ Lodge, *European Policy*, pp.87-8

¹⁷⁶ Jenkins, R. *European Diary 1977-1981*, (Glasgow, Collins, 1989), p.68

political calculation which concerns German national interests he diminished the old boundary between domestic and foreign policies.¹⁷⁷

The SPD gave critical support to the 1976 Tindemans Report on European Union, claiming that some of its provisions can be traced back to old SPD ideas. And although it proposed some changes to stress social democratic considerations, it embraced its general aim. At the November 1977 Hamburg conference the party emphasised once more its support for a federal European Union, with a democratic constitution, and called for a more powerful, directly elected parliament. In December 1978, the party held a European Congress in Cologne, and adopted a European election manifesto for the forthcoming elections. It demanded an *EC Charter of Civil Rights, humane and balanced growth*, measures to safeguard full-employment, economic convergence, a European Monetary Fund, as well as an increase in the parliament's powers and the abolition of the unanimity principle at the Council decisions.¹⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the preoccupation with German affairs was obvious. The main campaign slogan was: *Spokesmen for Germany - respected throughout Europe: Social Democrats Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt - SPD*. The Schmidt coalition government continued to support further Community integration and it was his Free Democrat Foreign minister, Genscher, who in 1981 with his Italian counterpart Colombo launched the initiative that bears their names, and which has been discussed in the first section of the present chapter. Here it should be noted that coalition government in the FRG meant that the pro-European attitudes of Genscher's Free Democrats had a great impact in German attitudes towards European

¹⁷⁷ Friedrich, "SPD and the politics of Europe", pp.437-9

integration. Nevertheless the chancellor remained preoccupied with the recession and the community's budgetary problems. Meanwhile, the SPD backed the applications of the Mediterranean countries, partly because of Socialist internationalism, partly to increase its own influence among weaker European parties.¹⁷⁹

After losing power in 1982 the SPD leadership became more positive on European policy. Kohl was criticised for not pushing his counterparts hard enough and for not achieving results. When the debate on European Union came to the forefront at the July 1985 Milan Council, the party made clear its support on this issue. So, in contrast to the early phases of European integration, the German Social-Democrats identified themselves with the goal of European unity.¹⁸⁰ One explanation for this can be found in the fact that when in opposition the SPD could afford to become more internationalist whereas when in office it had to operate within the constraints of the governmental responsibilities and the protection of the German national interests. Another one can be found in the fact that following Mitterrand's election to the French presidency a socialist government was in power in France in the 1980s, and this trend was followed by the election of socialist parties into power in a number of European countries.

The party's 1984 European manifesto called for institutional reform: to give the parliament more budgetary powers, and the rights to initiate legislation; to co-determine community policies, and to consultation before the appointment of a new commission; to force the Council of Ministers to reach decisions by set deadlines and to limit its power to change or veto legislation; to increase popular participation in

¹⁷⁸ Featherstone, K. Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988), pp.156-7

¹⁷⁹ Featherstone, Socialist Parties, pp.158-60

¹⁸⁰ Featherstone, Socialist Parties, pp.162-3

the policy making process, and to establish a common voting system in subsequent European elections.¹⁸¹

Writing in 1989 Telo observed that, although in June 1986 it looked that the party would adopt a pro-European stance in the forthcoming program to replace the famous Bad Godesberg text, a tendency pulling towards the direction of German national modernisation can be detected. So, among the new SPD ideas, proposals for German isolationism can be found which can be explained by a number of reasons. In Germany there is a strong national Keynesianism which was rooted in the civil service and the big industrial labour unions (as we will see in the next section national Keynesianism is not an option anymore in the modern interdependent world). At the same time a new left ecosocialism, which required measures that could not be extended to the rest of the Community, had started to emerge. Another reason can be found in the unification of fiscal policies that could lead to the abolition of measures hitherto essential to encourage qualitatively different consumption and production criteria. There was also the fear that the implementation of the minimal threshold would entail a net loss for West German workers. Finally Glotz's repositioning of the Mitteleuropa notion, which can be traced back to Karl Renner's *interstate internationalism*, was seen as leading to German hegemony of the area and the weakening of the Community's political unity.¹⁸² And despite the fact that in the mid-eighties some like Oskar Lafontaine were more interested in the nuclear issue than in European integration, especially after the success of the Greens, the party's

¹⁸¹ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.161

¹⁸² Telo, *SPD* pp.134-8

official policy declarations indicate that it had paid more attention to the need for European unity.¹⁸³

Writing on the Community's future, just before the 1989 European elections, Hans-Jochel Vogel the SPD's president called, for majority voting in the Council, a common European transport policy, strengthening the Community's executive powers in competition policy, an independent central bank and a uniform European currency.¹⁸⁴ Finally, he promised

*to continue to strive to ensure that the European parliament obtains the rights of participation which the national parliaments have long since lost in many areas of European policy-making.*¹⁸⁵

And at around the same time he identified three major problems, in the realm of security, the persistence of unemployment and the destruction of environment. They all must be tackled jointly at the Community, if a lasting satisfactory solution is to be found. Furthermore he asked for an increased role for the European Parliament and an international decision making structure to deal with the internationalised problems of the era.¹⁸⁶ And concluding he wrote:

*To fulfil this role, Europe does not need to become a superpower. It can do so by wielding its economic importance, as well as its tradition of ethics and the experience it has gained in two thousand years of history - sometimes through serious errors and tragic bloodshed. Europe must find a new unity.*¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ Featherstone, Socialist Parties p.163

¹⁸⁴ Vogel, H.J. "The Challenge of 1992" in Dankert, P. & Kooyman, A. (ed.) Europe without Frontiers: Socialists on the Future of the European Economic Community, (London, Cassell, 1989) pp.85-97

¹⁸⁵ Vogel, "Challenge of 1992", p.109

¹⁸⁶ Vogel, H.J. "Europe between the Dream and the Reality", Contemporary European Affairs, Vol.1, no.1/2 (1989), pp.46-54

¹⁸⁷ Vogel, "Europe between" p.55

The analysis of the previous narrative demonstrates certain points. The European policy of the SPD can be divided into various periods. In the Federal Republic's first years the dominant theme was German unification and Westpolitik and Ostpolitik were seen as interconnected. After 1959 Westpolitik was emphasised. SPD support for European integration was primarily highlighted in the early 1960s for two reasons. The Berlin crisis destroyed the Deutschlandpolitik, and leading SPD parliamentarians saw a pro-European policy as a way of achieving a coalition with the CDU/CSU. In the mid-1960s Brandt's perception of a European Peace Order meant that European integration was seen as secondary since a strong supranational community would derail East-West reapproachment. After 1966 Brandt was forced to re-examine his policy. That was because, although it was clear that the support for the *European Peace Order* was not seen by Brandt as an alternative to the Community, such a policy towards the East affected the Westpolitik. It marked a change in the single-minded quest for Western unity. Contradictions and ambiguities in Social-democratic European policy can be observed despite persistence of major goals; and from Adenauer to Schmidt reunification is unwelcome if it requires withdrawal from West European treaties. Following Kohl's ascendancy to power, and free from the responsibilities of government, the Social Democrats were able to claim the moral high ground again and advocate a more federalist policy.

It can be said therefore, that throughout the post-war period the SPD has put the interests of the German state, as it has perceived them, above any socialist internationalist ideas, and any differences in the policies pursued can be explained by the different approaches various people adopted towards the same end, ie. the promotion of German interests and the need to win elections. When European integration came to be regarded as a means of serving national-statist interests, it was

something worth fighting for. In any case it seems that the SPD is nowadays aware of nationalism's power. This confusion can be seen in the problem of rhetoric, and of the vocabulary used, in the arguments about the German state and the German national interests.

2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FRENCH SOCIALISM

According to Criddle, the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, SFIO) represented the essential socialist dilemma of orthodoxy vs revisionism in the tension between its respective wings. Of all the European socialist parties it was the one which despite strongly expressed resistance to reformism has, in practice belied its own words. On top of that French socialism had suffered from the peculiar lack of consensus on fundamentals. This meant that the party had to wage war on the communists on the one hand, and on the *petit-bourgeois anti-statists of the Right* on the other. Meanwhile, it had to use a revolutionary rhetoric, to satisfy Marxist followers, and to press for mild specific reforms to satisfy the liberal ones, thus limiting its own room for manoeuvre.¹⁸⁸

Featherstone has divided the French socialists' approach to Europe into four periods. The first, from the 1929 Briand initiative until the post-war liberation, symbolises socialist ambitions for greater European co-operation. The second, from 1947 until the late 1960s when the SFIO was disbanded, was a period dominated by an opportunist reformism and the party's partnership with Centre parties while the French Communist Party (PCF) remained excluded. The third, from the birth of *Partie Socialiste* (PS) until Mitterrand's election in 1981, is characterised by the adoption of a left-wing rhetoric and closer relations with the PCF, and the evolution

¹⁸⁸ Criddle, B. Socialists and European Integration: A Study of the French Socialist Party, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.9-16

of a new European policy. And finally, since 1981, a period covering the experience, and the difficulties, of office.¹⁸⁹

The SFIO supported the general idea of the Briand initiative although, writing in *Le Populaire*, Leon Blum detected the plan's contradiction of advocating a European federation while national sovereignty remained intact, and emphasised its political aspects and the need for disarmament. As prime minister in 1936-7 Blum promoted European co-operation through the creation of a political and economic solidarity and calls for disarmament. During the war he championed the idea of a super-state dominating individual national sovereignties.¹⁹⁰

At the June 1943 reconstitution of the SFIO, its executive committee following Blum's universalism called for a world society, while French fears of Germany were present.

This world society should be equipped with real economic and political powers. It must be a superstate, with power to enforce its decisions, and not be bound by outworn formulae of political non-intervention....

We must destroy the German military machine, assist the popular revolution, solve the agrarian problem, abolish heavy industry, socialise the Junker estates, and so on. Without prejudice to German unity, which is an undeniable fact, we must establish a federal regime which will do away with Prussian predominance, and must supervise political institutions and the educational system.¹⁹¹

In the December 1943 proposal for a common Resistance programme, the SFIO inspired by Blum and assuming that nationalism had led to Nazism and that it would be impossible to introduce socialist reforms in isolation within the nation-state,

¹⁸⁹ Featherstone, K. Socialist Parties and European Integration: a comparative history, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988) pp.107-8

¹⁹⁰ Featherstone, Socialist Parties pp.109-10

¹⁹¹ Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1 p.305

called for a United Socialist States of Europe as a first step towards a United States of the World. Again though the German problem was apparent.

The political and social democracy that we intend to build in France will not be viable or stable unless it is integrated into a European order, or rather, since the present war has diminished Europe's place on the map of the world, a universal order....

...Germany should be rendered for ever incapable of repeating her policy of expansion by force of arms...

The only way to resolve this contradiction and make Germany harmless in a peaceful and stable Europe is to incorporate the German nation in an international community powerful enough to re-educate her, discipline her, and if necessary master her.¹⁹²

In March 1944, the Socialist Party at Algiers published the Government Action Programme. In order to avoid offending the Communists though, no mention was made of a European super-state.¹⁹³ Blum saw the individual countries' interests as interlinked with those of the other European countries and even of the world as a whole. He perceived Socialism as the realisation of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity that could only be achieved within an international environment which could be utilised to control Germany.

Faithful to its traditional policy, the Socialist Party declares that the condition for a just, lasting and prosperous peace consists in the political and economic co-operation of all free peoples, that is to say a world organisation for collective security founded in justice. This organisation must not be placed under the hegemony of one or more great powers, but must be a federation of free nations each of which must yield part of its sovereignty to a higher organisation with its own authority, possessing a budget and an army sufficient to ensure the security of all...

¹⁹² Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1 p.333-4

¹⁹³ "Our Programme of Government Action", published in *Fraternite*, the official weekly of the party, on March 5, 1944. Lipgens, Documents, Vol.2 pp.318-9

*Only within this framework can effective measures be taken to permit the future integration of Germany, reformed in its structure and mentality, into the civilised community from which it has been cut off by Nazi barbarism.*¹⁹⁴

Philip advanced the concept of the big market, i.e. the idea that only a large market of more than 200 million people with a minimal reliance on imports could be sufficiently autonomous to follow a successful independent social and economic policy, something that could not be accomplished by the individual European states¹⁹⁵.

After the war the SFIO was not a passive witness in the process of Western adjustment. Blum was the ambassador-extraordinary who negotiated the *Washington Agreement* of May 1946 which was decisive in anchoring France in the Western camp¹⁹⁶. As we saw in the previous section this was not the case with the German Social Democratic leader. Whereas Blum was western orientated, Schumacher was looking to the east. Blum justified his western orientation as compatible with internationalist socialist objectives since, as he saw it, the threat was coming from the Soviet Union which was

*working to set up national sovereignties, which actually resuscitated the interests, instincts and dangers of economic nationalism and could lead to the emergence of two antagonistic blocs.*¹⁹⁷

In 1947 Blum rallied support for the Marshall Aid proposal on the basis that the resulting organisation would be a step towards a supranational international

¹⁹⁴ "Socialist Party (SFIO): Manifesto 12 Nov. 1944" in Lipgens & Loth, *Documents*, Vol. 3 p.25

¹⁹⁵ Criddle, *Socialists* pp.25-7

¹⁹⁶ Newman, M. *Socialism and European Unity: The dilemma of the Left in Britain and France*, (London, Junction Books, 1983) p.16

¹⁹⁷ quoted in Newman, *Socialism* p.17

community. At the same time Schumacher, the leader of the German SPD, as we have seen, welcomed the Marshall Plan.

The party's leading European was Andre Philip, and his position was unquestionably on the right. He was the guiding light behind the creation of *The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe*, the pressure of which led to the convening by the SFIO, in May 1948, of the *Conference Socialiste de Paris et les Etats-Unis d'Europe*. It was attended by delegates from 15 socialist parties and defined the United States of Europe in terms of a supranational entity involving the delegation of national sovereignty.

It is worth mentioning however, that Blum's advice to the conference was that the European idea should not be allowed to substitute itself for, but rather be seen as a step towards, the international socialist idea, which should be the final aim. And although any reference to socialist objectives was omitted from the conference report, the socialists expressed their hope for democracy, social justice and peace in the universalist tradition of Jaures and Blum. As Criddle has noted, the French Socialists managed by combining the internationalism of the great leaders with Philip's concept of the *big market* to drive their enthusiasm towards the attainment of European integration.¹⁹⁸

At the 1948 Congress Andre Philip, in his capacity as Economics minister, spoke in favour of the Marshall Plan as necessary for reconstruction, and justified it as important for the building of European unity. Philip saw the danger in not using the opportunity for industrial development and European economic unification presented by the aid. Opposition came from the exponents of third forcism who were not

confined only to the party's left. In the late 1940s a nationalistically inspired tendency for third forcism, seeking to create a vehicle for reconciliation between the two superpowers, was apparent in most French parties, and Philip went some way to accommodate this disposition.¹⁹⁹ The idea of the third force can be seen as nationalistically inspired since any idea of a third force in France would have as its natural leader France itself. It was therefore an attempt to put France at the driving seat of Europe and elevate her to a position at par with the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR.

On the party's left the two most important Europeanists were Pierre Rimbert and Marceau Pivert. Rimbert was the party's most prominent Marxist economic theorist. He maintained that the continuation of the nation-state constituted a contradiction for capitalism and socialism alike. He believed that the state was gradually forced to intervene to boost capitalism. This means that the kernel of socialism was visible within the capitalist state and progressive socialisation would be pushed by international competition. We should surpass the nation-state framework to build socialism, and as the process of building an international community was a major step towards this end, European integration within the Marshall Plan outline was to be encouraged.

The April 1948 Bulletin Interieur reflected the SFIO's suspicion of the American offer, and detected two serious threats for socialism in it. The privatisation of the public sector; and the safeguarding of the social privileges of the bourgeoisie. It advocated the establishment of democratically-controlled European Commissions and the organisation of a common economic union aiming eventually at a complete

¹⁹⁸ Criddle, *Socialists* pp.29-30

customs union. Nevertheless, squeezed between American capitalism and Soviet expansionism, the socialists found the idea of the third force as a natural escapist heaven.²⁰⁰

The resolution of the 1948 congress, while considering that the Franco-German problem could only be solved by German integration into a new European structure, called for a United States of Europe. As we have seen previously, for the German SPD, priority had to be given to German reunification rather than European integration.

...the Franco-German problem can only be solved by integrating the German economy into the new European structure...

*The Socialist Party is determined that its continued efforts to bring about the United States of free Europe should not be diverted in favour of either of the existing blocks.*²⁰¹

Western defence demands compelled the party to retreat from third forcism and internationalism by 1949 but the establishment of the Council of Europe in May of the same year offered some hope to the internationalists in SFIO. Writing in March 1949, Philip had gone as far as to advocate economic integration. He was especially concerned about the Ruhr, and said that its

*collieries and steel works should henceforth be placed firmly under European management.*²⁰²

Philip saw the Strasbourg Assembly as the democratic element binding together the individual member states. The party's 1949 congress accepted the Council's

¹⁹⁹ Criddle, *Socialists* pp.32-5

²⁰⁰ Criddle, *Socialists* pp.36-7

²⁰¹ SFIO: "Resolution on international action", in Lipgens & Loth, *Documents*, Vol. 3 p.80

limitations and called for the popularisation of the European idea. At the same time the German SPD opposed West German entry to the Council of Europe. The policy document *L'Union Européenne* advocated close co-operation between the assembly's socialist parties, excluding the communists, as the socialists saw the issue as an opportunity to increase their domestic electoral appeal among French workers vis à vis the PCF.²⁰³ The manifesto adopted at the July 1949 Congress argued that European unity was an economic necessity:

*If she remained cut up into segments, shielded behind autarchic economic policies, at the end of Marshall Aid Europe could neither retake her place in international commerce, nor avoid a lowering of her living standards, of which the working-class would be the major victim.*²⁰⁴

The setting up of NATO marked the end of third forcism as the party was compelled to make its position clear in the developing superpower rivalry. As Criddle has observed, there is no doubt that the leadership and the overwhelming majority of the rank and file membership were in favour of the Atlantic Pact. The unanimously adopted international policy motion of the 1950 Congress abandoned neutrality for the sake of the Western alliance, although writing in the same year Mollet held that an independent, but not neutral, third force was still possible. Again it was the animosity between communists and socialists in France, as demonstrated by the latter's active involvement in putting down communist-led strikes and demonstrations in 1947 and 1952, which determined the SFIO's degree of commitment to Western defence²⁰⁵.

²⁰² Philip, A. "The Economic Unification of Europe" in Lipgens & Loth, *Documents*, Vol.3 p.89

²⁰³ Criddle, *Socialists* p.40

²⁰⁴ quoted in Newman, *Socialism* pp.23-4

²⁰⁵ Criddle, *Socialists* pp.42-5



Speaking at the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly in August 1950, Philip called for a United Europe to repel the Soviet threat and listed the necessary institutions:

*a European army, a European bank of investments, a federal reserve bank system for Europe, joint organizations for coal, electricity, basic agricultural products, purchases and sales; finally, an Assembly to which these institutions, one and all, shall be accountable.*²⁰⁶

Speaking at the same body, in August 1951, Philip portrayed the Schuman Plan of functionalist integration as the prototype for future functional structures extending to the areas of power, transportation, labour and agriculture and thus gradually leading to prospective federalism. But for the SFIO, as for most parties in France, the underlying attraction of the plan was the possibility of containing German economic recovery and political autonomy. Discussing the question of the internationalisation of the Ruhr, the 1949 Congress welcomed the idea on condition that it did not imply a restoration to power of the old magnates. Philip offered a realistic approach by accepting that cartelization was both good and unavoidable in some cases, like the big primary industries where technical conditions rendered the process inevitable²⁰⁷. His concern was the modernisation, rather than the overthrow, of capitalism and he argued that socialism was mainly about the creation of new, and not the equal distribution of the existing, wealth²⁰⁸.

The party's numerous views of its own tradition found expression in the conditions placed in its official reaction to the Schuman Plan. Its socialism and belief in popular sovereignty were reflected in the condition that the controlling authority should include workers' representatives and be accountable to a European assembly. Its

²⁰⁶ Philip, A. "For a Political Authority", in Lipgens & Loth, Documents Vol.3 , p.123

²⁰⁷ Criddle, Socialists pp.46-8

romantic esteem of Britain was apparent in the condition that efforts should be made to incorporate as many nations as possible, and Britain in particular. And its *French* fear of Germany in the condition that the reconstitution of a German dominated private steel cartel should be prevented²⁰⁹. These conditions were less *socialist* than the ones defined by the Socialist International in September 1952 which reiterated the need for the protection of full employment, protection of the right of national governments to nationalise coal and steel industries, and the publication of regular reports on workers' living standards, migration and unemployment²¹⁰. Finally, in December 1951, the SFIO voted for ratification of the Paris Treaty in the National Assembly. According to Newman the acceptance of the Plan constituted a major step down the road to the castration of any remaining socialist notion of European integration within the party²¹¹. Again this acceptance of the Plan by the SFIO contrasts with Schumacher's restrained support.

As became apparent during the EDC debate, the French fear of being left alone with a resurgent Germany was instrumental in the desire to include Britain in the proposed ECSC. Mollet's desire for such an outcome led him to propose confederal, rather than federal, institutions if this could ensure British participation, claiming that the community should not be confined to six nations and that it should create strong bonds with outside states. In October 1952 he resigned from an ECSC sub-committee in protest against the increasing of its powers. Writing at the Socialist International Bulletin, Mollet justified his action in anti-clerical terms, as an act against a catholic domination of the community, an argument which was used against the proposed

²⁰⁸ Newman, *Socialism*, p.33

²⁰⁹ Criddle, *Socialists*, p.49

²¹⁰ Criddle, *Socialists*, p.49

²¹¹ Newman, *Socialism*, p.29

EDC in 1954²¹². Such an argument indicates something about Mollet's ideological style.

In October 1950 the announcement of the Pleven Plan, linking European integration with German rearmament, provoked the utmost degree of dissent within the SFIO, and from 1952 to 1954 dominated party congresses. The opposition case was based on a French nationalistic anti-Germanism, although sometimes dressed in an internationalist rhetoric, whereas the *cedistes* (i.e. EDC advocates), like Mollet and Philip, manifested a distinct anti-Russianism. Their basic argument was founded on total support for the building of Western defence as part of European integration with full German participation. The leadership's case was put by Philip who repeated his position that the nation state was unable to efficiently defend itself, stressed that rejection of the EDC would damage the whole European project and that only by allowing West Germany to integrate on equal terms could the danger of a revitalised German nationalism be curbed. At the end of the 1952 Congress the leadership introduced a set of conditions on which the ratification of the plan should be dependent: the creation of a supranational political authority able to exercise democratic control over the EDC; continued US involvement with European defense matters; and British association. As Aron has observed, the fact that the first two were mutually exclusive is characteristic of French wavering, as on one hand they wished the creation of a European authority to minimise the hazard of German rearmament, and on the other they wanted no part of such an authority in which German power would not be offset by British participation²¹³.

²¹² Criddle, *Socialists*, pp.50-4

²¹³ quoted in Criddle, *Socialists*, p.64

Moreover, Mollet had to compromise his own position in order to accommodate internal party unease with the EDC and to protect the SFIO from the successful Communist-led attack on the proposed community. The party division became deeper as subsequent French governments refused to take the treaty to the Assembly for ratification. In the vote taken on the issue at the May 1954 Congress the ratification carried the day by 169 to 1215 mandates in favour, not a decisive victory indeed, and thus the 1954 Puteaux Congress was also called to decide for a disciplinary vote, as demanded by Mollet. His position was that as the EDC was a European matter the socialists, themselves a European party, should ensure its accomplishment but, as Criddle has pointed, his motive could have been to achieve French agreement to German rearmament by means of coupling the latter with the popular idea of European integration. Against this position, Schumacher and the SPD leadership opposed any idea of German rearmament. Finally, at the National Assembly debate 53 socialists voted for the procedural motion by which the consideration of the treaty was rejected.²¹⁴

Comparing the socialist leadership with the other pro-EDC forces, Criddle observed that, with the exception of Mollet who talked of breaking free of the national sovereignty straitjacket, it emphasised more the community's defensive (anti-German) rather than its constructive (supranational) character²¹⁵.

The effects of this bitter controversy on the party's European policy were twofold. On the one hand, following the national trend, it became more assertive about national goals and more restive about the US, which was seen as unconcerned with

²¹⁴ Criddle, *Socialists*, pp.66-72

²¹⁵ Criddle, *Socialists*, pp.73-4

French needs. And on the other, it weakened any socialist justification for French participation in European integration²¹⁶.

In December 1954, in the vote following the debate on the Paris Agreements of the WEU (the less supranational way of linking Western and German defences) 18 socialist deputies defied the leadership and voted against the treaty, the rest of the Germanophobes being persuaded that this was the way to prevent German reunification. On the same issue Ollenauer had renounced German membership of the WEU. But for the pro-Europeans in the party the WEU was a relapse since it restated the predominance of national sovereignty. They now turned to the exploration of functional integration in the fields of economy and energy, and the direct elections of a European Parliament, where they played a critical part. As the reality of the Europe of the six became widely accepted harmony in the party was achieved by late 1955. The process was accelerated by the formation of the socialist-led government following the 1956 election. This produced a Europeanist majority in the National Assembly, thus making any greater commitment to European integration by Mollet a reflection of political necessity. The same motive underlined his position on the Euratom and the EEC, a political case rooted in a resurgence of third forcism, although the most prevalent argument was the isolation and international weakness of France following the Suez fiasco. From a failure of French international prestige, this was turned into an argument in favour of European integration.²¹⁷

Introducing the Rome treaties to the assembly the SFIO leadership had to disperse the strong fear among its own party that integration would be disastrous to national industry. On the contrary, integration was not seen as an obstacle to socialist

²¹⁶ Newman, Socialism, p.32

objectives. But by now the socialist championing of the EEC manifested an acceptance of the fact of French economic recovery which meant that competition was both, desirable and essential. In the meantime, following the Saar Agreements, anti-Germanism had completely vanished from party rhetoric. As Newman has noted, Mollet's EEC policy indicated some changes from previous socialist policy. The assertion of national sovereignty became more prominent. British non-participation was not seen as vital any more. And socialism almost vanished from the party's attitude towards the Community²¹⁸.

In the late 1950's the SFIO was undergoing a theoretical transformation which, although it did not result in a *Bad Godesberg*, offered a pragmatic approach dressed in a left-wing jargon, and in this pattern capitalism was becoming less of an issue but instead *the new technocratic Leviathan* was perceived as the main villain. A clear example can be found in an article by Gerard Jaquet, entitled *Socialism and the Construction of Europe* and published in *Le Populaire* on 29 March 1961, in which the author called for a European parliament to control the technocratic power, but which also demonstrated a lack of any true socialist ideas. The SFIO did not produce any important prescription for the Common Market.²¹⁹

Concluding his study Criddle pointed that throughout the Fourth Republic the SFIO had been instrumental in supporting European integration by providing a concrete pro-integration block in the National Assembly, which never had fewer than 95 deputies. It is worth noting that the SFIO was constantly involved in the business of coalition politics. The arguments used by both supporters and opponents of

²¹⁷ Criddle, *Socialists*, pp.75-81

²¹⁸ Newman, *Socialism*, pp.35-6

²¹⁹ Criddle, *Socialists*, pp.84-5

integration in the party were expressed in political rather than economic terms. This tendency was boosted by the fact that there was a wide agreement on the need for indicative planning among French parties, the difference being that socialists insisted on popular control and participation in the process. Any possible economic reservations were, as Philip has shown, those of a small producer facing large foreign competitors²²⁰.

During the party's period in opposition, socialist belief in supranational European integration and Atlanticism was in conflict with Gaullist policies, a conflict which the SFIO managed to present as a conflict between nationalism and internationalism. As a result the Franco-German treaty was opposed because it was an inter-state, rather than a community, affair, and the *force de frappe* was rejected as an attempt to compromise Atlantic, and therefore integrationist, defence. Again, while not doubting the basic honesty of socialist Europeanism, Criddle has detected an attempt on the SFIO's part to use the matter to mobilise the left against Gaullism. *La Gauche Europeenne* called for a workers', as opposed to a fatherlands', Europe to be brought about by supranational means²²¹.

De Gaulle's return to power in 1958 marked the beginning of a new period. Between 1958 and 1969 he endeavoured to increase French prestige in the global scene by following a more independent road. This was marked by an attack on established Europeanism and Atlanticism. He pursued a special relationship with Germany. He temporarily boycotted Community institutions (the 1965 crisis) and he vetoed the British applications to join the EEC. Finally, he advocated the creation of a European, as distinct from Atlantic, Europe.

²²⁰ Criddle, *Socialists*, p.91-5

At the same time the disintegration of the SFIO, on one hand, and the resemblance of Gaullist and communist rhetoric, on the other, made the formation of a socialist *European* policy a much more complicated, uncertain and elusive issue. Between 1958 and 1962 the SFIO reverted to its accustomed position on Europe. After having been careful on supranationalism while in office, now in contrast to the Communists, it reaffirmed its devotion to the United States of Europe. It opposed de Gaulle's veto of the British application and argued that the Franco-German treaty was motivated by out-dated concepts, derived from the will to power and hegemony that could damage the Community. In their opposition to de Gaulle, the French socialists found an ally in the German Socialdemocrats. The replacement of Defferre by Mitterrand as joint left presidential candidate for the 1965 election had a limited impact on European issues. French socialist leadership was now closer to its German counterpart as both opposed Gaullist policies. In his campaign he attacked de Gaulle on European and Atlantic grounds and calling for a federal Europe and a directly elected parliament.²²²

*I am European and I hope that one day all the French left will unite around the Common Market...a political Europe, built according to the methods used in the economic and technical domains, a Europe which will become the decisive factor in the coexistence of East and West.*²²³

During the campaign Mitterrand attracted agricultural voters against de Gaulle by portraying his policies as unfavourable to the farming communities. His European statements were in line with SFIO traditions, and he hinted at a Union of the left with the Communist Party calling for a democratic peoples' Europe instead of a capitalist technocratic one. At the same time he called for a political Europe with transfers of

²²¹ Criddle, *Socialists*, p.89

²²² Newman, *Socialism*, p.71

sovereignty, and his candidacy was endorsed by Jean Monnet.²²⁴ The PSU, the Unified Socialist Party²²⁵ which was established in 1960 by dissidents from SFIO, the PCF and other left-wing groups, only managed to produce a foreign policy in June 1965. It was a combination of Europeanism and left-socialism. They called for democratisation of the existing institutions; for co-ordination of social struggles at Community level and conclusion of collective European agreements; for the establishment of European planning with constant workers' participation; for safeguarding of European independence with regard to international trusts, and widening of the Community.²²⁶ The attitudes of the representatives of this trend, the best known being M.Rocard, are examined in detail in the first section of the next chapter.

In an attempt to reconcile communist and socialist views on Europe in face of his candidacy, Mitterrand appeared to share communist suspicions of the community because in historical terms Europe had been dominated by America, but claimed that the left's task should be to prove that Europe had a role to play in the search for peace and progress.²²⁷

In 1966 the *Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et d'Education Socialistes* (CERES), a new left group run by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, was founded advocating women's rights, ecology, workers' self-management and the union with the communists.²²⁸ Its argument on Europe was twopronged. On the one hand it was argued that the main enemy is American political and economic hegemony in Europe. On the other it was

²²³ quoted in Haywood, E. "The European Policy of Francois Mitterrand", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, no.2 (June 1993), p.271

²²⁴ Haywood, "European policy", p.276

²²⁵ for an exposition of the PSU's attitudes towards European integration see Chapter Three.

²²⁶ Newman, Socialism, pp.72-3

claimed that the acceptance of the existing Community should be conditional upon the latter's non-interference in domestic socialist policy. Moreover, further integration should be supported only if it would be useful for the attainment of socialism in France.²²⁹

Nevertheless, despite his wish to find common ground with the PCF, Mitterrand emphasised that national independence was meaningless,

*while American capital and management infiltrate the Common Market economy and the Russian Army ... possesses a nuclear force capable of annihilating each of the six countries of "little Europe" in the first quarter of an hour of war.*²³⁰

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was, for him, a clear demonstration of the need to explore the paths to French independence in an independent Europe, which could overcome the division of the continent. European integration and socialism were seen as complementary to each other as industrial specialisation was the prerequisite to economic expansion. Moreover, since integration based on capitalist principles would strengthen US domination, a *real* Europe would be a socialist one. This should be the task of a French socialist government by means of advancing its domestic policy within the Community and placing the *industrial spearhead* under public control.²³¹

At the June 1971 Congress at Epinay-sur-Seine Mitterrand was elected first secretary of the unified PS. On 11-12 March 1972 the party's national convention drew up its own programme and invited the PSU, the Radicals, and the Communists to join it in

²²⁷ Newman, Socialism , p.76

²²⁸ Johnson, R.W. The Long March of the French Left , (London, Macmillan, 1981) , p.65

²²⁹ Newman, Socialism , p.74

²³⁰ quoted in Newman, Socialism , p.76

hammering out a common programme. In June the Common Programme of the Left was signed.²³² The European question did not hinder the rapprochement between Communists and Socialists. At the Communists' insistence, the reference to uphold the unanimity principle in the Council of Ministers was included in the programme. In exchange, and in order to satisfy the Socialists, the programme allowed for the possibility of an increase in the Community authorities competence. Meanwhile, both partners agreed on the need to combat capitalism, neo-colonialism, the multinationals and US domination. The PS-PCF *Common Programme of the Left* for the 1973 legislative elections incorporated a general deal on the principles directing their European policy when in office, based on two tasks. One was participation in the building of the Community with the aims of freeing it from the dominance of monopoly capital, democratising its institutions, and directing its objectives towards workers' interests. Secondly, the partners, while in the Community's centre, should be free to pursue their policies.²³³ As Haywood has noticed though, in the 1970s Mitterrand's comments on European integration were muted. This was the result of the need to achieve and retain leadership of the PS, to unite the various party factions and to develop a common platform with the Communists.²³⁴

During the ten year period leading up to the Socialist victories in 1981, Mitterrand's *brokerage* managed to unite the different party factions. He combined a socialist and a national appeal, and thus prevented the expression of unresolved contradictions. The March 1972 programme endeavoured to spell out a range of policies which would allow a socialist breakthrough in France and strengthen Europe, without at the

²³¹ Newman, *Socialism*, p.77

²³² Johnson, *Long March*, p.67

²³³ Fatherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.119

²³⁴ Haywood, "European Policy", p.272

same time reinforcing capitalism. Nevertheless, it was not clear how this was to be achieved. It was argued that supranational decision making should be bolstered. But this should happen only after agreement that measures suggested by the left would be seriously considered by all. As Newman has observed, Mitterrand was trying to blend SFIO's Europeanism with the view that the Community could frustrate the socialist advancement. In parallel he attempted to persuade the voters that national and European independence were interlinked. In 1973, instead of building socialism in France, he was more concerned to strengthen Europe against the US, and in August at a bilateral meeting in London with the Labour Party he, as the French government did next year, almost dismissed Labour's grievances with the Community. Mitterrand strove to bring the socialist parties of the EEC closer to each other and he managed, despite strong opposition from the left, to persuade the PS to accept his idea of sending party envoys to all Community's member states. Thus he elevated the Community to central status in socialist strategy. At the extraordinary congress on Europe at Bagnolet in December 1973 the conclusions of the motion of Mitterrand's supporters were, as Newman has noted, wholly *European*. They called for more planning, common action to combat inflation, a common, independent from the dollar, monetary system, and an exploration into a European scientific and technological independence. They should all emanate from a democratic central authority. Nevertheless, the federalist solution was rejected.²³⁵

To the left of this, CERES offered a left-wing analysis characterised by a number of features: a distinction between Soviet dominance of a limited geographical sphere and US imperialism which was perceived as the main obstacle on the road to

²³⁵ Newman, Socialism, pp.92-8

socialism; a more comprehensive repudiation of SFIO traditionalism arguing that the degree of Europeanism is related to class collaboration; a claim that the Rome Treaty was incompatible with socialist aims since it considered competition as the exclusive motor of the economy; and finally, an emphasis on the necessity for a broader coalition, not only with foreign socialist parties but with all anti-capitalist forces, to combat capitalism on an international platform. The final resolution included elements of the above view but it was more European than the early majority motion. It was less conditional than the 1972 programme. At the same time it accommodated the left by suppressing the outright supranationalism of the ex-SFIO's right while permitting the pragmatists to claim that the PS's Europeanism would promote national independence. The party's advancement exacerbated internal conflicts as Mitterrand's standing was boosted and the proportion of CERES members increased. The situation deteriorated with the influx of a number of new members from the CFDT and Rocard's PSU. This resulted in more ideological vagueness. At the early 1975 Pau Congress Rocard joined the party directorate. CERES found itself isolated. The PS expressed a firm Europeanism supported by arguments similar to those of the SFIO. Mitterrand, while co-ordinating southern European socialists, established three joint working parties on Europe with Brandt thus bringing the party closer to the SPD. Europeanism was affirmed as the only way forward in a situation in which only limited progress was possible. It was often implicit, and sometimes explicit, that the PS would maintain its European orientation whatever the reaction of the PCF.²³⁶

In 1976, attempting to settle the issue of direct elections to the European Parliament, Mitterrand proclaimed that

²³⁶ Newman, Socialism, pp.99-101

*Election by universal suffrage will give it the authority and prestige of which it is now deprived and will clearly establish in public opinion the European idea which has up to now been fuzzy. A decision was made in December 1973 at Bagnolet...For socialists, a large scale political policy must be substituted for the economic power of grand capital...Europe will either be Socialist or she will not be, and it is now appropriate to pave the way for the massive entry of workers into the European institutions and the intellectualisation of the struggle.*²³⁷

On February of the same year the Comité Directeur of the party supported direct elections by 97 to 34 votes. Later in the month in order to distinguish its Europeanism from that of the centrists, it rejected the Tindemans Report.²³⁸

Two months later Mitterrand presented the party's attitude towards Europe which he identified with the European Economic Community. He mixed traditional Europeanism with the PS's new socialist critique by attacking the US, the FRG, and De Gaulle. The arguments in favour of Europe came to sound more like those of the SFIO. In 1977 the theoretical journal of the PS, *La Nouvelle Revue*, held a debate on the issue of Europe. 'Europeanism' was the dominant theme, and emphasis was placed upon the inability of any single nation-state to deal with the problems of inflation and unemployment alone. Moreover, it was suggested that the power of the multinational companies could only be curtailed by a European political authority.²³⁹ Thus, the themes that came to dominate the discussions about the future of socialism much later (sovereignty, interdependence, etc.), as we will see in the last chapter, were introduced. This trend was reinforced at the June 1977 Nantes congress where CERES was again marginalised and Rocard even supported positions irreconcilable with the Common Programme. Nevertheless, in July 1978 CERES called for the

²³⁷ quoted in Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.121

²³⁸ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, pp.121-2

²³⁹ Newman, *Socialism*, p.101

complete rejection by the PS of a common platform of Community socialist parties which had originated from the above mentioned initiatives of Brandt and Mitterrand.²⁴⁰

In October the party's Euroelection manifesto *Socialists for a Europe of the Workers* called for better democratic control of the Community, stronger workers' participation in the decision making process, and addition to the EP's powers, so it can control directives that now elude national parliamentary control. Under these circumstances the extension of EC competence would be satisfactory but this supranationalism was withdrawn a few years later.²⁴¹

In the winter of 1978-9 Mitterrand had to restrict his Europeanism and this was the price to be paid if CERES was to support him against the challenge by Rocard and Mauroy. In these terms the 1979 Euroelection's campaign was difficult and not very successful. The PS, while not altogether opposed to any future extension of Community powers, believed that the directly elected parliament must progress within the boundaries of the existing treaties. Any transfer of sovereignty could take place only with the agreement of national parliaments and governments. Nevertheless, the party's European orientation, after the April 1979 Metz congress, is of more long term importance. Having silenced CERES, Mitterrand was able to revert back to Europeanism. Furthermore, he continued his attempts to forge tighter links between the Community's socialist parties.

The question of Community enlargement tested the socialist Europeanism as the party's strong agricultural basis meant that domestic interests should be safeguarded.

²⁴⁰ Newman, *Socialism*, p.102

²⁴¹ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.122

In contrast to previous ideas about a *Europe du Sud*, the PS advocated a reform of the CAP. Products affected by enlargement should be assisted and a system of minimum prices checked at the national frontiers should be established. Regional policy should be reinforced and public intervention to sustain living standards should be facilitated. It was also proposed that new entrants should advance from one stage to the next not on the basis of time elapsed between the two, but on the basis of performance achieved.²⁴²

Having defeated Rocard within the party, Mitterrand and the PS were elected to power in 1981 with a contradictory Europeanism to appeal to both the left and the right, critical of most Community institutions and policies, and poised to reform them to create a workers' Europe. At the same time it was stressed that it was vital for France and Europe in general. During his campaign Mitterrand sought to distinguish his Europeanism from that of his opponent by criticising the Franco-German alliance and calling for a more cautious policy towards Britain.²⁴³ As far as institutional reform of the communities was concerned, the socialist 1981 election manifesto, without ruling out reform, stressed the literal application of the treaties and highlighted the preservation of the unanimity principle.

Once in office, Mitterrand's first European initiative was the European Social Area. The concept of a *Workers' Europe* was one the Socialists shared with the Communists. But opposition from Britain and Germany, and the difficulties faced at home by the Mauroy government destroyed its chances for success. It was used though as a sweetener for the acceptance of the neo-liberal structure of the internal

²⁴² Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p. 123

²⁴³ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, pp. 126-7

market and as a link between the pro and anti-integration factions of the party.²⁴⁴ For Chandernagor, the new administration's European Affairs deputy minister, the institutions should return to the roles assigned to them by the treaties. The Commission should be made a secretariat organisation, and although the parliament had a role to play, it would be the Council that should be taking decisions. In the face of opposition both from inside (the communists and CERES) and outside the government (the Gaullists) the October *Memorandum on revitalisation of the Community* was ambiguous. It suggested some small improvements, but indicated a move backwards by reintroducing, without defining it, the practice of declaration of "national-interest" to avert a vote even on a minor issue. The Genscher-Colombo initiative was met with a cautious response on the French government's side. Haywood offers two reasons for this apparent lack of interest. Probably they did not understand the link between majority voting and their own motions for EC policy reforms like *l'espace social* or, like the socialist group in the EP, they gave priority to socio-economic aspects of policies over EPC and institutional reform. This helps to explain the socialist government's dismissive attitude towards parliamentary reform.²⁴⁵ In fact, EC was a low priority compared with the domestic programme.

As Featherstone has observed, the Mitterrand administration wished to increase the size and range of Community expenditure but without disproportionately increasing its own budgetary contribution or cutting -back the CAP. France was not happy with the *Future Financing of the Community* option of the 1983 Green Paper that CAP beneficiary states should contribute more. Without blocking CAP reform, Mitterrand managed to persuade the other leaders, at the June 1983 Stuttgart summit, that such

²⁴⁴ Haywood, "European Policy", pp.274-5

re-examination should consider the global position and not be limited to a maximum on specific pieces of expenditure and that the costs should be shared among member states. Moreover, at the March 1984 Brussels summit and after, he managed to isolate and put Mrs Thatcher on the defensive with regard to refunds, thus proving true to his campaign declarations to protect French national interests. This was also true with regard to the Iberian enlargement as Mitterrand called for increased resources for Community policies to prevent France from becoming a net contributor, although an agreement on how this could be done was not reached. This put a strain on the relations between the French and Spanish socialists. Finally under the French presidency in 1984 a programme of negotiations was prepared aiming at Spanish and Portuguese entry in January 1986.²⁴⁶ Haywood has noticed that between 1981 and 1984 French attitudes towards European institutional reform underwent a major transformation. The explanation can be found in the failure of reflationary programme of the early Mitterrand years. As Wright has noticed, the socialists' industrial policy was five-pronged. It included a neo-Keynesian expansionist macro-economic policy based on the expected upturn in world trade, with the creation of new state jobs, increased salaries, benefits and pensions etc. It also included greater rights and powers for the workers in the factories, increased research budgets, the expansion of the public industrial sector, and finally, the vertical integration of entire sectors of related activities, such as electronics, etc. This was accompanied by the nationalization of big companies and banks.²⁴⁷ But the deflationary policies pursued by France's major trading partners at the time, the high American interest rates, the

²⁴⁵ Haywood, E.Z. "The French Socialists and European Institutional Reform", Journal of European Integration, Vol.XII, no.2-3 (Winter/Spring 1989) pp.122-5

²⁴⁶ Featherstone, Socialist Parties, pp.127-8

²⁴⁷ Wright, V. "Socialism and the interdependent economy: Industrial policy-making under the Mitterrand presidency", Government and Opposition, Vol.19, no.3, (Summer 1984), pp.288-290

turbulence of the economic environment of those days, and French technological dependency on the US and Japan resulted in three devaluations of the franc by March 1983.²⁴⁸ So, whereas in 1981 they believed that no institutional reform was necessary, three years later this had been reversed to the point that Mitterrand speaking at the EP, expressed support for the Draft Treaty on European Union.²⁴⁹ As the official line on Europe represented a compromise between the opposing party sections, any policy change should be cautious and justifiable in terms of making the implementation of domestic socialist measures on the Community scale more likely. The bypassing of the British veto at the 1982 agricultural price fixing session provided Mitterrand with a chance to show to the British, and to the anti-British lobby in France, that the socialists were prepared to be tough and not intimidated by the British demands, while safeguarding French farming interests. This sparked a new debate around the Luxembourg compromise interpretation with the French government referring not to "very important" interests, as the original text, but to vital or essential ones, a more firm interpretation. They were also claiming that the national interest must have a direct bearing on the issue of concern. The same line was advocated by the French representative at the ad hoc group discussing the Genscher-Colombo plan. Moreover, as far as the Genscher-Colombo proposals for EP and EPC reform were concerned, France adopted a cautious approach to the development of a common foreign policy and the progressive harmonisation on defence issues. In addition, France was hesitant by the time of the 1983 Stuttgart Summit to agree to the creation of an EPC secretariat, whereas Mitterrand went as far as to call the EP an *Assembly*. The Spinelli Initiative divided the Socialist group in

²⁴⁸ Wright, "Socialism", pp.294-5

²⁴⁹ Haywood, "French Socialists"

the EP as many MEPs, the French among them, insisted that policy and not institutional reform would *humanise* the European Union. It should be noted here that whereas the CERES faction opposed the initiative, the Rocardians supported it. At the first vote in the European Parliament on the initiative the PS representatives voted reluctantly for the *guidelines resolution*. In the next vote though, in September 1983 only two of them defied the party line and voted in favour. This can be explained by the fact that at that time candidates were selected for the forthcoming Euroelections. In the main vote in February 1984 they all abstained.²⁵⁰

As Mitterrand had become more dynamically involved in foreign policy, the change from Mauroy to Fabius did not result in substantial changes in European policy. Addressing the European Parliament in May 1984 Mitterrand offered a new stimulus to Community policy discussions, which was welcomed at a time when socialist domestic economic policies were under attack. Although his speech saw the EUT not as a replacement but as a supplement to the old treaty, he deviated from the French custom by supporting the idea of institutional reform. The speech manifested French leadership and a threat to Britain, at the time of discussing her budgetary contribution, to either accept the offer to be made at Fontainebleau or risk being left behind.²⁵¹

Next month the Fontainebleau summit engineered the creation of the *Dooge Committee* and another one to deal with a *People's Europe*²⁵². The Dooge Committee was to a great degree Mitterrand's brainchild. Campaigning for the 1984 Euroelections the PS abandoned the idealistic rhetoric of pre-1981 and adopted a

²⁵⁰ Haywood, "French Socialists", pp.121-31

²⁵¹ Haywood, "French Socialists", p.136

²⁵² Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.129

more realistic approach and reminded the electorate that it was a socialist government which signed the Rome Treaties, while at the same time calling not for just a exchange zone but a real *community* to overcome the recession.²⁵³ Only one party publication for the 1984 Euro-election suggested that national sovereignty was still an issue. And despite the fact that it called for the extension of the Parliament's powers, for a permanent secretariat for the Council, and for majority voting in it, the role of the institutions was not yet a priority. On the eve of the June 1985 Milan Summit a Franco-German communique proposed a draft treaty on European Union, limited to EPC and similar to the Howe draft, which included suggestions for institutional reform that went further than any earlier French Government document on Parliamentary powers. These included the power to discuss and amend texts to be discussed by the Council, although in case of a stalemate the latter would have the final say. Moreover, the Parliament would have the power to be consulted on the budget's global expenditure package and possibly the increase of own resources. Finally, it proposed the creation of a Council secretariat, dealing with EPC matters in particular. Following the Milan Summit, France took an active part in the negotiations and submitted many proposals though not as far going as the Commission's ones concerning parliamentary powers.

In the meantime, while the Fabius administration emphasised the issue of modernity, Jospin introduced Rocardian market ideas to the party. The March 1986 elections pro-Community manifesto was supported by all party factions and stated that the future of France goes via the renewal of Europe.²⁵⁴ The defeat of the PS at the National Assembly elections was followed by the dissolution of CERES, although

²⁵³ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, pp.129-30

²⁵⁴ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, pp.131-2

Chevenement founded a new group to succeed it. This meant that next presidential elections would be met with a unanimous strong pro-integrationist policy.²⁵⁵

Writing before the 1989 European elections, Laurent Fabius, at that time the President of the French National Assembly, offered *A left programme for the European Community*. Stating that the message of the Left is internationalist he declared that,

*The Single Market, once it has been completed, will automatically reduce the margin of autonomy of these national instruments. It will force the Left, whether in opposition or in power, to consider its actions in genuinely European terms. It is a challenge.*²⁵⁶

But this should not be just a single market for capital and products, but for the people and their ambitions and hopes as well. The idea of community symbolises liberty, equality, fraternity and democracy in all domains. For Fabius the goal of economic efficiency without free market excesses and planning paralysis, but with social justice distinct from the American and Japanese models, is what unites the European socialists. He perceived the strategy of the European left as consisting of four main guidelines. One, an environmentally conscious prolonged growth policy, which will be achieved by two measures. By building a commercial strategy to protect a few sensitive sectors which are now subject to national protection. And by harmonised rules to make environmental concern a major objective throughout the community. Two, fair competition which will be guaranteed by juridical rules and public intervention. Three, balanced industrial development, which will be achieved by a number of moves; an increase of the resources available to the structural funds;

²⁵⁵ Featherstone, *Socialist Parties*, p.133

redirection of the technological development strategy of the member states by means of wider access to public contracts; the formulation of specific programmes; the increase in risk capital; and the making of public authorities responsible for the provision of organisation and management advice strategy. And four, social progress. This will be brought about by building a Europe of human solidarity and of workers' rights of expression and consultation. By building a Europe of harmonisation between systems of social distribution, of more coherent social policies, and of social dialogue.

*So the left must put forward a way of using the internal market that is based on the development of freedom and equality jointly: freedom of movement for men, goods and capital, equality between regions with regard to growth, between undertakings with regard to competition, between men with regard to training, employment and the redistribution of revenue.*²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Fabius, L. "A Left Programme for the European Community", in Dankert, P. & Kooyman, A. (ed.) Europe without Frontiers: Socialists on the Future of the European Community, p.45

²⁵⁷ Fabius, "Left Programme" p.58

CONCLUSION

There are a few common, and interlinked, points that can be identified in the discussion of the policies of the German SPD and the French Socialists. The difference of statements when in opposition, and actions when in power, is one of them.

When in opposition they can afford to claim ideological purity, sometimes. The need to get elected, to appeal to the electorate, to perform their duty as opposition parties determines their rhetoric. One can see Schumacher's reaction to European integration through such a lens. After a long period in which the Social-Democrats were seen as unpatriotic, he had to reaffirm the party's German credentials. German unity became the paramount issue.

Both parties had to modify their policies once elected. Now they had to run the country, the room for manoeuvre was limited, and most of the time had to follow, more or less, established patterns of action. It is clear that domestic policy consideration has been the determinant of their European Community policy making. For example, as Bulmer has observed, Chancellor Schmidt's political fortunes at home had improved his freedom of manoeuvre in launching the European Monetary System (EMS). The FRG economy's dependence on steady trading relations made necessary some response to the uncertainties in the international monetary system.

The European Community containing Germany's closest trading partners seemed an appropriate framework for a response like this.²⁵⁸

As we have seen same events produced opposite responses in the two parties. The reactions to the Schuman plan, to the EDC and the WEU indicated that the first criterion of both parties had been their respective country's national interest, as they perceived it at the time, rather than the common European interest. And both Brandt and Mitterrand turned to Europe after their respective first years in office when they realised that their other alternatives were not available any more.

The role of the political leader is another point. Nowhere this is more obvious than in the case of Mitterrand. European policy, foreign policy in general, was his prerogative. In the 1980s and 1990s, more than any of his contemporary leaders, the French President was in the forefront of European statesmen driving the Community member states to closer political and economic integration.²⁵⁹ Although throughout the Fourth Republic he was more interested in colonial affairs and in the maintainance of French presence in Africa, he gradually turned into a convinced European. His shift had started in the 1960s and the 1970s, despite the fact that for tactical reasons he had allowed CERES to write the PS programme in 1971. So, his clear turnaround in the after his elevation to the presidency, can be explained by several reasons. Domestic Keynesian economic policy failed disastrously. For Wright, the Mitterrand experience of industrial policy-making from 1981 to 1984 demonstrates the external interdependence within the industrialised world in general. In order to implement an effective statist industrial policy a favourable economic

²⁵⁸ Bulmer, S. "Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.XXI, no.4 (June 1983), p.357

²⁵⁹ Cole, A. Francois Mitterrand. A Study in Political Leadership, (London, Routledge, 1994), p.116

environment is vital. But this is dependent on the outside world. France is the interdependent economy par excellence since it depends 80% of its energy and 40% of its imports are dollar denominated.²⁶⁰ Another reason can be found in the fact that the PS defeated the Communists in the left constituency. The Communists were marginalised in electoral terms and the Socialists became the dominant party of the left. Moreover, Delors, a socialist, was appointed President of the Commission. At the same time, economic policy became Europeanised. According to Haywood, Mitterrand's commitment to European integration and his method of advancing the cause were the result of three factors: his own historical perspective, his ideals, and most important of all, national self-interest and party advantage.²⁶¹

The last one, the national interest, is the most important one for the present thesis as well. It has been the major factor in determining socialist parties' attitudes towards European integration in the period discussed. For the German Social-Democrats on the one hand, as for the other political parties in the Federal Republic, the national interest has been identified with German unity. The way to achieve this has changed at different times, but the end task has remained the same. On the other hand, for the French socialists, as well as for the rest of the French society, the national interest has been tantamount to the containment of Germany. Despite Mitterrand's strong Europeanism, France was reluctant to grant enhanced powers to the European Parliament at the beginning of the current decade. For Haywood this is to be explained by German unification. The population of the new Germany would entitle her to a greater number of MEPs than any other member state. A more powerful

²⁶⁰ Wright, V. "Socialism and the Interdependent Economy: Industrial Policy-making under the Mitterrand Presidency", Government and Opposition, Vol.19, no.3 (Summer 1984), pp.287-303

²⁶¹ Haywood, "European policy", p.270

assembly would thus mean German dominance in political, economic and monetary issues.²⁶²

We have seen therefore, that both parties I have examined in this chapter, the French SFIO/PS and the German SPD dealt with the process of integration in the western half of the continent in accordance with perceived interests emanating from the two nation states. As far socialism is concerned, it was relegated to secondary position. So, the need to get re-elected, and the task of serving the national interest, as expressed by the interests of their respective states when in power, have prevented the French and the German socialist parties from pursuing an internationalist policy when it really mattered. Their fortunes were linked with those of their national domestic electorates in their countries and any internationalist claims had to be forgotten. It can be said that the actions and the rhetoric of both parties under consideration in this chapter can be characterised by confusion. Policies that aim at satisfying the domestic electorate have to be dressed in an internationalist vocabulary, the need to pursue foreign policies of nation-states has to accommodate the national feeling, etc. It is not surprising therefore that both parties failed to live up to their socialist international ideals. If, following Manning's and Robinson's definition, as has been stated in the introduction to the present thesis, political ideology is the *form of language which has made the construction of political life possible*, then this confused rhetoric and vocabulary signifies the confusion in the ideology itself. The reaction of the PS/SFIO and of the SPD to the process of European integration has illuminated this point. But if the parties were bound to

²⁶² Haywood, "European Policy", p.277

states, what about the thinkers. How did they respond to the same challenges? This is the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

Socialist Thinkers and European Integration

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I am looking at the first wave of socialist responses in the early 1970s as some of the early implications of European integration started to sink in. In particular I am examining the views of the French Rocardians, then in the PSU (Unified Socialist Party), of Johan Galtung, and of Ernest Mandel.

One should note the gap between Rocard's rhetoric and later his action as Prime Minister of France. Rocard's political position in general had shifted considerably between 1973 and he became PM and even he himself would no longer have adhered to the ideas exposed in the book I am examining here. Johan Galtung, a Scandinavian academic produced a structuralist analysis of the process of European integration based on power categories. Ernest Mandel, was a Belgian economist who had been Secretary General of the Fourth International. His analysis offers a typical marxist-internationalist approach.

Rocard's views are important for the present discussion because of the special weight he carried in the French socialist parties. He has remained a key player in an important political party that has, as we saw in the discussion of the SFIO/PS earlier, an important role in the process of European integration. Galtung, an academic freed from party affiliations and the responsibilities of office produced an intellectual explanation. And finally, Mandel an internationalist of the non-parliamentary left offered a more orthodox marxist view.

All three theoretical approaches though failed to provide a satisfactory analysis partly because of failures to appreciate nationalism or national questions, and partly because they were preoccupied with statism. Recent discussions of the issues examined here have attempted to fill these gaps, as we will see in the last chapter.

1. THE FRENCH ROCARDIANS

In France in 1960 a new political formation, the *Partie Socialiste Unifie* (PSU), was established by dissidents from the SFIO, the Communist Party, and other left wing groups. The name of M.Rocard, a later socialist prime minister, figured prominently among its members. Their views on the EEC in the early seventies were expanded in *Le Marche Commun contre l'Europe* co-written by B.Jaumont, D.Lenegre, and M.Rocard.²⁶³

They claimed that the identification of Europe with the product of the Rome Treaty was one of history's greatest myths. In the Community's 15 years' history never has a European policy been adopted if it contradicted either the national interests of a member state or those of a big company; therefore any increase of the powers of the Community institutions and the Parliament would be a fallacy, as such a move would destroy any resistance to the *wild capitalist development*. A socialist Europe can be founded on the workers' solidarity and against the Common Market, otherwise socialism is used to justify, and provide popular support for, the multinationals' profiteering.²⁶⁴ Their analysis was based on an examination of the multinational companies and the assumption that by 1980 200 to 300 multinational companies would dominate international trade through the control of 75% of Western companies.²⁶⁵ This process will be facilitated by the creation of common organs which open the gates of Europe to the American multinationals since any move towards a Common Market would benefit, above all, foreign, i.e. American, companies by allowing them to take advantage. This would result in a power

²⁶³ Jaumont, B., Lenegre, D., Rocard, M. *Le Marche Commun contre l'Europe*, (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1973). I am using the Greek edition *I Koini Agora enantion tis Evropis* (Athens, Nea Synora, 1976)

²⁶⁴ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* pp.22-3

vacuum, at both the national and the local level, leaving these companies unaccountable since they will be collaborating with each other in any member state without anyone having the authority to coordinate them.²⁶⁶

Jaumont et al saw the establishment of the Common Market as an attempt to introduce into Europe the foundations of a modern capitalist economy. The Treaty of Rome was condemned for not distinguishing between European and foreign companies. Any increase in the powers of the central organs of the Community, and the Commission in particular, would result in the destruction of any remaining national policies. And this not for the sake of a European policy but for the sake of the big corporations, irrespective of their country of origin. By replacing the protectionist policies of the individual member states with the principles of the so called *wild capitalism*, the Common Market benefits above all the American corporations which seek only profits and do not regard Europe as a permanent body, but as a step in their development process. The Common Market does not create European companies and does not lead to the emergence of a ruling class that could protect the common interests against an onslaught from abroad.²⁶⁷ So we have here the assumption that socialists should resist the spread of international capitalism, and that national or European capitalism is preferable.

For Jaumont, Lenegre, and Rocard the CAP was an exercise in passing from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist stage of production with the governments' blessing. The decreasing number of small (smaller than 10 hectares) holdings, and the corresponding increasing number of holdings larger than 35 hectares bears witness

²⁶⁵ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.28

²⁶⁶ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.64

²⁶⁷ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.84

to this. The Social Policy was seen as an attempt, on the one hand to *heal the wounds* created by competition, and on the other to provide the European bosses with the necessary flexible work force. As far as other community policies are concerned, monetary policy is seen as a failure, regional policy has not prevented the gap between the regions of the Community from widening, energy policy is simply non-existent, and finally, industrial policy has benefited foreign companies which have taken advantage of the relevant legislation. The only successful Community policy, CAP apart, is considered to be the transport policy which in turn is dismissed on the grounds that it benefits all businesses in the field, and not only the European ones, which means that although it is a policy it is not a European one. For them the choice is not between nationalism and Europe but between nationalism and free competition, and although the deepening of the Common Market reduces the powers of the nation state, its purpose is only to facilitate free market competition.²⁶⁸

For the authors, socialism in one country is impossible and international action is needed, but this action must be directed against the idea of Europe as identified with the EEC. This is another invention, on part of the dominant classes, to distract the workers' attention following the failure of older myths like nationalism, "grand idea" etc.²⁶⁹ The main use of Europe as an ideology is to contain the power of the unity of the forces of the left and to compete with socialism for popular support, by providing a consumer's paradise. A *European Nationalism* has been cultivated by the European capitalists to suit their interests. They have promoted a spirit of European coexistence in order to hide the real class conflict. Its hidden motives are the replacing of class conflict with nationalism, the *hot war* with the communist block, containment of

²⁶⁸ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.112

revolutionary tendencies in Europe and increase of profits. Its purpose is to act as a new *grand idea* replacing the old nationalism in a period when the traditional imperialism was suffering humiliating defeats in Indochina and Algeria, and to maximise profits by creating a bigger market, and to abolish state intervention by doing away with protectionism.²⁷⁰

The traditional concept of the nation has been undermined by the development of multinational corporations. And as the community declines, the currency which is the expression of common interests, loses its importance. For Jaumont et al the prevailing economic conditions determine the political institutions. It follows then that the EEC institutions are based on the multinationals' pattern. So, any such institutions would be senseless since they would be exercised in a state where the inhabitants have in common nothing more than some weak solidarity links, and where the technical or economic activity has no logical continuation on the state level. Moreover, as long as the main motive will be profit maximisation and the economic structure will be dominated by the multinationals, the real centre of decision making will always be outside these institutions. What is even worse, such a process would lead to nationalism, chauvinism, and isolationism, which would be disastrous for the international workers' solidarity.²⁷¹

If socialism is essential for the birth of Europe, the European dimension is also essential for the attainment of real socialism, as any government determined to break away from capitalism needs an alliance with neighboring states if the process is not to be brought to an abrupt end. This now sounds like an argument for socialism in

²⁶⁹ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* pp.145-6

²⁷⁰ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* pp.155-62

²⁷¹ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.173

several countries. On the defense issue they argued that individual European states, like Britain and France, can not construct a credible deterrence, something that could only be achieved by a true European union and not just by an interstate cooperation, as the failure of the *Europe* missile made clear, but that could only be achieved through socialism. Moreover, such a force is a prerequisite for the passage to socialism, as there is always the danger that such a move, as the cases of Vietnam, Czechoslovakia etc. indicated, could be opposed by either of the superpowers. Also a military strong Europe could assist socialist experiments, by providing security, in other parts of the globe if she does not want to be seen as an island of egoism.²⁷²

In the economic sphere the European dimension is even more important in the passage to socialism, as independence is inconceivable in the case of the industrialised world, and the same is true as far as technology (computers, space program etc.) and environmental protection are concerned. On the political level the European dimension is critical. It is critical if the European nations are to break free from the superpowers' straitjacket and if Europe is to retain its distinct voice and help the emancipation of the developing world. The last one is something every socialist should be aiming at but it could only be achieved in a bigger scale. This Europe though is incompatible with the Common Market.²⁷³

The PSU concept of the construction of Europe was exposed in the last chapters of the above mentioned book. For Jaumont, Lenegre, and Rocard, at first glance there is very little space for those concerned with building a European socialist society. Social-democracy, which acts as a caretaker of capitalism, nationalistic Soviet-led communism, and compromised trade unions have dominated the field. Europe's

²⁷² Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* pp.184-5

construction, as they perceived it, should be based on the forces which, having questioned the rationality of profit, are led to look for ways to take their fate into their own hands. No channel to power passes through the organs created by the Rome Treaty, and therefore capturing these very organs can not be the basis from which to change the structure of capitalism. We should start from the middle level of capturing the mechanisms of at least one of the nation states member of the EEC as this is the only way. All the desires for a real internationalism, for the negation of chauvinism should be given a new impetus and a political meaning they never had in order to help the building of Europe on the basis of self-management and against the principles of the Rome treaty. The effort should begin from within the Community institutions themselves, and in all levels, by confronting nationalism with European solidarity and capitalism with self-management. Through the supporting of the workers' demands in a sector of the economy, by making the others mobilize and present their position, we gradually move the arena and the target of the struggles and we encourage the construction of structures which can express the wishes of both. This would then turn the Brussels organs into the vehicle of popular demands for the breaking up of the Common market mechanisms. The antagonism between the actual aims of the Treaty of Rome and the construction of Europe becomes clear when the problems that are excluded (at the time the book was written) from the treaties like energy, scientific research etc., are examined. And it is here a real European policy can be applied to express popular feelings and contest capitalist interests.²⁷⁴

It is a deceit to try to make the others believe that the European construction was the realization of the Common Market. But one can easily use the effects

²⁷³ Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora pp.193-203

²⁷⁴ Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.215

*of such a deceit against the very people that have benefited from it and thus construct Europe against the Common Market.*²⁷⁵

In the last chapter, titled the *immediate duties*, they called for a coordination and cooperation between the European trade unions and socialist organisations. More important, for the purpose of the present study, they advocated opposition to any moves to abolish the unanimity principle, as such an attempt would jeopardise any attempts by any national government to introduce socialist policies. Also they called for real freedom for workers' movement. This should be an attempt to counter the freedom of movement for the companies which benefits them vis-a-vis the working class. The abolition of economic barriers forced the workers to concentrate in the more industrialised regions, but the continuation of political barriers has prevented them from exercising their rights and thus has effectively turned them into immigrants ripe for exploitation. The only way this could be remedied is by granting equal rights to everybody working in the Community irrespective of country of origin and residence, which means to revise and abolish the traditional notions of national solidarity and national interest, in itself a prerequisite and a model for the advance to socialism.²⁷⁶

It is worth pointing here to the fact that a similar notion has been advanced recently by a number of thinkers. The notions of citizenship and multiple identities are among the topics of discussion of the final chapter of the thesis. For instance, the development of a sense of common citizenship is of crucial importance to Miller's model of Market Socialism, as discussed later. Moreover as we will see in the conclusion, Meehan sees the European Union as an arena for the realization of

²⁷⁵ Jaumont et al, *I Koini Agora* p.216, own translation

democratic citizenship, and its framework allows for the recognition of people who have more identities than their nationality. This kind of pluralism is a necessary condition for a modern radical politics.

The other major area where common action is needed is technological interdependence as, with the domination of the multinationals, research laboratories have been dispersed in several countries which could hinder the passage to socialism by bringing to a halt whole sectors of activity. Discussing the case of atomic energy they observed that the domination of the European market by two or three companies (Westinghouse, Siemens-AEG) means that no individual state can regulate their activities and the EEC Commission lacks the means to perform this function. Moreover, even if it had wider powers it would only use them to protect free market principles, but not to back a European solution. Even nuclear reactors made in France by Westinghouse use American produced enriched uranium which further increases European dependence on the USA.²⁷⁷

Finally, they claimed that the state powers, following the ascendance to power of a socialist government in a EEC member state, could provide the European ideology with a real meaning. From that moment onwards some of the aims of the Rome Treaty, which otherwise would have remained a dead letter, will be realised in the name of the European idea. Only under these circumstances the Treaty mechanisms could be used to help the breach with capitalism in other Community member states.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora pp.224-9

²⁷⁷ Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.235

²⁷⁸ Jaumont et al, I Koini Agora p.243

This argument suffers from several defects. The claim that the Common Market does not promote European companies and does not lead to the emergence of a ruling class that could protect the common interests against a foreign offensive sounds more French than left. The claim that the Community institutions that are determined by the multinational companies would be meaningless is an odd one. The EEC institutions would logically reflect the interests of the multinational companies. The Rocardians' opposition to any moves to abolish the unanimity principle sounds more nationalist than internationalist. Furthermore, the veto power has generally been accepted to be a nationalist slogan (Here it can be said though that this argument has been associated with arguments about the defense of socialism) . Their criticism of the lack of a common scientific research policy has been rendered invalid by the adoption and promotion by the Community of a relevant policy. And there are several achievements that can be credited to such a policy. European projects like the ESPRIT, to name one, and technological products like, the DECT telephones, and the GSM mobile communications' system have given the Community a technological lead over its main competitors. Finally, their main failure, with regards to the present, thesis is their inability to comprehend globalization and interdependence. The nation state remains the focal point and they seem to rely very much on the individual national powers for the promotion of a socialist policy. It was a socialist government in France in the early eighties that was forced to learn the realities of globalization the hard way. The first Mitterrand government had to embrace Europeanism following the disastrous effect of their policies in a country where 40% of its imports are dollar denominated and 80% of its energy is imported.

In a nutshell their argument is based on two propositions. Opposition to any form of European integration which is based on market principles since this leads to new life for multinational capitalism. And since some member states are closer to achieving socialist objectives than the EEC, then integration threatens this situation if national veto is removed. This again goes back to the claim of socialism in one country.

But rather peculiarly, and with a certain logic, they also seem to favor a highly protectionist and interventionist Community, which would be like a Euro-state for realizing socialism. Moreover, they prefer *European* capitalism to *US* or *multinational* versions and advocate a form of European statist-socialism. This would be a future European state transcending the existing nation states, based on a new all-European nation to which they would have no problem in adhering once such a new European nation-state has been established. In any case, how such an entity might be created is not revealed.

It seems therefore that the Rocardians have offered an account of the process of integration in western Europe that, for a socialist analysis does indeed take into account the importance of nationalism, but that was inconclusive. For example, when they say that the Common Market does not create European companies and does not lead to the emergence of a ruling class to protect the common interests, they are in essence calling for the creation of a European nation that will emanate from the fusion of the old nations of the continent. This reveals an interesting preoccupation with state, and assumes that states can represent common interest even when class interest is present. Their whole conception of socialism also involves a great usage of the state in terms of intervention and control of resources (e.g. public ownership), introduction and implementation of social policy. Moreover, they touched upon the

delicate issue of the democratic deficit in the Community. Both issues have become of central importance to all discussions about the future of socialism as we will see in the final chapter.

2. JOHAN GALTUNG AND STRUCTURAL NEOIMPERIALISM²⁷⁹

As the title of his book indicates, Galtung perceived the European Community as the new emerging superpower. His argument is that the EC is a counter-historical venture to recreate a *unicentric* (i.e. Western dominated) Europe in a *Eurocentric* world. It is an attempt to overcome the situation in which Europe, following the Second World War, was itself colonised and became *bicentric*, with centres located in Washington and Moscow, and *bipolar* with the consolidation of the two opposing military alliances. These developments, combined with the anti-colonial movement, signified the end of a long Eurocentric era. In the light of these developments he saw the Community as an exercise in neo-colonialism. An exercise whose emphasis primarily lies in the market element. The common and European elements are only of secondary importance.²⁸⁰

The logic of EC development, as he perceives it, is based on the *staircase hypothesis*, i.e. a process of widening the community through increased membership which is followed by a deepening with consistent issues. He perceived European integration as a chain reaction process of transnationalisation which will exclude groups and interests that are not well articulated at the national level, or are in a minority in member states, or can not afford a transnational organisation. This will lead to the generation of anti-EC forces at the grassroots of society which, in turn, will increase Community vitality at the top. The European superstate will be realised

²⁷⁹ For Galtung's views on Imperialism see Galtung, J. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.8, no.2 (1971), pp.81-117, and Galtung, J. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism-Ten Years Later", *Millenium*, Vol.9, no.3 (Winter 1980-81) pp.181-196. For a general overview of Galtung thought see Lawler, P. *A Question of Values. Johan Galtung's Peace Research*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995)

²⁸⁰ Galtung, J. *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1973) Chapter 1, pp.11-7

*the day there is a massive demonstration of say, youth and workers from all member states rallying at Commission headquarters in Brussels, in front of the Berlaymont building at the Place Schuman, and this demonstration confronts a transnational European Community police force.*²⁸¹

Writing in 1973, Galtung thought that the principles governing EC enlargement are structural (i.e. similar level of techno-economic development and institutional political framework) and ideological similarity which essentially preclude certain states from joining. In an effort to turn history backwards the Community will increase its membership to fourteen so that, with the exception of Russia, all colonial powers are included, and thus

*sharpen the cleavage between itself and the rest of the world.*²⁸²

Galtung distinguished between power-over-others and power-over-oneself and between ideological (i.e. cultural), remunerative (i.e. trade and economic), and punitive (i.e. military) powers. The co-ordination of all these, and the power of communication constitute what is called politics. Power pressure can be resisted by directing counter-power in the opposite direction, or by developing more power-over-oneself which means *autonomy*. Finally, as far as power-over-others is concerned, he distinguished between power from something one *is or has* (i.e. resources) and *structural* power (i.e. centrality in world trade structure). This in turn can be divided into three aspects. *Exploitation* has to do with the direct exchange relation between two countries. When one country gets much more out of the exchange than the other, then the latter is being exploited. Exploitation is based today on the multinationals and the distinction between exploration and standardisation. *Fragmentation* is a

²⁸¹ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 2, p.26

²⁸² Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 2, pp.18-32

method that one party uses to dominate several parties, it is the method of divide and rule. This can be achieved by means of preventing *horizontal* contact between the dominated countries, avoiding *multilateral* contact involving the dominant and more than one of the dominated countries, and limiting contact between the dominated and the outside world. And *penetration*, i.e. penetration of the dominant country into the countries to be dominated. This can be achieved either as subversion, penetration from the bottom or the periphery, or superversion, penetration from the top. Superversion has two aspects. In the first the elite of the dominated country serves as a bridge-head for the elite in the Centre nation by acting as a recipient for its ideas, patterns etc. In the second, inequality is in itself distributed in an inegalitarian way between the dominant country and the dominated one. There is more inequality in the periphery than the centre. The combination of all these is *imperialism*. Another word for this is *dominance*. Dominance is based on *dependency*, the belief, after indoctrination, that only the centre can provide the periphery with something the latter regards as essential. Dependency and identification with the centre perpetuate the mechanism of structural power which helps to undermine autonomy.²⁸³

The resource power of the EC of the ten (Galtung presumed that Norway would join the Community) compares favourably with the other major powers (USA, USSR, Japan, China) as it would command one third of World trade, but the picture is overturned when one considers the number of computers in use. The Federal Republic of Germany has only 8000 computers whereas the US has 72000. The Community's dependent territories, the ocean floor, and the North sea which following the enlargement will become an EC lake with obvious benefits as far as

²⁸³ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 3, pp.33-47

energy is concerned, compensate for its very small area and offer unlimited opportunities for expansion under the 1958 Geneva Convention. This convention concerning the ocean floor defines the continental shelf as that part of the ocean floor adjacent to a coastal state and down to 200 meters, or even beyond that as far as exploration and exploitation are possible. The only limit is the mid-line principle defining the floor borderline between two coastal states. He then goes on to predict that the EC will catch up with the US and Japan on the tertiary sector, the services, as percentage of the GDP. At the time he was writing, unlike the US and Japan, this sector did not overshadow the secondary one. The same will be the case with civil aviation while, with the inclusion of Norway and the UK, its merchant fleet's capacity will outweigh that of all its competitors together. Thus the Community's remunerative powers are considerable. Moreover European cultural domination is solid and it is safe to predict that the EC will be a giant.²⁸⁴

Discussing the structural power of the EC he observed that relations between Community members were based on equality. The EC as an alliance for economic defence vies for partnership on an equal basis with the US. Relations with the Third World are characterised by the three faces of dominance, vertical division of labour, fragmentation, and penetration. Other Western European countries have been treated individually. The same applies, at the initial stages at least, to the European socialist states, which have also been treated individually rather than as a group. Different policies are administered in the direction of the Soviet Union, of Eastern Germany, and of the other members of the Warsaw Pact. This has resulted in an integration race with the establishment of the CMEA. Finally, the rest of the world countries have

²⁸⁴ Galtung, European Community Chapter 4, pp.48-54

been treated separately. In a few words EC policy aims at equality with the USA and Japan and domination over the others, particularly the Third World countries.²⁸⁵

The Community's policy towards the Third World is characterised by *exploitation* in the forms of the vertical division of labour maintained through the instruments of investment, research, and level of processing, with quotas replacing tariff restrictions. It is also characterised by *fragmentation* apparent in EC's relations with the bulk of Third World countries, where divisions between the group are encouraged by *selective preferences*, and the countries of the Yaounde Agreement in particular, which maintains the status quo and thus hinders horizontal trade and solidarity. The final characteristic is *penetration* into the elites of the former colonies, in the form of ideological *identification* with the European elites, and *dependency* on an enduring relation with them.²⁸⁶

As far as the Socialist countries are concerned, the policy pursued is one of vertical division of labour leading to increased dependency and, to a lesser degree, penetration and fragmentation. An integration race can be detected which might lead to a European Socialist Community (ESC) comprising the smaller Eastern European states, and which would challenge both the EC and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the degree of integration in the West, and soon also the East, works against a pan-European rapport.²⁸⁷

As the membership of the EC almost coincides with that of NATO, a transformation of the latter is what is needed for the first to acquire a military character as the chain effects of integration will result in attempts to create an independent defence force.

²⁸⁵ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 5, pp.55-67

²⁸⁶ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 6, pp.68-85

The changes in NATO's structure from hegemony to partnership combined with what he describes as the fall of the American empire and the EDC blueprint will push in this direction. This is the underlying motive behind European efforts to break the American uranium enrichment monopoly. The process will be accelerated by a series of inevitable domestic and international crises.²⁸⁸

Galtung then goes on to predict the future of the EC which, in his opinion, resembles Charlemagne's empire and which will become a political entity with a new capital and a single leader symbolising the new superpower. The world then will be divided into two opposing camps, USSR and US/EC on the one hand, and Japan and China on the other. This though suggests that the EC is not an emerging superpower, but part of an emerging Atlantic superpower. The new super-state will be the result of a geopolitical race, a *new non-military formula for empire-building* and will pose a new threat to world peace by introducing more conflict configurations.²⁸⁹

In chapter 10 he presents the demands that should be directed to the EC in terms of exploitation, fragmentation and penetration. As far as the first is concerned, relative to the Third World, this means giving up the idea of using these countries as raw materials' sources and markets for goods, and instead paying higher prices for raw materials, no quota restrictions for manufactured goods, free transfer of technology, abolishing vertical division of labour, and promoting horizontal trade among poor states. Relative to the socialist countries this means increased imports from them and transfer of technology instead of goods exports. As far as the second is concerned, relative to the third world it means the abolition of all preferential and differential

²⁸⁷ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 7, pp.86-98

²⁸⁸ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 8, pp.99-116

²⁸⁹ Galtung, *European Community* Chapter 9, pp.117-129

agreements, and channelling maximum capital and assistance to build strong third world organisations to negotiate with, thus moving away from the idea of dealing with individual countries and regional groupings. Relative to the socialist world this means preserving their solidarity and negotiating with the CMEA. Finally, as far as the last is concerned, relative to the third world and socialist countries it means a policy aiming at a better quality of life for the masses and closing the gap between the latter and the local elites, forming one's own development goals, and opening EC institutions at all levels to both groups of states. New forces would have to be provided to turn the European Community in such directions.²⁹⁰ Discussing the present forces he observed that the present Community apparatus is ill-suited for any fundamental change. The Commission is isolated from general society and the Eurocrats are concerned only with higher salaries. The extension of the Community will not boost its radicalisation, and an increase in Parliament's powers will not result in basic changes. The Western European working class is not a radicalising element either and any progressive hopes rest with the youth. A strategy for change should aim at increasing consciousness inside the Community as tremendous reservoirs of opposition will start flowing once the US supremacy is under dispute. Such a strategy should involve withholding of working power from the Community, revealing commercial secrets, and a strong reaction from the Third World and the Socialist countries.²⁹¹

Galtung saw European integration as a two pronged attempt by Western Europeans to regain control of old colonies and break free from American domination.²⁹² But

²⁹⁰ Galtung, European Community Chapter 10, p.138

²⁹¹ Galtung, European Community Chapter 10, pp.130-52

²⁹² Galtung, European Community p.153

*the European Community, where its global role is concerned, is not the beginning of anything new, but the end of something old. If the EC inspires anything at all, it is a feeling of déjà-vu.*²⁹³

Its structural power is unprecedented in history, but this power creates counterforces which someday may lead to a more fair and diversified world.

It is easy to criticise this thesis. Galtung himself has admitted that the concept of superpower is not synonymous with a powerful superstate and that his book suffers from certain shortcomings. The American military and moral defeats in Indo-China led him to underestimate US control over Western Europe and its ability to establish new forms of imperialism, as illustrated by the creation of the International Energy Agency. Examining the Lome Convention, which succeeded the Yaounde one, he accepted that the whole process was more one between equals than its predecessor. Exploitation was reduced since the new trade arrangements will facilitate the export of industrialised goods from the ACP countries to the Community. The joint negotiation highlights the reduction of fragmentation. Also the possibility of concluding equally favourable agreements with the rest of the world reduces the latter's fragmentation. But essentially Lome is a bad treaty because its character emphasises not human but structural development issues and strengthens private capitalism. Moreover it perpetuates the present division of labour by paying the raw material exporting states for remaining so and not turning to more advanced processing and thus prolongs internationalised capitalism.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ Galtung, *European Community* p.157

²⁹⁴ Galtung, J. "The Lome Convention and Neo-Capitalism", in Nairn, T. (ed.) *Atlantic Europe?* (Amsterdam, The Transnational Institute, 1976) pp.101-10

Galtung says little about the Community's internal affairs and constitution. As Holland has noted his thesis is an exaggeration. He failed to notice the lack of a combination of political, state, ideological, and economic relations that determine the quality of power, and ignored the Community's internal dynamics and the

*inability of its institutions to bridge the gap between super-power pretension and bureaucratic muddling.*²⁹⁵

It is not difficult to spot the shortcomings of his understanding of the process of European integration. His claim that de Gaulle vetoed the British applications because the Community was not yet ready to absorb new members²⁹⁶ contradicts the accepted version of events. As Urwin has argued de Gaulle's veto can be explained more by his fear that British participation might pose a threat to French European leadership, as well as his dislike of the American role in Europe.²⁹⁷ This view is shared by Greenwood.²⁹⁸ Moreover, his claim that de Gaulle's action has strengthened the integration process²⁹⁹ is doubtful and was not shared by de Gaulle's partners. His predictions about the future of the external role of the Community have not been proven true. EPC, which was replaced by CFSP under Maastricht, was never a great success story with member states putting their individual national interests above those of the Community as a whole. Galtung believes that among the Community members the policy pursued is one of equality. By this he means that the norm of equality is internalised and it cannot be said that the Community is a

²⁹⁵ Holland, S. UnCommon Market (London, MacMillan, 1980) p. 148

²⁹⁶ Galtung, European Community p. 21

²⁹⁷ Urwin, D. W. The Community of Europe () pp. 124-5

²⁹⁸ Greenwood, S. Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992) p. 86

²⁹⁹ Galtung, European Community p. 21

hierarchy of countries exploited by Germany.³⁰⁰ A careful examination will show that this is not the case. This was certainly not the aim of de Gaulle, and the fear today is that the EC will be dominated by the reunified Germany. His view on European cultural domination is highly disputable and is not shared by, among others, Jack Lang who has called for

*genuine cultural resistance, a real crusade against this domination, against - let us call a spade a spade - this financial and intellectual imperialism.*³⁰¹

Although not mentioned once in the speech it was clear, at least to the French press, that the Minister of Culture was referring to the US.³⁰² And this highlights the gulf between the Atlantic-Europe and the European-Europe assumptions.

It can be said that Galtung's most notable shortcoming, at least for the purposes of the present study, is the lack of treatment of nationalism.³⁰³ As a good Marxist-Internationalist he fails to address the issue. Nationalism is not even included in his list of the major European ideologies which includes conservatism, liberalism, and Marxism.³⁰⁴ In any case, the account he offers of the birth of the European superpower has nothing in common with the traditional process of strong nation-state building. Wallerstein has developed an alternative approach, a theory for the birth of the strong western state. For him nationalism is tantamount to capitalism. Capitalism is based on the so-called *unequal exchange*. This means the appropriation of surplus of the whole world economy by core areas, that is by strong states. Given slightly

³⁰⁰ Galtung, European Community p.57

³⁰¹ quoted in Mattelart et al. "International Image Markets", in During, S. (ed.) The Cultural Studies Reader (London, Routledge, 1993) p.427

³⁰² Mattelart, "International", pp.427-8

³⁰³ The same point is made by Nairn, T. "Super-Power or Failure? Johan Galtung's Europe" in Nairn, Atlantic Europe?, p.68

³⁰⁴ Galtung, The European Community p.53

different starting-points, the interests of various local groups came together in northwest Europe and created strong state mechanisms. In the periphery they separated resulting in weak ones. This process facilitated capitalist development and the emergence of *core*, *periphery*, and *semi-periphery*.³⁰⁵ Strong state mechanisms result in strong capitalism. This creates some problems for Galtung. The European Community will become a superpower only after strong Community level state mechanisms have been established. Nothing like this has happened yet. The Commission has not become a pan-European government and the Union is not a state as such. And the fact that people do not demonstrate in front at the Place Schuman is a clear indication of this impotence, although lately there have been agricultural protests in Brussels.

European integration is an attempt to accommodate and unite various nationalisms. For Nairn, Galtung's historical perspective is a limited one, focusing only on the recent imperialist past of the continent, and thus giving an inadequate theoretical basis. On the contrary, a broader historical perspective would have to look at the long history of inter-state warfare which accounts for the development of European capitalism and ends with World War II. Europe was divided and weak and it has remained in this historical limbo since the late 1940s. If integration is an effort to create a multinational state based on rapid capitalist development, then it is doomed since the *unevenness* inherent in capitalist development was the cause of destruction of the old multinational empires.³⁰⁶ Farhi saw the differences between Northern and Southern Europe, expressed as opposition between their respective ruling classes

³⁰⁵ Wallerstein, I. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol.16, no.4 (Sep.1974), pp.387-415

³⁰⁶ Nairn, T. "Super-Power or Failure?" in Nairn, *Atlantic Europe?* pp.66-73

following the 1973 oil crisis, as the reflection of the contradictions caused by *uneven development*.³⁰⁷

The relationship between capitalism and nationalism is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand capitalism is universalistic, and as such anti-national, but on the other needs, and depends upon, the nation-state and nationalism. It needs a strong state mechanism to safeguard its gains, defend it from outside competition, supply outlets, manpower and raw materials, and maintain internal peace.³⁰⁸ According to Kaldor the European nation-states, which are small by world standards, have no power to carry out effective parochial economic policies as the enormous growth of multinationals has eroded the traditional instruments of economic policy. European integration is an attempt to overwhelm particular protest and to protect more effectively certain parochial interests.³⁰⁹ And whereas in economic terms capitalism strives for continuous expansion by overcoming national particularities and local traditions, in social terms it has been forced to compromise with these very particularities and traditions. Capitalism has always started as a national phenomenon. Outside implantation by itself can not account for its rise. The EC is not a nation-state, and nationalism on a European scale does not exist as yet.³¹⁰

Another of Galtung's shortcomings is that he has based his theory on power categories, but he has failed to provide an adequate answer to the question where does power come from. But again for the purposes of the present research, his major failure is the failure to comprehend the power of nationalism. His theory remained

³⁰⁷ Farhi, A. "Europe: Behind the Myths" in Nairn, *Atlantic Europe?* pp.82-93

³⁰⁸ Farhi, "Europe". The same point is made by Kaldor, M. *The Disintegrating West* (London, Allen Lane, 1978) p.15

³⁰⁹ Kaldor, *Disintegrating* p.24

³¹⁰ Nairn, "Super-Power" in Nairn, *Atlantic Europe* pp.75-8

attached to structures, it did not take into account particularities and traditions, in short he is another example of a treatment that lacks all those elements that as we will see later on characterise a modern socialist understanding of the idea of the nation.

3. ERNEST MANDEL: THE INTERNATIONALIST

Certain thinkers in the European Left have seen the process of European Integration as one of strengthening capitalist interests over those of the workers. A typical example of this can be found in the work of Ernest Mandel³¹¹. He studied, what he called the *Contradictions of Imperialism* from a

*viewpoint which sees the origins, rise and fall of states and societies as ultimately determined by objective laws.*³¹²

Mandel began his study with the observation that, as a result of *unequal development* US power has been eroded very quickly. US ability to consolidate its relative, but not its absolute, superiority can be accounted for by three reasons. The Soviet departure from the capitalist system, the end of colonialism after the second World War, and the need to support economically Western Europe and Japan, the last being the result of the intrinsic economic necessities of American capitalism. The need to export surplus corporate capital led to the modern reconstruction of European industries, which in itself explains the European and Japanese *sensational comeback* into the world's markets.³¹³

The rapid expansion of the European economy between 1950 and 1964 was caused by the new industrial revolution, the need to close the gap in the consumer durables' production, the re-emerging arms industry, and the industrialisation of the underdeveloped parts of Western Europe. After the Second World War the sharpening of international competition led to increased international capital

³¹¹ Although a convinced Trotskyist Mandel does not seem to refer to Trotsky

³¹² Mandel, E. *Europe versus America*, (London, New Left Books, 1970)

³¹³ Mandel, *Europe*, Chapter 1, pp.9-17

concentration and centralisation aimed at the highly developed nations. The oligopolistic national trusts are driven towards international expansion in order to outstrip domestic competitors, acquire an international range of operations, or absorb foreign competitors threatening the monopolistic structure of the international market. This process takes four forms. These can be described as follows. *Out-and-out alienation*, when a national industry suffers in favour of foreign capital. This is not applicable to Western Europe. *Foreign capital penetration*, if the process is not completed and there is no qualitative change in politico-economic relations, this being the case of American capital in Europe. An example of this is the absorption of the French Machines Bull and the computer arm of the Italian Olivetti by the American General Electric. *International capital interpenetration*, with no single country holding a position of hegemony, is exemplified by the merger of the Belgian Gevaert and the German Agfa photographic companies. And finally, classical *national capital* concentration and centralisation, is symbolised by the merger of the Italian chemical giants Edison and Montecatini, which were eventually joined by the chemical arm of the state ENI trust. As far as multinationals are concerned for Mandel the concept of multinationality is a simple formality, since all American multinationals are controlled by particular American financial bodies. This combined with the fact that the American concept of multinationality is not reciprocal leads to the emergence of a European nationalism among European capitalists who must resist American economic expansion in order to survive.³¹⁴

Higher American productivity is the result of size, financial power and technological advance accelerated by the massive military spending and the European brain drain.

³¹⁴ Mandel, *Europe*, Chapter 2, pp.18-27

Big research budgets, the US spends more per capita than the EEC, and state subsidies have given US companies the technological advance they enjoy in computers, lasers, etc. Mergers on a national scale can not produce companies big enough to challenge the US supremacy which can be explained by Marxist laws of competition, accumulation, and capital concentration.³¹⁵

Competition dictates the centralisation of capital, and in certain sectors like supersonic aeroplanes, satellites, and the list is increasing daily, state and international financing is critical for profitable production. Capital interpenetration is fundamental in all sectors of the economy, and this is recognised by employers' organisations and Community officials alike. The European company statute is an attempt by the Commission to facilitate the process. For Mandel this is a manifestation of how the relations of production determine the social superstructure. European integration, since the common market has intensified competition, has accelerated the process of capital concentration. This in turn has triggered counter-tendencies as many West European bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, against their class interests, still think in the old national concepts. This has forced the big capital to re-examine the state's role.³¹⁶

Nowadays the state has become the protector of the profits of the monopolies and oligopolies. This has led to the paradox that whereas, on the one hand, the capitalist class has to follow the economic developments and become international, on the other it needs direct state intervention to protect it against social unrest. Thus Gaullism is to be seen as a manifestation of the inability of French capitalism to overcome the post-war economic and social crisis and successfully compete with its

³¹⁵ Mandel, *Europe*, Chapter 3, pp.28-39

foreign counterparts. Moreover, in common with other European bourgeoisies, it represented a challenge to US capitalist leadership and a suspicion of the Eurocrats. As the Community is not a real state the bourgeoisie tends to defend its national sovereignty as only the nation-state can guarantee its welfare. But paradoxically Gaullism became *American Capital's best ally* in Europe as without merging with other European firms national companies were ultimately captured by the Americans as the case of Machines Bull indicates. This combined with European interpenetration of capital and the need of European capital of a European state led to De Gaulle's downfall. Here it must be noticed that this is a peculiar example of economic determinism. Nevertheless the process is not complete yet and the era of national capital and state is not over. European capitalism needs supranational institutions to compete with its American counterpart, but a united European front has not been achieved because of the divergent interests of national capitalism. The moment they disappear and the international capital interpenetration creates central common interests integration will become deeper. The dividing line between pro and anti-Europeans is the one between the wealthier and weaker businesses, their respective interests dressed in passions and ideologies. As the telecommunication industry illustrates the leading concerns in the member countries support and need a common European platform.³¹⁷

British entry to the Community was the result of British Capital fears of being squeezed between European and American firms. The formation of big European companies is the only way of resisting American domination especially in the advanced sectors like computers and aviation. This project involves the relinquishing

³¹⁶ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 4, pp.40-50

of national sovereignty. De Gaulle's inability to transcend his early nationalist beliefs led him to veto the British application. Here there is a paradox. By opposing British entry he lost an ally in his fight against supranationalism. Moreover, an independent Europe is almost impossible without the British economy and technology.³¹⁸

But the interests of capital are contradictory to those of the workers and mankind in general, and economic integration on a regional scale heightens universal competition, and turmoil. The CAP, tariffs on textiles and food and the discrimination in favour of the associated African countries constitute a great barrier to Third World exports. This combined with the tendency of developed nations to trade between themselves leads to international concentration of wealth. Furthermore, the generous EEC loans to associated African states have not accelerated their industrial development but instead have been used to benefit community exports. Meanwhile, the Americans dominate in Latin American, Japanese and south-east Asian markets, and the Europeans in Chinese, Soviet and East European and African markets respectively. This means that since the rest of the world market does not essentially change the power relations between the two poles of international capitalism, the battle between them takes place in the West itself. At present American trusts compensate for higher labour costs with greater productivity due to technological advance and economies of scale.³¹⁹

Currency reserves is the one field that reflects most clearly the loss of absolute American superiority. Whereas in 1950 the US had a reserve of \$22.8 billion compared with \$3 billion for the EC countries and \$3.7 for Great Britain. By 1968

³¹⁷ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 5, pp.51-60

³¹⁸ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 6, pp.61-70

³¹⁹ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 7, pp.71-81

the US reserve was reduced to \$14.6 billion and the EEC one was increased to \$23.5 billion. Nevertheless the US economy is the most powerful in the world and any difficulties it might experience would endanger the whole capitalist system. As the similarity between European and American capital interests becomes clear the calls for a world currency become louder which, for Mandel, is incompatible with competition and capital accumulation. This is a contradiction the system can not solve.³²⁰

The fate of the Community's supranational institutions depends on the degree of capital interpenetration in Europe, as national governments will only relinquish their powers to a supranational authority if compelled by domestic economic forces. And as the long expansionist period comes to a stand still the big capital will make heavier demands on the bourgeois state. But given the degree of capital interpenetration, anti-crisis policies and the necessary intervention will be impossible within national boundaries and will have to be adopted at the community level. This means that the process of integration will either be reversed or deepened. High finance and big business push towards the latter as the need to spread the social costs of the imminent recession cannot be met without an effective supranational administration. That will be the manifestation of the Community's consolidation.³²¹

In the past the bourgeoisie has been associated with nationalism whereas the working class was the *incarnation* of internationalism. Large scale capitalism however has found it easier to become international than the proletariat as the latter's political division, lack of international practical experience (languages, travels, etc.) and lack of self-confidence have prevented the formation of a united international trade union

³²⁰ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 8, pp.82-94

movement. As a result European integration has shifted the balance of power against the workers. There is no justification therefore for the workers to abandon their effort to win power at the national level and concentrate at the EEC level instead or to wait for the socialisation of Europe via the universally elected European Parliament. Since the development of social and political forces in the Community is still controlled by the law of uneven development such a policy would only frustrate the socialist advance. And as long as the capitalists have not formed a competent European union and executive the objective possibilities for a successful socialist revolution exist in each individual country. The chances will be eliminated with the establishment of powerful supranational bodies following the international interpenetration of capital. Nevertheless it should be noted that this does not mean that the workers must prevent the interpenetration of European Capital. The alternative is not a retreat to bourgeois economic nationalism but Europe-wide actions leading to a united socialist Europe. And although the increasing international capital interpenetration will, in the beginning, weaken the economic power of organised labour at the national level, once the process is completed the international organisation of labour, as the only solution, will effectively counterbalance this trend.³²²

Answering Servan-Schreiber's proposals that the labour movement should support European capital concentration guaranteed by a mighty European federation, against transatlantic domination, Mandel saw no reason why the labour movement should renounce its aims. It is worth noticing here that Servan-Schreiber's proposals show some remarkable similarities with those of his fellow Frenchmen, the Rocardiens which were exposed in the first section of the present chapter. Without the abolition

³²¹ Mandel, *Europe*, Chapter 9, pp.95-106

of the private ownership of the means of production, surrendering power to the state would strengthen the dominant factions of big capital. Under free market conditions states and parliaments cannot control prices and profits. Only far reaching workers' control of production, and not just the right to consultation, can achieve the desired ends which are in conflict with the very structure of capitalist society. Meanwhile, the long-wave of expansion is coming to an end, and a new wave of slow growth is looming as a result of overproduction which at the end cannot be contained in over-capacity by organised capitalism. Only a socialist system of planning can solve the capitalist contradictions. In economic terms the relative prosperity and saturation in many consumer areas makes firm adherence to market economy meaningless. And in social terms automation emphasises the authoritarian framework of factories, and the society as a whole, and generates reaction against it. The

socialist alternative is the key to the solution of the problems raised by the competition between Europe and America.

For Mandel money is not the only factor determining where and how people will work. But even if this was the case, socialist Europe will be able to close the technological gap with the US because more workers' children will have higher education. Moreover, American research is tied with military objectives. Finally, a solid alliance with the Third World could be cemented. And he closed his book with the following words:

*Forward, against American and European monopolists, to the United Socialist States of Europe!*³²³

³²² Mandel, Europe, Chapter 10, pp.107-16

³²³ Mandel, Europe, Chapter 11, pp.117-134

Mandel's is an example of a Marxist analysis. As he put it in the beginning his is an attempt to explain the erosion of American supremacy as a result of objective historical laws and inevitable revolutions. He offers an economic deterministic discussion of European nationalism.³²⁴ The relative superiority of American firms is explained in terms of size and technological advance.³²⁵ With respect to the first as GM and IBM, the American multinationals par excellence, have realised big is not beautiful and breaking up could be the solution to a giant corporation's problems. This can be highlighted by IBM's recently announced record losses and the problems facing GM. On this side of the Atlantic ICI offers another example of the disadvantages of size. Today there are 179 European companies among the world's 500 biggest companies as compared to 135 U.S. and 128 Japanese.³²⁶ With respect to the technological advance Community policy is specifically designed to promote technological development and projects such as ESPRIT are examples of the importance that is allocated to this field. For Mandel US technological advantage has been boosted by the gigantic military expenditure and the brain drain from Europe to the US. This is disputable today in the face of the end of the Cold War. Converting military industries for civilian use is a very difficult task and trimming down looks like the only solution. And although it is true that mergers on a national scale can not produce industrial giants able to challenge the great American corporations³²⁷ as a result of Community policy transnational mergers and take-overs have multiplied recently. In the automobile sector Peugeot of France has bought Citroen, and have taken over the European section of Chrysler (Rootes in the UK and Simca in France), and the German VW has acquired Seat of Spain and the Czech Skoda.

³²⁴ Mandel, Europe, p.25

Mandel's assumption that the bourgeoisie needs state intervention and that the time of *laisser-faire, laisser-passer* is over³²⁸ seems flawed in the aftermath of the emergence of the new right and the triumph of Thatcherism in Britain and the development of the Single European Market. And his belief that the British computer industry is the only feasible western European competitor of the American corporations³²⁹ is unfounded since ICL has been bought by the Japanese who are now the force to beat in the sector. Towards the end of the book he predicted that the abundance and saturation in many consumer areas will make firm devotion to the market economy implausible.³³⁰ Again the nature of the capitalist system has rendered such predictions absurd as they fail to comprehend the system's ability to transform and create new needs. Overall, Mandel's picture of capitalism seems very simplistic. It is largely based on multinational industry. Nowhere does he deal with multinational finance capitalism (he has only dealt with domestic finance capital in relation to multinational capital), and this is something that makes his theory even more outdated. Nowadays it seems that it is the banks and financiers like James Goldsmith and George Soros that have the controlling power. Industry, and especially heavy industry, has been curtailed and directed by the finance capital. This lack of treatment is a major shortcoming. Much of his analysis seems to be based upon an extrapolation of current trends which he identifies at the time of writing. This is always a dangerous type of argument.

³²⁵ Mandel, *Europe*, p.28

³²⁶ *Fortune International*, No 17, August 23, 1993

³²⁷ Mandel, *Europe*, p.36

³²⁸ Mandel, *Europe*, p.51

³²⁹ Mandel, *Europe*, p.65

³³⁰ Mandel, *Europe*, p.129

But Mandel's great failure, in common with most socialists, seems to be his neglect of the power of nationalism, and that of national identity. As a typical marxist, he failed to take into account the great power of popular adherence to the nation-state. Nowhere he considered the nationalist sentiments of the working class, or even left any role to popular participation in the development of community institutions. For him as we have seen, the fate of the Community's supranational institutions depends on the degree of capital interpenetration in Europe. Under his understanding things like the popular rejection of the Maastricht treaty in Denmark, for example, could only be seen as historical mistakes. It is typical of his misunderstanding I believe that, for Mandel, the working class has not become international enough because of the lack of international practical experience (languages, travels, etc.) and lack of self confidence. Recent theories have attempted to fill this vacuum in socialist thought and this is the topic of the fifth chapter of the present thesis.

CONCLUSION

What is of some interest is the diversity of these early responses. From the examination of the above mentioned first wave of left thinkers, it becomes obvious that they all failed to grasp the reality of European integration and construct a reasonable response to it.

Departing from different theoretical startpoints they produced theoretical models and, in the case of Jaumont et al., action programmes, which the reality of European integration has proven false. The common theme in all these works is the deep misunderstanding of the way the nation-state and international society have evolved in the second half of the twentieth century. An understanding of the challenges that the modern nation-state faces is still missing from the socialist analysis of European integration. Only the Rocardians, to a certain degree, seemed to understand the power and the opportunities that the popular attachment to national identities can offer to socialism, but that was in an inconclusive way. The fact that they had to operate within the realms of a mainstream party can be the explanation for this "success". But this also is the cause of the same confusion in the vocabulary and the rhetoric used that we saw in the discussion of the German SPD and the French PS/SFIO of the previous chapter.

Galtung in turn, remained focused on his structures and power models having not time for any other factor in his discussion. And Mandel completely ignored national feelings and identities and the other notions that form the main body of more recent theories. All three theories remained mainly occupied with statism. Time has proven them to be irrelevant. All three strands of thought under consideration demonstrate

their aging by remaining attached to the economic determinism model of Marx and completely ignored any other issues that fall outside this category. It was only Spinelli, as we will see in the next chapter that managed to escape this straitjacket and provided the link with the new theories that form the backbone of the discussion of the final chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Altiero Spinelli: The Continuing Prophet

INTRODUCTION

Altiero Spinelli was born in Rome in 1907 and died in 1986. His significance cannot be overemphasized. Among the thinkers under consideration he was the only one that had the opportunity to try to put his ideas into practice. Moreover, he was the only one to have an inside view of the way the major Community institutions work, and to produce ideas that were a by-product of such a deep knowledge. His long political career can be divided into three stages. The first, covers his early years and starts with the *Ventotene Manifesto*, written in 1941, and ends in 1970. The second stage covers his period in the European Commission from 1970 to 1976. The last stage covers his years in the European Parliament, as an independent in the Italian Communist Party's (PCI) list, from 1976 until his death ten years later. The present chapter is an attempt to examine his intellectual development and to determine the nature of his European-socialism by looking at his words and deeds. Spinelli was a federalist. He was also a socialist with a flexible and non-doctrinaire understanding of the ideology. He attempted to produce a synthesis of federalism and socialism that took into account the importance of nations. In my examination of Spinelli I will place more emphasis on his theoretical works rather than the *Crocodile Initiative* and the Draft Treaty of European Union that followed it, as they were more the result of

compromising and accommodation of different interests, rather than ideological manifestations.

1.1941-1970. THE EARLY YEARS

The first recorded document in which Altiero Spinelli offered his vision of Europe is *The Manifesto of Ventotene*³³¹ (July 1941), after the island where he and Ernesto Rossi, the heads of the group with the same name, were detained at the time. They dismissed the nation-state as having outlived its usefulness, as having developed hegemonic tendencies towards other nation-states, and as having become the arena for class and economic conflicts which could destroy any united front of progressive forces. Although in the past the idea of national independence was a progressive one, it was injected with the seeds of capitalist imperialism which produced totalitarian states and resulted in world wars. If the nation-states are resurrected it will not be long before they are conquered by the reactionaries and they are placed against each other again. For Rossi and Spinelli,

*The question which must first be resolved, and if it is not then any other progress made up to that point is mere appearance, is that of the abolition of the division of Europe into national sovereign states.*³³²

Only a European Federation could solve the complex set of problems, such as the definition of boundaries, protection of ethnic minorities rights, etc., which plague Europe's international affairs. As the conflicts between the small principalities were resolved by the creation of large nation-states, so the problems between today's nation-states will be solved by their amalgamation into a European federation. Such a process will require the abolition of certain monarchical dynasties and will be a first

³³¹ The "Ventotene Manifesto", in Lipgens, W. (ed.), Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. I, (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1985) pp.471-84

step towards a global political unity. In the same document they stated that what makes a political party more progressive is not more democracy or socialism, but more internationalism.³³³ During these early years therefore, and under the effects of the Second World War, Spinelli was preoccupied with was federalism. It was seen as the solution to the great evils of the war. At the time these line were written, the war was threatening the existence of civilisation in Europe, and federalism seemed the only solution.

The same line of thought can be detected in Spinelli's other writings of the period. In the essay on *The United States of Europe and the various political tendencies* (1941) he dismissed communism for focusing only on the abolition of capitalism, which of itself does not lead to war, while overlooking the problem of an international political authority to draw up economic plans.

*The only way to avoid these evils is to create institutions which will frame and enforce an international law against the pursuit of aims that profit one nation at the expense of others.*³³⁴

In the essay on *Marxist policy and federalist policy* (1941), he distinguished between Marxism and socialism and saw federalism as the only cure to the evils of modern society.

*Recognising as we do the prime necessity of creating a federation of the existing sovereign states - at least, to begin with, in Europe, where imperialism has achieved its most terrible manifestations - the advocates of this solution are best distinguished from other groups by the name of federalists.*³³⁵

³³² "Ventotene Manifesto", in Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1, p.478

³³³ "Ventotene Manifesto", in Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1, p.479

³³⁴ Spinelli, A. "The United States of Europe and the various political tendencies", in Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1, p.485

³³⁵ Spinelli, A. "Marxist policy and federalist policy", in Lipgens, Documents, Vol.1, p.490

The nation-state should be abolished and the monopolies should be socialized in a revolutionary situation.³³⁶ Here another theme can be identified. Spinelli now introduced the idea of socialization, a classic socialist theme. So alongside federalism socialism came into his work.

In the *Draft Declaration of the European Resistance Movements*³³⁷, written largely by him in Geneva in July 1944, Spinelli called for the transcending of absolute state sovereignty and advocated a single world federal organization to be achieved gradually. The first step will be a European federal union to guarantee peace in the continent which will be the cornerstone of world peace. The geographical limits of the union were not specified but all countries that belong wholly or partly to Europe would be eligible for membership. The member states should irrevocably surrender to the federation the external affairs, defense, and international trade and communications aspects of their sovereignty. The declaration called for a Union government directly responsible to the people and not to national governments with its own armed forces, excluding all other national armies, and a supreme tribunal to interpret the constitution and settle the differences between the federation and the member states, or between the states themselves.

Looking back at the *European Union and the Resistance*³³⁸ he justified Federalism as a reaction to the nation state with which Nazism and Fascism had been identified,

³³⁶ These two essays were published in Rome by the underground in 1944 as: "A.S." (A. Spinelli) and "E.R." (E. Rossi), *Problemi della federazione europea*. They are discussed briefly by Delzell, C.F. "The European Federalist Movement in Italy: First Phase, 1918-1947", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 32, no. 3, (Sep. 1960), pp. 241-250

³³⁷ "Draft declaration of the European Resistance Movements, July 1944", in Vaughan, R. *Post-War Integration in Europe*, (London, Edward Arnold, 1976), pp. 16-20

³³⁸ Spinelli, A., "European Union and the Resistance", in Ionescu, G. (ed.), *The New Politics of European Integration*, (London, MacMillan, 1972), pp. 1-9

and which had failed to guarantee the independence and security of its citizens' despite all their sacrifices.

*The nation state had become, for those who sought guidance, a compass which had ceased to give any bearings.*³³⁹

The radical wing of the resistance was striving to achieve a democratic state with regional autonomy, a free market economic system with an element of planning to guarantee uninterrupted development and social justice, and a federal government in charge of foreign, defense, and economic policies.³⁴⁰

It is here I believe that one can detect the themes that dominated Spinelli's thinking throughout his long career, the themes that characterised it, the themes that set him apart from traditional thinkers of the left and the themes that can establish the link between himself and the more recent theories that are examined in the following chapter. These are federalism, development, market socialism, grassroots democracy, and rights. What, in Spinelli's words, were the aims of the radical wing of the resistance, are now the questions concerning socialism in a transformed world.

Later, looking back to the growth of the European Movement since World War II, Spinelli attributed it to the combination of a number of factors.³⁴¹ The war experience led to the downfall of the idol of the sovereign national state in the continent as all European people suffered military defeat. The predominance in all west European countries of Catholic political parties which were not eager to safeguard national sovereignty contributed significantly to the growth of the European movement. This

³³⁹ Spinelli, "European Union", p.3

³⁴⁰ Spinelli, "European Union", p.4

process was accelerated by the decline of the established nationalist forces such as the various national administrative, social and economic bodies. Moreover, the fear of Soviet expansionism boosted, by proxy, ideas of European unity as the only alternative to Communism. In addition the American influence favored a united continent. And finally, the need to find a solution to the German problem was becoming more pressing.

Assessing the record of the ECSC Spinelli identified three limitations. One, the community was not completely separated from the national controlled economies, two the High Authority was restricted by the national ministers, and three the Common Assembly had no legislative power. In this document Spinelli, once more, advocated a federalist approach and attributed the failures of the past to the functionalist position which did not attack directly the problem of the limitation of national sovereignty. Instead of moving through conventional diplomatic channels the Schuman Plan should have been elaborated by a European constituent assembly. The failed EDC was a step in the right direction which was killed by the relaxation in international relations following Stalin's death, the economic boom, and the revival of national conservatism. Functionalism had contaminated Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe which was interested only in the speedy achievement of an atomic pool. Again he stated his belief in the inability of national governments to promote serious European integration and to guarantee the economic and social welfare of their citizens. European union will be brought about only by the people and not by the bureaucrats.

³⁴¹ Spinelli, A., "The growth of the European movement since World War II", in Grove Haines, C. (ed.), European Integration, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1957), pp.37-63

Again, federalism can be seen as the dominant theme in Spinelli's thought. Federalism that should lead to a United Europe. But the way this should be brought about is of importance for us. As we saw, the Schuman Plan should have been elaborated by a European Constituent Assembly, and European union should be based on popular participation. The subject of such an enterprise must be economic and social welfare for the citizens. These are the themes that set Spinelli apart from most of the other supporters of European integration of his time.

In *The Eurocrats* (1966) Spinelli described what he called the centres of united European action. He was dismissive of the old notions of nationalism, national solidarity, and the nation state since these were the causes of European wars. It was the Second World War that dealt a final blow to the popularity of the states among their citizens and opened the way for a united Europe. It is not surprising that the less pro-European nations are the Swiss, the Swedes, and the British who, for different reasons, did not experience total defeat. The War disasters have turned Europeanism into

*a blueprint of political action which can offer an interpretation of, and a solution to, the problems of a Europe in misery and a Europe in affluence, a Europe politically and militarily impotent and a Europe once more an important factor in world politics...*³⁴²

Discussing the various approaches to European unification Spinelli observed that the choice is between the federalists' determination to create democratic liberties among multinational Europeans, the functionalist Bureaucratic supranational structure, or the confederalist transformation of old nationalisms into a new European

³⁴² Spinelli, A., *The Eurocrats. Conflict and Crisis in the European Community*, (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1966), p.7

nationalism. His sympathy certainly lies with the first. Functionalism, on the one hand, suffers from the *intrinsic weakness* of political power as the possible unpredictability of the member states could destroy the Community and has created a centralised bureaucratic Europe. Confederalism, on the other, contains

*nationalist resentments, autarchical dreams, authoritarianism, disdain for democracy, and desire for power.*³⁴³

The Parliament must be capable of legislating, imposing taxes, voting budgets, and participating somehow in the choice of head of government. What the Assembly lacks, and thus is deprived of a genuine Parliamentary character, is true representation of political forces and effective participation in Community decision formulation. The Commission's indifference towards the EP has undermined its own authority in the face of the growing power of the various intergovernmental bodies. Moreover, the Parliament has failed to exploit the links of its members with their respective national assemblies and Commissioners to its own advantage. The enlargement of the parliament's powers will signify the passage from the functionalist Europe of offices to the federal democratic Europe.³⁴⁴ Once more here, the enlargement of the parliamentary powers can be seen as the issue that can emphasise Spinelli's importance for today's socialism. Giving more power to popular assemblies is one of the key issues in the recent discussion of socialist regeneration.

Assessing the role of the political parties he observed that all parties have been infected with Europeanism which has given a feeling of general popular support to national ministers involved with European issues. Gaullist confederalism, designed

³⁴³ Spinelli, *Eurocrats*, Chapter 1, pp.3-25

³⁴⁴ Spinelli, *Eurocrats*, pp.151-72

to favor French national supremacy, resulted in a parting of ways for the left and the right corresponding to different concepts of Europe, with the left opting for the democratization of the Community. Nevertheless, these different concepts will remain vague until there is a democratic power struggle at the European level.³⁴⁵

So, during these early years Spinelli's thinking was affected by the war experience. Federalism was his solution. But it was a federalism that was characterised by democracy and popular participation.

³⁴⁵ Spinelli, Eurocrats, pp. 172-90

2. 1970-1976: THE COMMISSIONER

Spinelli's ideas during the time that he served as a Commissioner were expanded in *The European Adventure* (1972). Here, he offered his vision of the European Community which he regarded as the expression of the European idea.³⁴⁶ It is clear that for him a common market is not the ultimate goal.

*The purpose of the European Community is to unite progressively the destinies of several nations by the development of a body of laws and institutions common to them all, obliging them to face certain great tasks with a common policy and to adopt a common position and responsibility towards the world outside.*³⁴⁷

And although unions of nations have been brought about in the past by violence, the European Community is an effort to achieve unity by consensus in the aftermath of World War II. The cataclysm of the Second World War resulted in a catharsis of nationalism in Western Europe as it was held responsible for the tragedy. In contrast to the west, in the other half of the continent Soviet military predominance has discredited the notion of unity, and nationalism is seen as the reference point of a repressed and passive resistance.

What he calls *The European Adventure* has met numerous obstacles in the process. Although Europe is popular and the differences in popular belief lie only in the characteristics each individual ascribes to it, the number of people involved in it is very small. The pro-European attitude is ever increasing along with the number of

³⁴⁶ Spinelli, A., *The European Adventure. Tasks for the Enlarged Community*, (London, Charles Knight & Co Ltd., 1972), p.vii

³⁴⁷ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p.1

problems which demand European rather than national solutions. Nevertheless, is not yet sufficiently articulate in political terms and has not created the agencies for popular participation, elections, parliament, a European government. The Commission has provided inspiration but its capacity has been hindered by the Rome and Paris treaties and its inability to develop the constructive political imagination which the European adventure needs.

The substantial resistance of the national establishment forms the second obstacle.

*One may no longer believe in the supremacy of the national perspective, but all traditions, laws, centres of command, habits of obedience, working habits and standards, and calculations of profit and loss are national in character; the majority of personal relationships, public or private, are with fellow nationals, who think and feel in a similar way. Once homage has been paid to the idea of Europe, profound national conservatism is easy.*³⁴⁸

This is particularly true with respect to economic policies. And although the centre governing parties adopted Europeanism, it was the two ends of the political spectrum that were reluctant. As far as the left is concerned, leftist nationalism, based on controls and measures imposed on the nation state, in association with communist loyalty to the USSR had penetrated the internationalist Left. In the right, the Gaullist variety aspired to a Europe where important decisions remain under national control. This confederal tendency is present in all national administrations and should be combated with the creation of supranational action centres based on a minimum of supranational administration. Everyday issues make national governments inward looking and it is only in times of crisis that they become European oriented and are in agreement with each other. The Commission has been the most authoritative and

³⁴⁸ Spinelli, European Adventure, pp.9-10

effective centre of common action, but the lack of a truly effective institution meant that substantial progress was made only at rare occasions.

Assessing the process of European integration in the 60s, he found that it was a positive decade as the successes outweighed the failures of the era and the number of regulations, directives, and organisations created resulted in an advanced level of economic interpenetration among the member states. But this was not true for the political sphere where the Community appeared weak and divided and it was only towards the end of the decade that pattern started to improve.

Writing before the 1973 enlargement, Spinelli identified the tasks for the 70s. These included the implementation of economic and monetary union combined with common regional, social, environmental, industrial, and scientific policies; the coordination of more areas of foreign policy; and the overhaul of the Community institutions. Without common international action in all fields the community structure is in danger of collapsing as none of the goals of the enlarged Community are included in the present Treaties. Declarations of principles in themselves, without the means to achieve the specified ends, are empty. The long crisis of Euratom is an example. If the then forthcoming October 1972 Summit were to work towards the realisation of its objectives by means of intergovernmental diplomatic negotiations then the national administrations would keep all their prerogatives. But, for him

In reality, the Community is not merely an association of states; it is also a political entity with its own personality, superior in certain aspects to the states, possessing its own organisations, producing decisions which must be accepted by the member states and respected by their citizens. Thus, that which for the states is a treaty, is for the Community its own constitution; that

*which for the states is a revision of the treaty is for the Community a revision of its constitution.*³⁴⁹

The Treaty, according to democratic principles and in order to counterbalance national conservative tendencies, should be revised by the European Parliament with the Commission's support and finally should be ratified by national assemblies. The European Parliament should be directly elected and more powerful. New delegations should be nominated to the EP on January 1st, 1973 to coincide with the enlarged Community's birth. A new electoral law should be introduced and a date for direct elections should be set within a specific period. Again the concept of democracy, with emphasis on popular participation, accountability, constitutionalism and citizenship are emphasised. And these are combined with social, environmental and regional concerns.

Given the different conditions in member states Spinelli saw the danger in monetary union that would lead either to a levelling-up of inflation rates or to slower growth in some member states. The solution to such a problem is to be found in interpenetration as increasing interdependence will result in greater convergence in economic performance. Acute competition and the emergence of transnational unions limiting the possibilities of wage explosions, will close the competitive gap between different countries. Productivity performance will become more uniform with the growth of multinational corporations. A common monetary policy will eliminate the possibility of disparate price trends and price expectations, a trend which is going to be boosted by increased labour mobility and common research, energy, transport, competition, and vocational training policies. The effects of interdependence will be

³⁴⁹ Spinelli, European Adventure, p.26

strengthened by the harmonization of economic objectives, policies and institutions, and any country which finds that it will fail to achieve its goals should automatically *have* its strategy examined at Community level.³⁵⁰ Again, Spinelli touched upon the issue of the state and globalization. The inability of the traditional nation-state to cope with the emerging problems of interdependence are dealt with by means of common action at the European level.

Next he attempted to offer a solution to the problem of regional inequality. Regional policies must be adopted in order to achieve balanced growth throughout the Community, but despite the good will expressed in the Rome Treaty the positive means for such a policy were not provided. A new idea of regional policy in the era of full economic integration would be a step towards political union. New political mandates and institutions are needed for the enlarged Community. Problems of structural imbalance referred to as the declining periphery and the over-expanding centre occur in all the new member states. The policy's goal should be the healthy distribution of the working population. The first problem to be tackled is the *inflation/redundancy* syndrome. Bringing jobs to the workers should subordinate the stock-in-trade of regional policy provisions. Moreover, such a policy should end the

*non-sense of compartmentalised policies for agricultural structures and of the importation of third country workers into already congested areas while Community regions are still suffering from redundancies.*³⁵¹

The Community countries have been undergoing a structural change characterised by the rapid industrialisation of certain hitherto pre-industrial regions since the end of World War II, the transformation, as a result of technological and commercial

³⁵⁰ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, pp.92-6

change, of the old industrial and urban regions, and the changing nature of urbanisation which benefits the old financial and administrative centers. This is the second problem that must be dealt with by the regional policy and has come to be known as the *dereliction/pollution* syndrome. The last problem is that of *congestion* of political power. Regional planning power should be allocated to the appropriate level and this would entail the creation of a new Community jurisdiction and greater autonomy for the regions. This will form the bridge from economic to political union.³⁵² The sticks and the carrots of the existing regional policy have failed to solve the problem of regional imbalance. If a fairer distribution of workers is to be achieved, Community control and intervention is required. Agencies of entrepreneurial nature should be created, the importation of workers from third countries should be controlled and finally, a system of public funding should be devised to build the infrastructure necessary to give regional ventures a proper chance. The ideas of regional autonomy, free market with a degree of regulation and state intervention, and environmental concern, topics that were to dominate the discussion about the reconstruction of the left decades later were dominant in Spinelli's thinking in the early seventies.

He called for a revision of the Treaties, the strengthening of the European Parliament, and for the Community to acquire a jurisdiction in physical planning.³⁵³ Spinelli identified four fields of action in regional policy. *Regulation*, combining within one Community field of action the distinct national regimes for economic and physical planning with the view of leading to a fully comprehensive Community policy for the distribution of the workers. *Investment*, the rationale of which would be to introduce

³⁵¹ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p.102

³⁵² Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p.106

a Community perspective into the thinking of the financial institutions and public budgeting practices of the individual states. *Development*, amalgamating into a single entity the various national fields of action. This

*is of the greatest importance for integration and economic union. The purpose of the measures included in it is to develop policies and institutions that treat the enlarged Communities as a single territory and so produce for the Communities as a whole, a unity of action and a sense of mutual responsibility analogous to that which characterises the action of a national government.*³⁵⁴

Finally, *strategy* to ensure that regional policy keeps up with the pace of economic and monetary union.³⁵⁵

*In fact everything is interdependent in the construction of Europe. The customs union provided the starting point for the monetary and economic union, which is intended to prolong and consolidate it; this postulates in its turn political union.*³⁵⁶

Spinelli outlined what he regarded as the Community's essential qualities. All these are of central importance to any discussion on the future of socialism in today's conditions. These qualities form the outline of the discussion in the following chapter of the present thesis. First come liberty and democracy, the essential values of socialist theory and practice. Secondly, there is respect for national identity and sovereignty, co-existing within the European Community.

The goal of the Community is not a single European state, designed to become a single European Nation, but a Federation of Nations in which

³⁵³ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p. 107-11

³⁵⁴ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p. 118

³⁵⁵ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, pp. 111-21

³⁵⁶ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p. 122

*citizens will jealously guard their own traditional home country while becoming at the same time citizens of the Community.*³⁵⁷

Thus Spinelli understood the power of national allegiances and allowed for multiple identities. Thirdly, there is the development of increasingly compatible economic systems by subordinating national policies to an overall economic policy. Thus he touched on the problem of the changing nature of sovereignty and the unit of change in contemporary socialist ideas. Moreover, the Community has also to develop a policy for society and nature to counterbalance the negative effects of growth. What is needed is a new philosophy of education to allow for work for the youth, adult education, and political involvement as well as enjoyment of leisure for all. In the workplace the workers should be brought in during the process of decision making along with managers and owners. The problems of the cities should be tackled collectively so that a remedy is found for the development that threatens the life of this foundation of all great civilizations. This calls for a coordination of national decision making and reform of the Commission's consultative bodies so that the Community's bureaucracy can effectively carry out its role as the central body which promotes the Community.³⁵⁸ Again all these ideas were to dominate the discussion of socialism in a transformed world years later. Spinelli seemed to share the ideas of workers' participation and of the new social movements before they became fashionable.

Searching for ways to give a single voice to the Community he singled out the relations with the developing countries as the most important of the three aspects of foreign policy. The context in which future policy towards the West will be formed

³⁵⁷ Spinelli, European Adventure, p.147

has been changed by a combination of American frustration with foreign affairs and *opportunism* as regards to the post-war economic system, and the changing nature of international trade with the doing away of protectionism and concern with social issues which eroded the consensus on the emphasis of higher GNP. This translated means non-tariff barriers and concern with production itself as much of what is socially desirable (pollution control, etc.) is not economically efficient. All these mean that the Community should introduce a political element in trade negotiations. A unified Community should promote the idea of international integration among the developed countries along the EFTA lines and the Commission should be given powers to bargain.

For Spinelli, the enlarged Community should strive towards the gradual transfer of prerogatives in certain fields from individual states to competent and democratically organised Community institutions, and the development of inter-state cooperation in the fields where interdependence is of a low level. The Parliament suffers from not having its function clearly defined, and as far as direct elections to the European Parliament are concerned, what is needed is the endowment of the Assembly with real authority, and population related representation. Constitutional reform must define the authority that has to be delegated to the Community institutions. And closing the book he stated:

*The old Community of Six created a customs union and an agricultural policy. The new enlarged Community has to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the dollar system, to meet the need for common action against ominous threats to our environment, to pool resources in industry and technology, to find new social patterns and to play a new role in a multipolar world.*³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, pp.145-55

³⁵⁹ Spinelli, *European Adventure*, p.186

Again, during these years, Spinelli remained a convinced federalist. But his espousal of environmentalism, popular participation, rights, and respect for national character were very apparent. And in practical politics he found ways of working towards these objectives.

3. 1976-1986: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Spinelli was elected to the European Parliament in 1976 as an independent in the PCI's list. During this time he was especially concerned with upgrading the power of the European Parliament, of the body that could promote accountability in the Community. His years as an MEP were spent working towards this direction. In 1978 reflecting back on the Community's institutional crisis, he observed that conflict is endemic in the system since the essential elements of the Community, the functional Commission, the federal Court and Parliament, and the confederal Council, are founded on contradictory principles. Thus national governments have paralysed the Community, a possible collapse of which would revive nationalism and would result in American domination. Institutional reform is therefore overdue and the first directly elected Parliament should transform the Commission into a European government. Such a body

...can emerge only from an appropriate reform of the Commission. Since the Community has to be, on one side, a democratic body and on the other one a compound of different nations which intend to maintain their own peculiarities, a Parliament representing the people and a Council representing the member states, are essential components of the institutional structure; both must participate in the formation and control of the Government, in legislating, in levying taxes and authorising expenditures. But these developments of the Parliament and of the Council can only result from the central decision to endow the Community with a fully-fledged common Government.³⁶⁰

So, Spinelli was not only aiming at introducing democracy into the Community operation, but was also concerned with the preservation of national peculiarities,

something that proves, once more, the fact that, unlike the other theorists discussed in the previous chapter, he understood the importance of nations. As Burgess has noted, Spinelli's federalist and constitutionalist approach to the European construction, unlike Monnet's functionalism, led him to allocate to the Parliament a crucial role and he had endlessly encouraged the Commission to support it.³⁶¹ In June 1980 Spinelli circulated a letter to all MEPs describing his plan for a Parliament initiative. Eight members of various nationalities and party groupings responded to his invitation and they met on July at the Crocodile restaurant in Strasbourg. The nine agreed that reform of the Community was needed if it were to become more sufficient. The European Assembly should undertake such an initiative. A club was formed named after its birthplace. The *Crocodile Initiative* stem from his awareness that, whereas the people comprising the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court do not represent their individual national interests, the Council is rendered impotent by the fact that ministers represent their respective countries.³⁶² As Spinelli himself acknowledged, the need for reform occurred to the MEPs as they became aware of a number of facts. The power to reject the budget was only a blunt weapon. The Council ignored all of the Parliament's recommendations. The Commission rarely noticed the common popular interests while the Council was the real initiator of policies. There was no executive in charge of common foreign policy, and thus nothing to establish fixed points of reference for the parliamentary debates in this field. The recognition that previous suggestions for institutional reform, within the existing treaty framework, had been abortive. And finally, the acknowledgment that

³⁶⁰ Spinelli, A. "Reflections on the Institutional Crisis in the European Community", West European Politics, Vol.1, no.1 (1978), p.87

³⁶¹ Burgess, M. Federalism and European Union, (London, Routledge, 1989), pp.93-5

³⁶² Spinelli, A. "Foreword", in Lodge, J. (ed.) European Union: The European Community in search of a Future, (New York, St.Martin's Press, 1986)

daily the solution to an increasing number of problems can be found by joint action.³⁶³

Discussing the *Crocodile Initiative*, which led to the draft European Union Treaty (EUT)³⁶⁴, Cardozo and Corbett noted that Spinelli acted as the catalyst required if all political groups were to participate in the process, and he acted as an impartial mediator in the Committee on Institutional Affairs in order to achieve unanimity. The final resolution was supported by the EPP, Liberal, Socialist and Communist groups, while the Conservatives left a free vote and the Gaullists abstained. Furthermore, with the exception of Denmark, it was supported by the majority, of those voting, of every nationality.³⁶⁵ Lodge has divided the EUT's basic ideological premises into two categories. On the one hand there are the elements regarding pluralist democratic issues; and on the other, those manifesting federal arrangements, although federalism as a term does not appear in the text.³⁶⁶ These two sets of elements form the backbone of Spinelli's theory and underline his importance for the present discussion. Moreover, the Union's stated objectives include harmonious development, full employment, and protection of the environment. These are concerns that have dominated many recent discussions about the future of socialism.

Within the implicit federal objectives, it should be noted that European Union institutions will carry out only those tasks that can not be dealt with effectively by the national institutions. According to Burgess, this notion of subsidiarity was incorporated in the Draft Treaty at the insistence of the Christian Democrats and

³⁶³ Spinelli, A. *Towards the European Union*, Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence 13 June 1983, European University Institute

³⁶⁴ Bull. EC 2-1984

³⁶⁵ Cardozo and Corbett, "The Crocodile Initiative", in Lodge, J. (ed.) *European Union: the European Community in search of a Future*, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 15-46

Spinelli himself did not care much for it.³⁶⁷ One might also note that in his study on the Draft Treaty's *Policy for Society*, Collins observed that while it did not break new ground in any sensational way, it was primarily concerned with the preservation of the existing policies, and to a lesser degree with the promotion of new individual and societal issues. The mark of political compromise was evident. But in the field of international relations common action will be the norm if a decision falls under the Union's competence, but the stress is on promoting interdependence with the member states retaining a degree of autonomy. In accordance with federalist principles, the European Parliament is given a prominent role in the Union's decision making, while the proposed legislative process highlights the Council's accountability to the Parliament.

So again we find the same themes of federalism and democracy, along with the attempt to empower the European Parliament, and concern for economic social, and environmental issues. These are combined in a package to invigorate the process of integration, while at the same time showing respect for national characteristics.

³⁶⁶ Lodge, J. "European Union and the First Elected European Parliament: The Spinelli Initiative", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.XXII, no.4 (June 1984), pp.377-402

³⁶⁷ Burgess, M. "Confronting the European Constitution: Federalism and Subsidiarity", *ECRU Insight*, no.1 (Dec.1993) p.5

CONCLUSION

Spinelli's career spans a unique period. His approach was important because he offered an inclusive view of politics and was concerned with both theory and action. Spinelli was above everything else a federalist, but also a man of the non-doctrinaire left, who was eclectic and open to a variety of influences. The federalism which he encountered through the liberal economist L.Einaudi remained the constant theme throughout his career.³⁶⁸ As Burgess has observed, federalism also became a Christian Democratic notion which could be combined with the Catholic view of organic society authorized in the papal encyclicals of the *Rerum Novarum* (1891), *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) and *Pacem in Terris* (1963), which constitute a philosophy of man evolving around the federal principle. Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi were all dedicated catholics and a European federation is the stated goal of the EPP's party statute.³⁶⁹

Recognizing this approach, one may still raise the question: what is the distinctively socialist character of Spinelli's contribution and where is it to be located? Nobody can doubt his Europeanist convictions and evidence of his approach and activities are to be found in the history and developments of the European Union. But in what sense was he a socialist? In his early writings he mentioned the revolution but he distinguished between marxism and socialism. He regarded internationalism as the determinant of progressiveness. He called for a European Community with a stronger identity and international presence, increasingly

³⁶⁸ Burgess, M. "Federal Ideas in the European Community: Altiero Spinelli and 'European Union', 1981-84", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 19, no.3 (Summer 1984), pp.339-347.

³⁶⁹ Burgess, M. "Political Catholicism, European Unity and the rise of Christian Democracy", in Smith, M.L. & Stirk, P.M.R. (ed.) *Making the New Europe*, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp.142-155. For the origins of christian democracy and its doctrines see Irving, R.E.M. *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1979) pp. 1-28.

independent from the USA. But his Europeanism was not an empty vessel in terms of ideology and policy. While rejecting the state socialist models of public ownership and central planning in favour of a mixed economy, he favoured a dynamic conception for popular public authorities. He campaigned for European public policies to promote economic growth, full employment, popular participation in public life including the workplace, and environmental protection. His European federalism, as we have seen, involved commitments to the principle of social solidarity, using European and national public authorities for the redistribution of resources to disadvantaged social groups and to regions. The development of popular education along with scientific research and technology were public responsibilities. Many of these objectives overlap with those of other political traditions, including the more progressive elements of Christian Democracy and social liberalism. But this is merely a recognition that none of the major democratic western political ideologies can be conceived as completely mutually exclusive. There are significant shared values and objectives.

I believe his great contribution to socialism to be in his recognition and development of these linkages. As, in the early stages, an isolated integrationist in the European left he provided a vital link between socialism and Europeanism. While today the socialist parties act as strong advocates of integration this was not always the case, and Spinelli's contribution to this climate of ideas was important. His ideas also fit in the current debate about socialism ~ where such notions as market, association and citizenship, and environmentalism figure prominently in the attempts to redefine the tarnished ideology.

This contribution should also be understood as arising in a particular political and cultural environment. He was an Italian. His socialist credentials were of an Italian origin with its unique socialist tradition, which has a number of strands where liberalism, political catholicism, liberalism, and marxism have had fruitful encounters.³⁷⁰ Similarities with Spinelli's line of argument can be detected in the thought of Bobbio and Rosselli, who are to be discussed in the next chapter. It is worth noticing here, that Spinelli was a member of *Giustizia e Libertà*, and a leading member of this group was Carlo Rosselli. The group's programme was based on the ideas of parliamentary socialism, large regional autonomies (almost a federal system), workshop democracy, and civil society which was conceived as a sort of federation of federations.³⁷¹ Some clear similarities between Spinelli and Rosselli are easy to find. They both rejected Marxism and attempted to infuse liberalism into socialism which they saw as part of the dynamic idea of liberty. They saw socialism as a moral ideal and a commitment, as humanism, with the goal of extending democracy. Unlike marxism which they understood to envisage a homogenous future society, they allowed for a more pluralistic model which could include antagonistic features. And like Spinelli, Rosselli seemed to understand the power of nationalist feelings, recognising the positive role that nation states had played in human development while being critical of the existing state system. As Albertini said, Spinelli felt that the left should be more interested in the European ideal. The left's

³⁷⁰ For an early example see Cammett, J.M. Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967)

³⁷¹ Rosselli, C. Liberal Socialism, ed. by N.Urbinati, trans. by W.McCuaig, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.xxviii-xxix

view of development and reform would be realized through European integration.³⁷²

This is his great legacy to socialists and Europeans alike.

³⁷² Albertini, M. in the E.P.'s Battling for the Union-Altiero Spinelli, 1988, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, p.51

CHAPTER FIVE

Socialism in a Transformed World

INTRODUCTION

The end of the eighties marked a turning point in European and world politics alike. In central-eastern Europe a revolutionary upheaval, albeit not the one expected by convinced Marxists, toppled the established communist regimes and thus dealt a blow to socialism from which the ideology has yet to recover. One has to agree with Baudrillard that revolution

*is even less kind to those who think it has already happened than to those who oppose it.*³⁷³

But for Motchane the collapse of communism represents a double failure for Social Democracy as well. One, its inability to safeguard in the European consciousness an historical domain which is its own. And two, its failure to develop a practical method that would pursue its perspectives in the social consciousness.³⁷⁴ In the meantime, in the western half of the continent the prevailing social democratic model has been on the defensive for some time in a process that was started by the 1979 Thatcher victory in Britain.³⁷⁵ As Lemke and Marks have noted, socialism has been called into question in all of its facets, as an ideology, as a movement, and as a regime type.³⁷⁶ Fukuyama went as far as to

³⁷³ Baudrillard, J. Cool Memories, trans. by C. Turner, (London, Verso, 1990), p.7

³⁷⁴ Motchane, D. "What's Left after Socialism" in Walzer, M. (ed.) Toward a Global Civil Society, (Providence, Berghahn Books, 1995) p.302

³⁷⁵ See Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (ed.) The Politics of Thatcherism, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1983)

³⁷⁶ Lemke, Ch. & Marks, G. (ed.) The Crisis of Socialism in Europe, (Durham, Duke University Press, 1992) p. ix.

speak of the death of socialism.³⁷⁷ These developments combined with the transformations unfolding in the world arena and the changing nature of the capitalist system demand a new approach if the left is ever to regain the momentum lost. One has to agree with D. Miliband when he says that the

*the task for the left is in this context less to show that reform is necessary than that is possible.*³⁷⁸

A combination of developments demand a new approach on the behalf of the left when, to use a quotation from Marx,

*all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.*³⁷⁹

Traditional assumptions are questioned, age old certainties disappear and a new way of thinking becomes necessary. These changes, although connected and not clearly separated, can be grouped under three headings. National sovereignty and the state. Class and new identities and movements. And socialist values, where the notion of democracy and the ideas of choice, rights, autonomy, and the market are becoming predominant. These correspond to developments associated with the unit of socialist change, the agent of transformation, and socialist theory and practice respectively.

Developments in the three fields mentioned above are interconnected. All mainstream socialist trends have perceived socialism in terms of the antagonism between state planning and market. The collapse of the command economies of

³⁷⁷ See Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992)

³⁷⁸ Miliband, D. (ed.) Reinventing the Left, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994) p.4

³⁷⁹ Marx, K. & Engels, F. "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, (Glasgow, Fontana, 1984) p.52

Eastern Europe has led to a reexamination of the socialist rejection of the market. Market socialism is an attempt to come into terms with the market. At the same time, the power of the nation-state is being undermined. On the one hand power is moving up, to bodies that can not be controlled by the state mechanisms, and on the other, power is moving down, with regionalism and the proliferation of new movements and identities. Democracy, is becoming the dominant theme in contemporary socialist thought. But democracy requires a degree of social regulation, and globalisation has curtailed the scope for such regulation at the level of the individual nation-state.³⁸⁰ The European Union could become the arena where these new ideas might be put into practice. It is worth mentioning here that any discussion of the above mentioned issues brings into mind, once more, Spinelli. Most of the topics under consideration have been dealt with by him (power to the regions, concern for the less advantaged social groups, the environment etc.), and his ideas of non-doctrinaire socialism can be regarded as the forerunners of the ideas exposed in the present chapter.

³⁸⁰ Newman, M. Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union , (London, Hurst & Company, 1996) , p.76

1. THE UNIT OF CHANGE: THE STATE AND GLOBALISATION

When discussing socialism and the process of European integration, and the powers that have been pulling towards this direction, one cannot avoid touching upon the issue of sovereignty. On the one hand, most debates about the process of European integration evolve around the issue of sovereignty. Opponents of the European Union have been arguing that any transfer of national-state power from the member states to the Union amounts to a loss of sovereignty. Any discussion of the process of European integration has therefore to touch upon the issue of sovereignty. On the other hand sovereignty, seen as the location of power in the state, has been central to socialism.

For Hobsbawm, the socialist ideal became tied to the conquest of state power when the labour movements, following both the Marxist and the Jacobin democratic tradition, took the road of collective political action. Thus the state became the central component in the building of socialism. As a result, all mainstream socialist currents saw socialism in terms of the antagonism between state planning and market.³⁸¹ (Later in this chapter we will discuss the recent attempts by socialists to come to terms with the market, in what came to be known as *market socialism*) In order to break the logic of the market the left needed an alternative socialist logic. The state became the left's alternative center of power. The reformists saw the state as making inroads into the logic of the market and modifying its excesses. The revolutionaries saw it as destroying the market and

³⁸¹ Hobsbawm, E. "Out of the ashes" in Blackburn, R. (ed.) After the Fall: the Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism, (London, Verso, 1991) pp.316-8

capitalism and gradually absorbing and taking over the main social processes.³⁸²

By making the national state the tool for the implementation the socialist ideal,

*state socialism nationalized the creed itself.*³⁸³

So, according to Keane, the program of state administered socialism, regardless of its substantial achievements in post-war Europe, lost most of its appeal since it failed to recognize the limits of state action in relation to civil society. State administered socialism, through its assumption that the state could become the caretaker and modernizer of social existence, cultivated the passive consumption of state provision and weakened the citizens' confidence in their competence in directing their lives. Socialism came to be identified with red tape and state control. The crisis became more profound when consecutive governments failed to deliver the goods, at the time when such provisions were most in need, that is, in times of economic recession and company modernization. In addition, the grand expansion of state agencies led to its overload, thus damaging its policies' coherence and weakening its authority. Finally, as the state became an organized battleground for social groups while it was itself dependent on the more powerful of them, its effectiveness was further crippled.³⁸⁴

A major development of the recent past has been the crisis of the nation-state.³⁸⁵

According to Dunn, this crisis does not stem from a weakening in the appeal of the idea of the nation. Nationalism in East and West, North and South has in fact experienced a rejuvenation. Rather it stems from a weakening not in the normative

³⁸² Hall, S. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left, (London, Verso, 1988) p.224

³⁸³ Luard, E. Socialism Without the State 2nd ed., (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1991) p.xx

³⁸⁴ Keane, J. "The limits of state action" in Keane, J. Democracy and Civil Society, (London, Verso, 1988) pp.3-6

³⁸⁵ For a historical perspective see Hont, I. "The permanent crisis of a divided mankind: 'contemporary crisis of the nation state' in historical perspective" in Dunn, J. (ed.) Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995)

but in the practical effectiveness of the state idea. Here of course we must be aware of the two different views of this crisis. The first locates the crisis in a decline of national-state power as such, while the second locates it in the massive increase in the degree of threats now confronting its subjects.³⁸⁶ For the purposes of the present discussion, although several southern states would fall under the first category (Somalia, Iraq, etc.)³⁸⁷, I take crisis to mean the inability of the state to protect its subjects from these new threats to their security. This coupled with the political integration attempts at the European and global level call for a new approach. Signs of growing system integration are visible in global society at the level of socio-economic relations and the development of cultural and political institutions. The global society's economic system is built around the global market which coordinates the international division of labour and the production and exchange of commodities, and consists of the international institutions like GATT, IMF, etc.³⁸⁸ Discussing economic policy attention should be paid to the first Mitterrand government in France in the early eighties. The French attempt at reflation inside an open economy at a time of world deflation turned out to be a disaster. As the French socialists discovered at their own peril, the international environment within which the newly elected left-wing government had to operate was of major importance. To attempt to implement policies without the fullest reference to developments beyond national borders is to invite disaster. The only alternative, which is not an alternative after all, is to seal off the country in an *Albanian* way.³⁸⁹ Studying the French industrial policy of the same period, V. Wright concluded that it demonstrated the difficulties confronting any reformist

³⁸⁶ Dunn, J. "Introduction: crisis of the nation state?" in Dunn, Contemporary Crisis

³⁸⁷ see Hawthorn, G. "The crises of southern states", in Dunn, Contemporary Crisis

³⁸⁸ On the shift of power from states to markets see Strange, S. States and Markets, (London, Pinter Publishers, 1988)

³⁸⁹ MacShane, D. French Lessons for Labour, Fabian Tract 512, (London, Fabian Society, 1986) pp.4-5

administration committed to a particular policy as it reveals the external interdependence within the advanced world as a whole. Favorable economic conditions, necessary for the implementation of a statist industrial policy, are dependent on the outside world. France is a typical example of an interdependent economy since it increasingly depends upon international trade and the state of the international money market, as 40% of its imports are denominated in US dollars, and it imports 80% of its energy. As the president himself admitted in 1984, the French socialists were not in control of the crisis which hit their country. This can explain his sincere campaign for the rejuvenation of the European Communities.³⁹⁰ Problems that could not be dealt with at the level of a major nation-state such as France, could possibly be solved by some degree of pooling of sovereignty.

The political system is that of the competitive system of states and consists, in turn, of the global and regional institutions the most important of which is the UN.³⁹¹ As Held has noted, this process of globalisation emphasizes a number of disparities between the power of the nation state in principle and in practice. First, a disparity between the national political authority and the production, distribution and exchange systems that restrict it through the internationalization of production and financial transactions. Second, connected to these changes in the world economy, there is a disparity between the idea of the autonomous state and the emergence of the global state system dominated by powers and power blocs (such as the US and NATO respectively), frequently undermining national authority and integrity. Third, a disparity, and the resulting friction, between the idea of national

³⁹⁰ Wright, V. "Socialism and the Interdependent Economy: Industrial Policy under the Mitterrand Presidency", Government and Opposition, Vol.19, no.3 (Summer 1984), p.303

³⁹¹ Shaw, M. "The theoretical challenge of global society", in Shaw, M. Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.11-21

sovereignty and the international decision making process. And fourth, the disparity between the idea of citizenship and the development of international law. The nature of global interconnections and the questions confronting the modern state contradict the idea of the *national community of fate*, the cornerstone of national sovereignty. The last two *disjunctures* can be illustrated by the practice of the European Union.³⁹²

In their treatment of sovereignty Camilleri and Falk, in addition to the internationalization of trade, finance and corporate organization, list the globalisation of the security system, the rapid transformation of technology, the resulting spread of environmental problems, and the mushrooming of local and transnational social movements as the trends transforming our understanding of the world.³⁹³ As they put it

*we are living at a time when the hard certainties of an older political space are giving way to new but still only partially discernible constraints and possibilities. Shifting allegiances, concepts, identities and forms of authority are characteristic of our age. The complex forms of social, economic and political organization, the multiple tiers of jurisdiction, and the uncertainties over what is to follow reinforce the conclusion that we live in a time of transition.*³⁹⁴

The external dimension of the theory of sovereignty, treating the state as a foundation exercising absolute power and authority in society within its boundaries, is expressed by the state-centric world view. International relations, seen through this spectacle, were characterized by sovereignty, legal equality, and territorial integrity. Consequently, a sovereign state, free from outside

³⁹² Held, D. "The decline of the nation state" in Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (ed.) New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1989), pp.192-201

³⁹³ Camilleri, J.A. & Falk, J. The End of Sovereignty? the Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1992), p.3

³⁹⁴ Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, p. 9

interference, enjoyed absolute control within its territory, could not intervene in other states' internal affairs or compromise their integrity, while all states regardless of wealth, size, and strategic importance, enjoyed equal rights and duties.³⁹⁵ A state to be sovereign must have *capacity*, i.e. a plentitude of resources at its disposal to achieve its aims, and *internal*, *external*, and *subjective* autonomy. Internal autonomy means freedom of action unconstrained by other actors operating within its own domain. External autonomy means freedom of action unconstrained by external actors, such as other states or outside institutions. Finally, subjective autonomy refers to a state's ability to formulate and seek to implement a variety of objectives. Any restriction in these domains means a limitation of sovereignty.³⁹⁶ The essence of sovereignty has been seen in the absolute primacy of the state power, its formal independence from any superior authority.³⁹⁷ This was the idea in de Maistre's treatment of the subject. As he put it in his Study on Sovereignty, sovereignty

*is always one, unviolable and absolute. Take, for example, the English government: the kind of political trinity which makes it up does not stop sovereignty from being one, there as elsewhere. The powers balance each other, but, once they are in agreement, there is then only one will which cannot be thwarted by any other legal will, and Blackstone was right to claim that the English king and Parliament together can do anything.*³⁹⁸

The traditional understanding of sovereignty has recently been challenged by developments in three key areas. Major structural changes in the global market, such as production dispersion and deterritorialization, market globalization and the resulting calls for the dismantling of national trade barriers, have challenged

³⁹⁵ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.29

³⁹⁶ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.105

³⁹⁷ Wallace, W. "Rescue or Retreat? the nation state in Western Europe, 1945-93", in Dunn, *Contemporary Crisis* p.53.

the concept of national community.³⁹⁹ Moreover, whereas in the past the media helped in the cementing of national communities, now they promote a new image of international culture dominated by the values of this emerging global market. The rapid structural change in communications technology indicates that the international flow of messages, images and money, by means of an integrated global communications system, dominated by transnational corporations like News International, Time-Warner, and Bertelsmann, rather than national entities, confront state authority and call for a new form of regulation by an international body. Finally, the development of transnational environmental problems, such as the hole in the ozone layer, and the pollution of the Mediterranean to mention but a few, reveal the limits of national communities and imply a conception of global civil society.⁴⁰⁰ This view is essentially a similar one to that of the Interdependence theory which perceives international politics as a complex network of governments and non-state actors.⁴⁰¹

But whereas these developments have undermined the state's core functions, little has changed for the nation state as a focus for popular identity and a basis for legitimacy. And although a certain diffusion of loyalties and a certain broadening of horizons from the national to the European and the global are manifest mainly among elites, and to a lesser extent among the masses, it has led to fragmentation rather than integration, as challenges to the legitimacy of national institutions and elites have come mainly from the inside. The previous bases of state internal legitimacy, the ideological identification with the nation, and the rational ability to

³⁹⁸ de Maistre, J. The works of Joseph de Maistre, selected, translated and introduced by J.Lively, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965), p.112

³⁹⁹ For a discussion of the marxist treatment of this issue, see Murray, R. "The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State", New Left Review, no.67 (May/June 1971), pp.84-109

⁴⁰⁰ Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp.56-8

deliver security, prosperity and welfare to their subjects have come to be questioned. If in the 1960s the West European states were able to deliver to their populations the goods and the state acquired legitimacy by becoming the welfare state, the end of the Keynesian era brought these provisions to a halt. The combination of slow growth, high unemployment, and huge social budget deficits of the early 1980s represented not only a crisis of the European welfare state, but a possible crisis for the idea of the nation state. For Offe, this crisis of the welfare state can be attributed to the fact that, instead of being a sovereign and autonomous source of well-being providing incomes and services as a citizen right, it is itself highly dependent upon the good fortune and profitability of the economy. Even for the Left the welfare state is seen as ineffective and inefficient. As its huge redistributive machinery works horizontally within the wage earning class, it is susceptible to the fiscal crisis of the state. It is also seen as repressive since it is highly bureaucratized and the individual in order to obtain its services has to comply with its routines and requirements. Finally, the welfare state is perceived as conditioning a counterfeit ideological perception of social and political within the working class by dividing the economic sphere from that of citizenship.⁴⁰² Moreover, intermarriage, migration, cross-border movement have diffused identities and upset established presumptions about national political communities. As Wallace has noted, the nation as a political and social community is uncoupling from the state as provider of security and welfare.⁴⁰³

Advances in telecommunications and data processing have been instrumental in the globalization of financial markets, which in turn have provided the funds

⁴⁰¹ See R.O. Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd edition, (Boston, Glenview, 1989)

⁴⁰² Offe, C. "Some contradictions of the modern welfare state", in Offe, C. Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. by J. Keane, (London, Hutchinson, 1984), pp.150-7

necessary for the development of these new technologies. The nation state's declining power to regulate the economy as a result of the fusion of trade and finance is clearly indicated by the breaking down of the Bretton Woods system.⁴⁰⁴

National sovereignty is also contradicted by the existence of a hegemonic power in the world system, a role performed throughout the centuries by Spain, Britain and more recently the US, respectively. The hegemonic state enjoys privileges, responsibilities and functions not shared by other states and thus its authority extends beyond its own national jurisdiction. But recently we have witnessed the decline of American hegemony, as between 1983 and 1988 the US turned from the world's largest creditor to the largest debtor nation.⁴⁰⁵ The end of the cold war with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and instances like the Gulf War can not hide the fact that the world's only remaining superpower has lost its hegemonic position in the world capitalist system. This process has been accompanied by the proliferation of strong protectionist pressures on governments and the erosion of GATT required discipline with a trade war between Japan and the USA looming. As recently as May 10, 1995 the US was threatening to impose the most visible trade sanctions ever against Japan.⁴⁰⁶ But this decline has not restored national sovereignty, but instead has resulted in a more subtle and less statist, centralized and predictable hegemonic matrix dependent on, but not constrained by, state apparatuses. The international capitalist order has survived thanks to a combination of factors. A network of military alliances offering American nuclear protection to Japan and Europe has to a great extent compensated for the decline of American economic power. At the same time other powerful capitalist state

⁴⁰³ Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat", pp.55-75

⁴⁰⁴ Camilleri & Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp.73-6

⁴⁰⁵ For a discussion see Calleo, D.P. "America's federal nation state: a crisis of post-imperial viability?", in Dunn, J. (ed.) Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1995).

structures have emerged promoting a unitary economic and foreign policy. In the meantime international institutions, such as the IMF, GATT, etc., have assumed many functions previously performed by the US. Here though, it should be remembered that the latter clearly plays a dominant role in these institutions. Nevertheless, the fact that the US had to relinquish its direct dominant role in the system is an indication that it has lost at least some of its capacity to dominate the international arena. Moreover, in times of heightened tension in the global marketplace, this process has been accelerated by the diminishing capacity of the nation-state in general to regulate economic activity within its own boundaries.⁴⁰⁷

*International bureaucratization is itself evidence of the diminishing capacity of national bureaucracies to provide an adequate institutional framework for the complex task of economic regulation.*⁴⁰⁸

A major feature is the proliferation of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. These owe their existence to, and are dependent on, states for their survival, but acquire a life and agenda independent of, and sometimes conflicting with, the member states' priorities. Alongside the IGOs, a number of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), such as the World Council of Churches or the International Islamic Relief Organization, help to further erode national sovereignty. They redefine the political terrain by occupying

*political space and areas of decision-making which contrast sharply with the territorial delineation of sovereign jurisdictions. In the process they establish a framework of interaction which diminishes the importance of physical and legal boundaries.*⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ The Independent, 10 May 1995, "America poised to strike Japan", 33

⁴⁰⁷ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, pp.89-94

⁴⁰⁸ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.97

⁴⁰⁹ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.145

World market integration and the interpenetration of national economies blurs the dividing line between national and global markets on one hand, and the one between foreign and domestic policies, on the other thus undermining the very foundation of national sovereignty.⁴¹⁰ And as Landesman noticed, while producers of various kinds coexist in world markets, a medium-size economy like even the major European states can only have marginal influence in the way world markets evaluate products, with all the implications this has for the prosperity of the producers who supply them. As a result any economic strategy for a medium size economy like the UK, even a strategy advocated by socialists, must take into account the regulatory mechanisms of world markets, which exert great influence on the economy's specialization model and output growth. In this way they control directly or indirectly its ability to generate real-income growth, jobs, and social provision. It follows then, that any policy framework must pay attention to the question of how the desired institutional, social and economic policy targets will face the strain of global competition.⁴¹¹ The possibility of national policies has been reduced, and even nationalized industries, the last bastions of truly national capital, are involved in international projects. An example is British Aerospace which, even under state ownership, was deeply involved in collaboration with American and European companies, and heavily dependent on its arms sales. It can be said then, that in certain respects the company was denationalized before its privatization and given the market pressures it is not clear how much difference simple ownership can make. In several cases the advantages for the national economy, if one can speak of one nowadays, would be greater if the state

⁴¹⁰ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.98

intervention took place on a European level.⁴¹² Global economic liberalization threatens state ability to protect the welfare of its subjects and thus challenges the hitherto dominant Keynesian conception of the welfare state.⁴¹³

*Whatever the kind of socialism, capitalism, or mixed economy, Islamic political economy, or other system that people may "choose", they cannot escape worldwide competition; it is a fact of life.*⁴¹⁴

In the pursuit of national prosperity the apparent failure of national industrial strategies has been recognized by the European governments as Community programs such as ESPRIT, EUREKA, etc. have increasingly come to be seen as the motor of development.⁴¹⁵ Here it should be brought into mind the fact that Spinelli, whom I discussed in the previous chapter, was the father of the common research policy. The problem though with these programs is that they do not seem to have managed, despite the huge amounts invested, to rejuvenate the European high tech industry. Most often Europe follows the US and Japan.

Discussing technological developments and their implications for national sovereignty Camilleri and Falk observed that, despite the fact that at first sight it might seem that advances in military technology reinforce national sovereignty, weapons by becoming part of a broader transnational weapons system can not be used in isolation. Therefore, powerful military arsenals do not guarantee freedom

⁴¹¹ Landesmann, M. "UK Policy and the International economy: an internationalist perspective", in Nolan, P. & Paine, S. (ed.) Rethinking Socialist Economics: A New Agenda for Britain, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986) p.117

⁴¹² Smith, R. "Britain and the international state apparatus", in Nolan and Paine, Rethinking Socialist Economics, pp.111-2

⁴¹³ Dunn (1995), 12

⁴¹⁴ Gunder Frank, A. "Revolution in Eastern Europe: lessons for democratic socialist movements (and socialists)", in Tabb, W.K. (ed.) The Future of Socialism: Perspectives from the Left, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1990), p.103

⁴¹⁵ Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat", p.66

of action but instead are another indication of defense interdependence.⁴¹⁶ Military alliances, such as NATO, are another manifestation of the erosion of sovereignty in the sensitive domain of national defense. A number of developments have called the traditional concept of security to question, and have proven the national state inadequate. The increasing range, speed, and sophistication of missiles have made all parts of national territory impossible to defend. The speed of military deployment has placed entire nations at the mercy of powerful neighbours, as Hungary, Poland, and Grenada discovered at their own peril. At the same time though, the changing nature of warfare, undertaken by non-conventional means for political rather than territorial purposes, such as guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and Afghanistan, or terrorism in Northern Ireland, means that even the most powerful states can be defeated.⁴¹⁷ These are hard times even for superpowers. And in the area of arms production and procurement, individual nation states increasingly find themselves cooperating with each other. The European Fighter Aircraft is a good example of interdependence in military aircraft development and production at the European level. Furthermore, as Luard has noted, security maximization by unilateral means is based on the logical delusion of maximizing the opposite party's insecurity thus escalating the arms race and ensuring that both remain permanently insecure.⁴¹⁸ What is needed therefore, is a new concept of international security.

With special reference to Europe and the European Union, public order sovereignty was formally undermined with the 1985 Schengen Agreement providing for the abolition of internal border controls and subsequent measures for

⁴¹⁶ Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty , pp.107-8

⁴¹⁷ Luard, E. The Globalization of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World , (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990), pp.20-2

⁴¹⁸ Luard, Globalization of Politics , pp. 33-4

police, immigration, customs, and intelligence cooperation, as well as common entry and residence procedures. More recently Titles V and VI of the Maastricht Treaty, the *third pillar*, set out to formalize, although in an intergovernmental framework, the extensive existing patterns of *Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs*. The strengthening of the WEU, the Anglo-Dutch Marine Force, and the Franco-German brigade, all represent visible indicators of further erosion of national sovereignty in these vital fields. The acceptance of European Community law as superior to domestic law in all areas of Community competence under the Treaties, offers the sharpest onslaught on national sovereignty.⁴¹⁹

Advances in the technology of communications, Internet etc., reducing all transmitted information to a common digital form undermine state capacity to regulate information flows across national boundaries. Satellite television channels, such as the CNN, reinforce the global village image by bringing to screens across the globe, that can afford it, news and images that previously could have been at the state's prerogative to transmit. These changes call into question the whole notion of national culture.⁴²⁰ According to Tabb, an example of the integrating effect of innovations in transportation and communication can be found in the nineteenth century, when regions of the United States became integrated into an immense national economy with the construction of the transcontinental railways.⁴²¹

These developments and advances have been taken advantage of by the multinational companies which in turn further undermine national sovereignty.

⁴¹⁹ Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat", pp.70-3

⁴²⁰ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, pp.120-3

These companies, both as representatives and beneficiaries of the integrated global system, restrict the national state's room for maneuver, reproduce uneven development within the society, and champion a development model in contrast to the values, lifestyles and institutions of the host country, especially if the latter is a third world one.⁴²² As the Moroccan writer Tahar Ben Jelloun put it,

*While waiting for further episodes of Dallas, Moroccan television is showing another series, The Conquest of the West. In French.*⁴²³

Even major industrialized states feel vulnerable in such an environment. At a time when most of the world's ten largest banks were Japanese and much of the American immense foreign debt was held by Japan (The situation has been reversed now following the crisis in the Far-East and Japan is coming to be the world's greatest debtor), the country's economic power was not paralleled by a corresponding international cultural power. Its contemporary verbal culture has been austere, even impoverished, dominated by comic books and talk shows, in short has been characterized by total dependence on the West in cultural discourse.⁴²⁴ And at the 1982 World Conference on Cultural policies in Mexico City (Mondiacult'82), the representatives of what used to be the Communist world, and of the Third World countries received well Lang's speech when he called for a cultural crusade against the "intellectual imperialism" of the multinationals. Needless to say that the United States registered their "total exasperation", although the US had not been named once in the speech of the

⁴²¹ Tabb, W.K. "Where we are in History: Introductory themes to world-transforming events", in Tabb, Future of Socialism, p.6

⁴²² Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp.127-9

⁴²³ Mattelart, A., Delcourt, X. & M.Mattelart, M. "International image markets", 428, in During, S. (ed.) The Cultural Studies Reader, (London, Routledge, 1993), p.428

⁴²⁴ Said, E.W. Culture and Imperialism, (London, Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1993), pp.399-400

French Minister of Culture.⁴²⁵ Benjamin Barber has spoken of a global move to what he calls *McWorld*, i.e. the world of Macintosh computers and McDonald hamburgers, although now one can say that Macintosh computers should be replaced by the software of Microsoft of Bill Gates. This can be illustrated by the fact that during the Apartheid era, the most popular TV series among South African whites was the *Bill Cosby Show*, depicting the life of an American black family.⁴²⁶ And more recently the film quotas have threatened a trade war between the United States and Europe. The very fact that Japan lost its leading position and the Soviet block collapsed in the meantime, can be seen as strengthening the argument rather than undermining it. Even such powerful states such as Japan in economic, or the Soviet Union in military terms found themselves unable to maintain their position and, in the case of the USSR even their territorial integrity.

The increasing interconnection of different regions both, between themselves and the global strategic order, the globalization of conflict, the cold war and the wars between the then two superpowers by proxies, in the Middle East for instance, and the subsequent detente, all demonstrate the internationalization of conflict. The inadequacies of the nation-state can, at the same time be caused and explained by, a number of developments at a time when, for the very same reasons, the contemporary human predicament has assumed global proportions. These developments include amongst others: the nuclear weapons' capacity for massive destruction; the interconnection between the various threads of global disorder, like terrorism and organized crime, cutting across policy and institutional boundaries; and the fast pace of change and communications. All these have highlighted state limitations in dealing with this complex new reality. As

⁴²⁵ Mattelart, Delcourt and Mattelart, *International Image Makers*, pp.426-7

Camilleri and Falk have observed, a new macropolitical agenda has been formed questioning the notion of sovereignty and the significance of territorial borderlines.⁴²⁷ The exercise of explicit sovereignty has been hindered by the destructiveness, the boundary penetrating capacity, the high costs, and the corrosive effect on democratic practices and institutions of advanced military technologies.⁴²⁸

On the ecological front, the Chernobyl disaster highlighted another limitation to national sovereignty. Environmental pollution knows no national boundaries and any solution to environmental problems must be tackled at an international level as the risks posed are beyond the control of any state. In Brazil the destruction of the Amazonian rainforests could have disastrous consequences for climatic conditions all over the world. More recently, in early October 1995, the prospects of the reopening of the *Cozlondui* nuclear reactor in Bulgaria, the same type of the one at Chernobyl, caused alarm in Greece as a potential catastrophe saw no national boundaries. The doctrine of sovereignty is an obstacle to the solution of the problem, while at the same time it is a cause of this very problem.⁴²⁹ A number of arguments are available. The international system of nation-states can no longer provide a viable political framework for the collective management of the global environment. More and more nation-states find it difficult to deliver localized order and a satisfactory level of environmental management in their domain. As a result, the nation state loses its primacy as the focus of human loyalty.⁴³⁰ The partitioning of the biosphere, derived from the spatial distribution of political

⁴²⁶ B.Barber, in his plenary lecture on the last day of the 1991 Annual Conference of The Political Studies Association (PSA). University of Lancaster, April 15-7.

⁴²⁷ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, pp.150-1

⁴²⁸ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.154

⁴²⁹ Camilleri and Falk, *End of Sovereignty*, p.179

power, contributes to environmental decay in various ways. The notion of sovereignty geographically separates the state from the global consequences of its conduct.⁴³¹ Differences in national legislation may allow a polluter to transfer to a state with more lenient laws, and thus to continue polluting. Sovereignty conceals vital political and economic relations, such as economic and structural dependence that might limit the number of possible options available to a state, which contribute to environmental degradation. Finally, the concept of sovereignty disguises the degree to which the development of new processes and structures to deal with environmental problems is feasible.⁴³² International action is the only feasible and effective course of action needed to protect the environment in several cases. The depletion of natural resources, safeguarding of energy supplies, sea and air pollution, the preservation of plant and animal species are a few of them. Again, the notion of sovereignty can sometimes be a brake on effective action as some countries would resist calls for higher standards, such as China and CFC emission into the atmosphere. This brings us to the need for broad international concerted action and the resulting globalization of politics as the conflict becomes one between short and long-term interests, and between social and individual purposes. The globe becomes the terrain for successful environmental political activity as national level decisions seem fruitless.⁴³³

Managing global environmental issues involves a dramatic change in the character and goals of international society: away from the minimalist goals of coexistence towards the creation of rules and institutions that embody notions of shared responsibilities, that impinge heavily on the

⁴³⁰ Hurrell, A. "A crisis of ecological viability? global environmental change and the nation state", in Dunn Contemporary Crisis, pp.146-7

⁴³¹ The idea of *Bioregionalism*, as developed by Kirkpatrick Sale is an attempt to divide the earth's surface in bioregions whose boundaries are determined by natural (flora, water, etc.) rather than human dictates. See Kirkpatrick Sale, "Bioregionalism", in Dobson, A. (ed.) The Green Reader, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1991), pp.77-83

⁴³² Camilleri and Falk, End of Sovereignty, pp.185-6

⁴³³ Luard, Globalization of Politics, pp. 73-97

*domestic organization of states, that invest individuals and groups within states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of the planetary good.*⁴³⁴

Whereas in the economic field a deficiency in state domestic power can be detected, in the ecological domain the problem is one of *disclination or incapacity for effective collective action*.⁴³⁵

As Luard has observed, although the nominal power of governments within their own territory has never been greater than today, in real terms their capacity to control events and to promote the welfare of their subjects is frustrated by events and developments outside their domain. As a result, in order to achieve their aims, citizens and political organizations have to promote their causes at an international level. So, as the power of national governments gradually declines and the important decisions are taken at an international level, people come to realize the way the outside world affects their lives. This he calls the *globalization of politics*.⁴³⁶

International political movements have started to play an important role, Islamic fundamentalism being a prominent and topical one. Several Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad operate in more than one country at the same time. The controversy that followed the publication of Rushdie's Satanic Verses and Khomeini's fatwa with the corresponding problems in Bradford is a good example. Here of course we should remember that Islam is a

⁴³⁴ Hurrell in Dunn (1995), 149

⁴³⁵ Dunn (1995), 13

⁴³⁶ Luard, *Globalization of Politics*, pp.3-12

universalist religion since the imperative of the Islamic creed is the advancement of the umma, i.e. the Islamic community regardless of state boundaries.⁴³⁷

European transnational party groupings have not managed yet to become an example of international political movement. So far, they have only remained loose alliances. Nationalist feelings and the different national leaderships' priorities have hindered such a development which has remained at an embryonic stage but with some potential. At this point it should not be forgotten that, as we saw in the previous chapter, Spinelli devoted his career in emphasizing this transnational European political dimension, from the time of the second world war to the Crocodile initiative and the draft European Union Treaty that followed it. The proliferation of transnational pressure groups such as Greenpeace, END, etc., associations of manufacturers and producers and the international process of institution building, are all manifestations of the same process.

The politics of welfare is another area where the globalizing process can be observed. Here an upward movement of welfare provision is at work, from local to national and later international level, the last part being accelerated by the fact that inequalities within nations are surpassed by inequalities between them. So, whereas the OECD countries can afford eight (8) hospital beds per thousand (1000) people, the Sub-Saharan African countries can afford only 1.5.⁴³⁸ Connected to this is the rate of infant mortality. Here the OECD average, excluding Turkey, is 0.9%, and that of the Sub-Saharan African countries is

⁴³⁷ Piscatori, J. "Islam and World Politics", in Baylis, J. & Rengger, N. (ed.) Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.310-333. For a discussion of the ideology of a transnational Islamic party see S.Taji-Farouki, The Fundamental Quest: The Origins and Development of Hizb al-Tahrir (Grey Seal Books, London) forthcoming.

⁴³⁸ The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics, p.216

10.9%.⁴³⁹ The ease of communication in the modern world presses for more concerted action at the international level as epidemics and diseases are difficult to contain, and the funds necessary to combat them can not be provided by a single government. In this area the World Health Organization (WHO) is instrumental. AIDS is a disease that has to be tackled at an international level, while the recent Ebola epidemic in Zaire demonstrated the inability of the nation-state to deal with and contain the spread of the virus. Furthermore, last year's tragedy in Rwanda indicated the need for international relief provision if major tragedies are to be prevented.

Over the last century it has come to be accepted that national political systems cannot always be trusted with the safeguarding of human rights and foreign governments and people have the right, and the obligation, to raise the issue of human rights in the case of a regime failing to respect them. This has been seen as interfering in another state's internal affairs and challenging its sovereignty. The international condemnation and boycotting of the South African apartheid regime is a notable example. Again coordinated action is needed as an individual state on its own will have limited power. In the human rights realm international society has become an interrelated unit.⁴⁴⁰ A very recent example can be found in the European Union's calls for a just trial by Turkey, of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Economic inequality can be observed at its extreme manifestations today not between citizens of the same state but between the citizens of the first and third worlds as groups. For example, in 1988 the average GDP per head of the OECD countries was \$17097, whereas for the Sub-Saharan African states was only

⁴³⁹ The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics, p.214

\$484.⁴⁴¹ Moreover, since third world populations are growing on average faster than those of the first world, a significantly higher rate of economic growth is needed if they are ever to achieve first world living standards.⁴⁴² It has been estimated that whereas the average annual population growth for the OECD countries between 1983 and 1988 was 0.7%, the corresponding number of the Sub-Saharan African countries was exactly double, i.e. 1.4%.⁴⁴³ A solution to this problem can only be found by means of international action, especially since the difficulties faced by the third world are international, rather than national, in origin. According to Luard, poor countries are doubly dependent on the rich ones. They need outlets for their own exports, while they are dependent on imports from the developed world. The picture becomes even bleaker if one takes into account the fact that future technological development depends on existing technological advances, thus making the chances of the poorer nations catching up with the richer ones slimmer.⁴⁴⁴

*Politics has been globalized in part because inexorable technological change has had the effect that national endeavors are no longer adequate to achieve the goals which are everywhere demanded: the creation of a more peaceful, secure, environmentally acceptable life for the citizens of any state, free from the fear of military annihilation, environmental catastrophe or gross violations of their human rights. Because those tasks, even within states, today often require international rather than national action, political activity too must be international rather than national.*⁴⁴⁵

Here, it should be noted that the issues of equality and welfare have become global ones because it seems to be an ethic of international equality, which although not strong enough yet in order to demand a complete international

⁴⁴⁰ Luard, *Globalization of Politics*, pp.98-117

⁴⁴¹ *The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics*, p.34

⁴⁴² Luard, *Globalization of Politics*, p.123

⁴⁴³ *The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics*, p.16

⁴⁴⁴ Luard, *Globalization of Politics*, pp.118-137

redistribution, it is powerful enough to stimulate the demand for some kind of action by the rich countries. Moreover, there is always the danger of consequent disorder spilling over national boundaries. The European Union has been forced to take some action by the fear of big numbers of economic refugees crossing the union's borders from the old eastern block and the countries of the Maghreb.

As Enzensberger put it, sovereignty, the state's pride and joy, has lost its meaning. *Bound by a thousand threads like Gulliver*, the state's room for maneuver grows ever smaller. And despite all the efforts of the three Internationals, it was the anonymous market, symbolized by a *few iconic brand names* and dominated by the multinational companies, the big banks and the *parastatal* financial organizations that managed to establish the idea of a world society. In an ironic way, McDonald's has realized the principles of socialism in their purest form by offering the same service to people everywhere.⁴⁴⁶

Some socialists, influenced by the effects of globalization and disillusioned with state socialism east and west, have gone so far as to reject the state as an instrument altogether. A prominent exponent of this view is Luard who called for the bypassing of the state, for a World Socialism, for *Socialism in the Stratosphere* as he put it. He saw the seeds of an international government in the network of international institutions established over the last thirty years or so, and advocated the strengthening of their powers.⁴⁴⁷ I have already discussed the limits of the international bodies. The inertia of the United Nations and the European Union in finding a solution to the Yugoslav crisis with the parallel effectiveness of the American government is only another example that should make us a bit more

⁴⁴⁵ Luard, *Globalization of Politics*, p.191

⁴⁴⁶ Enzensberger, H.M., "Ways of walking: a postscript to utopia", in Blackburn, R. (ed.) *After the Fall: the Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism*, (London, Verso, 1991), pp.21-3

cautious. We must bear in mind that today's globalisation is prepared by states and is mostly not about bypassing states, but rather about reorganizing them and is taking place under their aegis. An example of this can be seen in the process of integration in western Europe. In order to face the increasingly difficult international situation, with sovereignty challenged on a number of fronts, states come together in an attempt not to destroy the concept of the state itself, but in order to reorganise it. This is going to be achieved by the establishment of new bodies that can be perceived as states in an embryonic form. They are not states yet, but they are moving towards this direction. It could be said that states emulate companies. Companies merge in order to form bigger entities, and in a parallel way, states attempt to bring together some of their functions with the prospect of forming a new state in the distant future. And as the centre of gravity shifted from national economies to the world economy as a whole the states were reorganized as having a responsibility to both. Under this light one can see the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into effect on January 1, 1994, and the importance of which, in President Clinton's words, lies in the guarantees it offered for US investment in Mexico.⁴⁴⁸ Moreover,

*Not only is the world still very much composed of states, but insofar as there is any effective democracy at all in relation to the power of capitalists and bureaucrats, it is still embedded in political structures which are national or subnational in scope.*⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁷ Luard, E. Socialism Without the State, 2nd edition (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991), pp.163-5

⁴⁴⁸ Panitch, L. "Globalisation and the State", in Miliband, R. & Panitch, L. (ed.) The Socialist Register - 1994: Between Globalism and Nationalism, (London, Merlin Press, 1994), p.74

⁴⁴⁹ Panitch, "Globalization and the State", p.87

Finally, the state is still a socially predominant idea which has won the popular imagination and provides a setting in which its behavior is important.⁴⁵⁰ We live in times of transformation. The state is changing and to a degree it is losing some of its powers. So, new mechanisms are needed and given the important role states can play as the focus of popular loyalty, probably what is needed is a new form of state, a new form of nation building that takes into account all the above mentioned developments. If old states are becoming obsolete we might need new forms, new types of states. If the modern nation-state was the byproduct of the French revolutionary changes, a new kind of state will be the byproduct of the current momentous changes. The European Union lacks the powers to be this new kind of state now. But if empowered it could play such a role.

One can see some of these tensions expressed in conflicting theories of European integration. Milward and Moravcsik⁴⁵¹ for example see the process as an attempt by member states to strengthen themselves while recognizing the advantages of some collective action. The assumption is that the states can continue to set limits on the process of integration. Other theorists such as neofunctionalists (who owe something to federalist influences) see the process as having a dynamic which increasingly moves beyond the state-centric model.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ Garnett, J.G. "States, State-Centric Perspectives, and Interdependence theory", in Baylis and Rengger, Dilemmas of World Politics, p.78

⁴⁵¹ see Milward, The European Rescue, and Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power".

⁴⁵² For a brief discussion see Rosamond, B. "Mapping the European Condition", European Journal of International Relations, Vol.1 (1995), pp.391-408

2. THE AGENT OF TRANSFORMATION: SEARCHING FOR A NEW SOCIAL BASE

The second major development of the recent past is the decline of the traditional class identities and the emergence of new ones alongside the proliferation of new social movements separate from traditional class allegiances. As several of the new identities are ethnic in origin, this development cannot be distinguished clearly from the previous one. Furthermore, the domination of the omnipotent state has severely limited all possibilities for dissent and diversity.⁴⁵³ The all mighty organization, as expressed by the state resulted in the decline of community and the death of individualism. The emergence of the new social movements introduces another discrepancy into traditional socialist thinking. Since a substantial number of these movements are environmental in origin the failure of the nation state can be seen as a major cause for their propagation. And this development has resulted in a number of proposals for new forms of political radicalism. At the same time, the potentials opened by the European Union must be underlined as it can provide the platform upon which transnational movements can be founded.

⁴⁵³ Luard, Socialism , p.26

2.A. The Decline of Class and the New Movements

Another of the notions that have dominated recent discussions about the future of socialism is the death of class. For Touraine, the concept of social class must be replaced by that of the social movement, and the analysis of situations must be replaced by that of action. A social movement confronts a power relation which is engraved in institutions and organizations, and explores cultural goals by working on power relations and relations of inequality.⁴⁵⁴ Besides, the role of the working class is in doubt because its reforming potential is in doubt. The British experience is very useful here, once more. The Labour coalition of 1945 was dominated by an exclusive ethos, viewed the class dimension as of paramount importance, and was incapable of transcending labour interests without betraying its origins. Working class interests were assigned a prime legitimacy denied to other interests. For Marquand,

*What working-class Labour voters wanted was a conservative society in socialist clothing. The reason they were prepared to wear socialist clothing was that they saw socialism as the means through which an essentially conservative society might come into being. To put it more simply, they wanted everything to be different, in order that it could stay the same.*⁴⁵⁵

From the 1920s onwards the Labour party has faced the very same problem, that of surpassing labourism without betraying the workers' interest, of closing the gap

⁴⁵⁴ Touraine, A. Critique of Modernity, trans. by D.Macey, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), p.243

⁴⁵⁵ Marquand, D. The Progressive Dilemma: from Lloyd George to Kinnock, (London, Heinemann, 1991), p.71

between the old Labour and the non-Labour forces, and of building and sustaining a broad social coalition in order to form a viable reforming government rather than just a temporary parliamentary majority.⁴⁵⁶

In the 1980s what Ellen Meiksins Wood has disapprovingly called the *new true socialism*, the rejection of Marxist economism and class reductionism has virtually excised class and class struggle from the socialist project. By rejecting the correspondence between politics and economics and the workers' privileged position, this school of thought attempts to build a socialist movement independent from traditional class relations. This project, following Gramsci's ideas, ascribes to intellectuals a prominent role. Whereas the working class is dismissed as driven by material interests, the intellectuals constitute a more appropriate constituency because of their autonomy from material conditions. Wood summarized the fundamental propositions of the thinkers falling under this heading as follows. The working class, despite the Marxist prediction, has not produced a revolutionary movement. Consequently, any relation between class and politics is circumstantial and there is no privileged relation between the proletariat and socialism. As socialist politics should be independent from economic conditions, a political force can be constituted and organized on the ideological and political planes irrespective of the class connections or oppositions among them, with universal objectives transcending class interests. The struggle for socialism then, can be conceived as a plurality of democratic struggles and it may be possible to replace the concept of socialism with that of *radical democracy*. Finally, the natural constituency of the socialist movement is constituted by a loose collectivity with no common concrete identity, but a variety

⁴⁵⁶ Marquand, *Progressive Dilemma*, p.207

of particular ones.⁴⁵⁷ The essential mistake lay in reading from class a revolutionary consciousness. The connection between the class location of the wage earning population and its political orientation can assume not only progressive but reactionary forms as well.⁴⁵⁸

For Bahro, the problem begins when we realize that the revolutionary subject is not 'functioning' as expected, and

*we can look round in vain for a revolutionary working class, which is more or less like looking for radio sources with an optical telescope.*⁴⁵⁹

The old concept of the dynamic of internal class contradiction in the advanced world had been rendered inadequate by three external contradictions: between East and West; between North and South; and between humanity and nature.⁴⁶⁰ The last two remain today as vivid as ever. And although the first one has largely disappeared, other divisive manifestations, such as religion, are becoming clear now.⁴⁶¹

Laclau and Mouffe have noticed that, whereas in the periphery exploitation has provided the popular struggle with a single center, in the advanced capitalist world a variety of antagonisms, many of them in opposition to each other, have permitted the multiplication of democratic struggles. This development, coupled with the rejection of privileged points of rupture and the confluence of struggles into a unified political space form the basis of a new radical and ambitious political agenda. Under these circumstances socialist demands should be seen as

⁴⁵⁷ Wood, E.M. The Retreat from Class: a New "True" Socialism, (London, Verso, 1986), pp.1-7

⁴⁵⁸ Miliband, R. Socialism for a Sceptical Age, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.128-131

⁴⁵⁹ Bahro, R. "Goodbye to Capitalism - Goodbye to our Concept of the Proletariat", in Bahro, R. Socialism and Survival, intro. by E.P.Thompson, (London, Heretic Books, 1982), p.63

⁴⁶⁰ Bahro, "Goodbye", p.65

part of the broader democratic revolution. Meanwhile, following the commodification and bureaucratization of social relations, the reformulation of the liberal-democratic ideology, and the expansion of the means of mass communication, new forms of political identities have arisen. These "new social movements" have embraced ecological, feminist, ethnic, and other struggles. It is important here to notice though, that these struggles do not necessarily have a progressive or left-wing character. Under the circumstances the left, instead of denouncing it, should deepen and expand the liberal-democratic ideology in a radical-pluralistic direction. So far this process has been prevented by classism, statism, and economism. For Laclau and Mouffe, socialization of the productive assets can not be reduced to workers' self-management. Such a reduction would ignore the demands of other groups such as women, consumers, etc. Therefore, an equivalence should be established between the various struggles. And finally, they called for the broadening of the domain of the exercise of democratic rights beyond the limited one of citizenship.⁴⁶² Once more, it should be emphasised here that, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Spinelli inspired draft European Union Treaty's basic ideological premises focus on pluralist democratic issues, and its stated objectives include harmonious development, full employment, and protection of the environment. Which means that under certain conditions the European Union can provide the terrain upon which new progressive alliances and new movements can be build and function.

The need for a new politics of the left emanates from the discrediting of both, centralized planning as practiced in the east, and bureaucratic forms of welfare

⁴⁶¹ For an interesting, but sometimes self-contradictory exposition see Gorz, A. Farewell to the Working Class: an Essay on Post-industrial Socialism, trans. by M. Sonenscher, (London, Pluto Press, 1982)

⁴⁶² Laclau, E. & Mouffe, Ch. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a Radical Democratic Politics, (London, Verso, 1985)

state in the west. The root cause can be found in the belief of both communists and social democrats. In the centralized state as the agency capable of guaranteeing economic growth and bringing about a more just, free, and egalitarian society. The formulation of this new left politics must begin with the

*deconstruction of the exclusive alternative between market and social regulation as its point of departure.*⁴⁶³

The failure of the Marxist hypothesis to materialize has a series of critical implications for today's left. The new radicalism will not be brought about by the emergence of a subject capable of personifying the universal, but by the expansion and proliferation of fragmentary, partial and specific subjects who enter the collective decision making process. The numerous identities emanating from the fragmentation of the labour process, the effects of environmental degradation on the whole of population, and racial and social differences, all have an interest and must participate in the global management of society. And the level of state intervention cannot measure the degree to which a radical democracy is reached, and socialism is not a simple blueprint for society anymore (the issue of state intervention is further later in this chapter). A radical democratic alternative will be the result of a combination of political, economic, aesthetic, and philosophical interventions.⁴⁶⁴

Along similar lines, Laclau saw Marxism's viable destiny as a partial and limited moment within the wider historical line of the western radical tradition. Its main limitation is the objectivism in the understanding of social relations. Using Derrida's terminology, he sees class struggle in Marxist theory as playing the role

⁴⁶³ Laclau, E. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, (London, Verso, 1990), p.xiii

⁴⁶⁴ Laclau, New Reflections, pp.xiv-xv

of a hymen: the theory both requires it and makes it impossible. Hegemony is what is positive and retrievable in it. This means the

*contingent articulation of elements around certain social configurations - historical blocs - that cannot be predetermined by any philosophy of history and that is essentially linked to the concrete struggles of social agents.*⁴⁶⁵

These changes can be seen as forming part of what has come to be known as *Disorganized Capitalism*⁴⁶⁶ and which is seen as the result of a number of related developments. The globalisation of economic, social and political relationships has undermined the coherence and integrity of individual societies. As small firms proliferate more people become self-employed, while at the same time automation leads to a decrease in the number of employees of manufacturing plants and to the parallel growth in the size of the secondary labour force. All these lead to a situation where mass production of standardized products in massive plants employing vast numbers of male workers will be a thing of the past. At the same time, companies are now operating on a global, rather than a national scale, taking advantage of different wage and strike rates. And while the employers are becoming more innovative and more mobile, the workers are becoming more conservative. Meanwhile, as income and power inequalities do not produce homogeneous social classes, and more social groups are inclined to organize, social class is no longer the major factor around which culture and politics are organized. Finally, as a result of the growth of electronic mass media, the break up of unmixed neighborhoods, and the emergence of an uncommitted middle class, a radical individualism has surfaced. This has resulted in a new culture ready to

⁴⁶⁵ Laclau, *New Reflections*, p. 184

⁴⁶⁶ see Offe, C. *Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics*, ed. by J. Keane, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), and Lash, S. & Urry, J. *The End of Organized Capitalism*, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987)

confront authority and difficult to gather support for traditional type of collective goals.⁴⁶⁷ So, as the structures of contemporary capitalism are being transformed by the combination of globalisation from above, decentralization from below, and disintegration from within, age old certainties and optimism associated with organized capitalism are vanishing. The Left has started rethinking the use of the state to correct social and economic injustices and inequalities. It attempts to reexamine the potential of class struggle as sufficient in bringing about the socialist transformation. And finally, it has come to appreciate that there is the realm of civil society, which is neither purely public or private.⁴⁶⁸

For Rutherford, Derrida's post-structuralism was the catalyst that brought into light the absence of a Marxist treatment of the issues of identity and difference. It has been the negation of essentialism and class reductionism that facilitated the proliferation of the sites of possible political antagonism, and thus broke the limited theoretical parameters of traditional socialism.⁴⁶⁹ The Marxist tradition, when faced with the actual implications of political diversity, reveals its deficiency since the idea of the class struggle fails to address the variety of modern conflicts and antagonisms.⁴⁷⁰

Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. But it is also about your social relationships, your complex involvement with others, and in the modern world these have become even more complex and confusing. Each of us live with a variety of potentially contradictory identities, which battle within us for allegiance: as men or women, black or white, straight or gay, able-bodied or disabled, "British" or "European"...The list is potentially infinite, and so therefore are our

⁴⁶⁷ Urry, *End of Organized*, pp.97-100

⁴⁶⁸ Urry, *End of Organized*, p.101

⁴⁶⁹ Rutherford, J. "A place called home: Identity and the cultural politics of difference", in Rutherford, J. (ed.) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), p.20

⁴⁷⁰ Mercer, K. "Welcome to the jungle: Identity and diversity in postmodern politics", in Rutherford, *Identity*, p.48

*possible belongings. Which of them we focus on, bring to the fore, "identify" with, depends on a host of factors. At the center, however, are the values we share or wish to share with others.*⁴⁷¹

As Weeks pointed out, identities are not neutral. Our quest for identity is shaped by different, and sometimes conflicting, values and beliefs.⁴⁷² The result then is that under this light the political agenda is radically altered. We cannot talk of priorities and dominant struggles anymore. There are no marginal and mainstream conflicts.⁴⁷³

And as the old central conflict conducted at the level of workplace struggles spreads to other areas of social life, new types of antagonism have come to supplement the old labour-capital contradiction, thus rendering the traditional class analysis obsolete. Workers no longer fundamentally challenge the capitalist relations of production at the workplace, but do so in their capacity as tenants, citizens, and consumers since it is in these kinds of environments that they suffer the deprivation caused by capitalist development. The new social movements will become the bearers of socialist transformation when they ally themselves with the unemployed, the part-timers, and all those who do not identify themselves with their employment and who constitute what Gorz calls the post-industrial proletariat.⁴⁷⁴ As Habermas has observed, the common characteristic the diverse protest movements share is the increasing sensitivity towards what he calls the *secondary dysfunctions* of capitalist growth, and a readiness to resist them. There is a growing concern about the penetration of capital into areas of social life that were previously protected from it by tradition and within which capitalist values

⁴⁷¹ Weeks, J. "The value of difference", in Rutherford, *Identity*, p.88

⁴⁷² Weeks, "Value of Difference", p.89

⁴⁷³ Brunt, R. "The politics of identity", in Hall and Jacques, *New Times*, p.157

⁴⁷⁴ Gorz in Blackburn (1991), 288-93

were not dominant before. As the social composition of these movements is heterogeneous, they do not fit into the classical Marxist protest paradigm.⁴⁷⁵ Every individual occupies multiple functions, roles and places without identifying with any single one of them. As a result we all have to construct a personal identity, a never ending quest.⁴⁷⁶ In these conditions, the construction of a new "counter-hegemony" is required, and

*(t)he problem for socialists is to show and make acceptable the link between them, and to explain that radical demands, for democratization, for equal rights for all, for the creation of communities of citizens, can only very partially be met, if they can be met at all, within the existing structures of power and privilege, and why their fulfillment requires the kind of comprehensive transformation which socialism signifies - yet to do this without in any way belittling the importance and value of the struggles which are conducted for immediate and limited reforms.*⁴⁷⁷

The decline of the Marxist paradigm has given rise to a debate about the nature of collective action in today's society. As Melucci has noticed, contemporary forms of collective action are not concentrated on struggles over the production and distribution of material goods, but

*challenge the administrative rationality of systems based on information primarily on symbolic grounds: the ways in which an information-based society generates meaning and communication for its members.*⁴⁷⁸

They, as a result of growing interdependence, display a planetary dimension and have acquired a transnational reach.⁴⁷⁹ This plurality of cultures and discourses

⁴⁷⁵ Habermas, J. "Conservatism and capitalist crisis", in Habermas, J. (1992) Autonomy and Solidarity, ed. by P.Dews, (London, Verso, 1992), p.66

⁴⁷⁶ Gorz, A. "A Left in need of redefinition", in Gorz, A. Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology, trans. by C.Turner, (London, Verso, 1994), p.22

⁴⁷⁷ Miliband, R. Socialism for a Sceptical Age, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), p.157

⁴⁷⁸ Melucci, A. "The new social movements revisited: reflections on a sociological misunderstanding", in Maheu, L. (ed.) Social Movements and Social Classes: the Future of Collective Action, (London, SAGE Publications, 1995), p.113

⁴⁷⁹ Melucci, "New Social Movements", p.114

constitutes what Heller and Feher call the "postmodern political condition". And as the class scenarios disappear and the functionalist character of society ascends, traditional political patterns and programs are rearranged and reorganized. The state is not seen as a mere class agency anymore, and it and the democratic institutions are taken much more seriously by the left. Consequently, the political options are forged by movements rather than parties.⁴⁸⁰

Once again, when discussing the importance of democratic institutions for the left, one has to remember Spinelli's contribution towards this end. Throughout his long involvement with the institutions of the European Community, and especially during the time he served as a Euro MP, he was particularly concerned with giving more power to the European Assembly, the Community's democratic institution par excellence.

⁴⁸⁰ Heller, A. & Feher, F. The Postmodern Political Condition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988), pp. 5-8

2.B. New Forms of Political Radicalism

The decline of class and the proliferation of the new movements is directly connected with the emergence of new forms of political radicalism. New forms that do not fit in the traditional models of political organization and participation.

For Giddens, today's world is one of dislocation and uncertainty, a *runaway world*. The advance of human knowledge and intervention, instead of creating certainties, causes unpredictability, or what he calls *manufactured uncertainty*. The risks involved in our lives are new, and therefore cannot be dealt with by any of the old remedies. They do not respond to the remedy of more knowledge and more control, as prescribed by the enlightenment. This uncertainty is the consequence of the long term development of modern institutions and has been hastened by the combination of various factors. Intensifying globalization, by which Giddens means the transformation of space and time resulting from the development of the means of instantaneous global communication, has led to the emergence of a post-traditional social order, i.e. not the disappearance but a change in the status of tradition. Traditions are forced into open view, they have to be explained and justified. Part of this development is the emergence of the various fundamentalisms. Moreover, the growth of social reflexivity, the filtering of all sorts of information relevant to one's life by the individual and the consequent action based on this process, has exposed an interruption in the link between knowledge and control. And this change leads to greater autonomy of action with

important political repercussions.⁴⁸¹ Socialism is no longer in the vanguard of history, whereas traditional conservatism can turn into fundamentalism. What is needed is a radical politics only loosely identified with the left. Meanwhile, an

*ever-expanding capitalism runs up not only against environmental limits in terms of the earth's resources, but against the limits of modernity in the shape of manufactured uncertainty; liberal democracy, based upon an electoral party system, operating at the level of the nation-state, is not well equipped to meet the demands of a reflexive citizenry in a globalizing world; and the combination of capitalism and liberal democracy provides only limited means of generating social solidarity.*⁴⁸²

This new radical politics should be built around a number of principles. Damaged solidarities should be repaired and this, sometimes, should include the preservation or reinvention of tradition. It has been said that the restoration of civil society could be the solution to this problem. This cannot be the case anymore as civil society was the end result of social arrangements that have been proved outdated. Since the idea of civil society was bound up with the state and its centralization, it is hard to see how it could be renewed in the time of globalization. Besides, the renewal of civil society might heighten fundamentalist tendencies and the potential for violence. External clear-cut enemies and internal solidarity cemented the nation-state and, most of the times, guaranteed internal peace. Furthermore, there is the danger of a possible tension between democratization and a renewal of civil society, since a proliferation of abstract universal rights, as advocated by liberalism, might destroy the communal orders of civil society.⁴⁸³ The centrality of *life politics*, revolving around the idea of

⁴⁸¹ Giddens, A. "Brave new world: the new context of politics", 21-25, in Miliband, D. (ed.) Reinventing the Left, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.21-5. For lengthier discussions see Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990)

⁴⁸² Giddens, "Brave New World", p.27

⁴⁸³ Giddens, A. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, (Cambridge, polity Press, 1994), pp.124-6

emancipation, feminism etc., in formal and less orthodox spheres of the political order should be recognized. Within this context ecological questions should be linked to broader problems of identity and life-style choice. The notion of generative politics, a politics supporting a positive action on behalf of individuals and groups, in order to make things happen themselves rather than accepting a passive stance waiting for things to be done for them. Another is dialogic democracy, i.e. the creation of a public arena for the discussion and resolution of contentious issues through dialogue. Thus democracy will be democratized. In relation to the world of nation states in particular, to the degree that they are still relevant, this should mean the filling in of the *empty* or *anarchic* areas connecting states. The whole idea of the welfare state should be revised thoroughly in the light of the changing nature of risk from external to manufactured. Unlike external risks, e.g. misfortunes etc., the manufactured risk is a result of human intervention into the conditions of social life and nature, e.g. global warming. It is a risk that cannot be coped with by traditional insurance methods. Whereas the idea behind welfare has been a passive one, to protect against misfortunes that happen to people, a new positive concept is required emphasizing the mobilizing of life-political measures and thus linking responsibilities and autonomy. Globalization undermines the welfare state's economic basis and the commitment of its citizens to the correlation of individual and national wealth. And as the state is unable to control economic life effectively and centrally, the national sovereign capabilities are crippled by the combination of globalization and social reflexivity. Moreover, the welfare state failed to address the issues of world poverty and wealth redistribution, and became a instrument in the hands of the expanding middle class.⁴⁸⁴ Finally, the role of violence in human affairs, from family to inter-state

⁴⁸⁴ Giddens, Beyond Left and Right , pp.140-9

war, should be confronted, something that is missing from both liberalism and socialism.⁴⁸⁵

Giddens expanded his argument to full length in his *Beyond Left and Right*. He argued for a new radical politics as the age old distinctions between left and right become obsolete. Modern conservatism has managed to respond to the effects of globalisation, and the corresponding manufactured uncertainties, by means of stressing the need for market deregulation. Markets, in this context, are seen as creating the fundamental conditions of individual freedom and are more crucial to democracy than the constitution of the state itself.⁴⁸⁶ Meanwhile, as reflexive modernization and globalization change the social and economic environment, the cybernetic model, implicit in all forms of socialism, that was reasonably effective in the past cannot deliver the goods anymore. A modern economy can endure and expand under a great degree of central planning, only if it is a national one where social life is *segmentalized*, and the degree of social reflexivity is low. Otherwise both, command and Keynesian economies stagnate.⁴⁸⁷

Whereas conservatism embraced radicalism, socialism retreated from it. Radicalism can be rescued by the ecological movement which, for Giddens, has neither obvious affinity with leftist thinking, nor a privileged connection with conservatism and the right.⁴⁸⁸ The ecological crisis is vital to political renewal because it is

⁴⁸⁵ Giddens, "Brave New World", pp.28-37

⁴⁸⁶ Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, pp.35-43

⁴⁸⁷ Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, pp.66-7

⁴⁸⁸ Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, pp.200-2

*a material expression of the limits of modernity; repairing the damaged environment can no more be understood as an end in itself than the redress of poverty.*⁴⁸⁹

For Giddens, although some of the socialist principles retain their value, productivism must be seen in a context different from the traditional socialist understanding of the issue. Compulsiveness should be overcome in the light of expanding human happiness. The critique of productivism, following philosophical conservatism, argues for a recovering of suppressed moral concerns and assumes the creation of a variety of social pacts, the most notable being the one between the sexes.⁴⁹⁰

Two major flaws in the direction of conclusions can be identified. The major one is that it sees socialism as a single entity. To do this is to ignore the richness and variety of the socialist tradition. And although it is true that the dominant currents came to reject all radicalism there is still plenty of radicalism waiting to be rediscovered in the lesser known socialist currents. Another shortcoming of his analysis of state and deregulation is that he overlooks the possibility of incorporating some initiatives and approaches at the European level.

Along similar lines, Blackwell and Seabrook advocated what they call a conserving radicalism, a form of conservatism leading to the search of all the valuable resources, the people that have been neglected in the process of ardent industrialization.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁹ Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, p.227

⁴⁹⁰ Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, pp.247-8

⁴⁹¹ Blackwell, T. & Seabrook, J. *The Revolt Against Change: towards a Conserving Radicalism*, (London, Vintage, 1993), p.4

*is nonsense, a mistake, just another ball and chain shackled to socialist parties by Marxist fetish.*⁵⁴⁰

Rosselli saw socialism as the realization of liberalism which in turn he attempted to dissociate from free market. Unlike most socialists of his generation he did not regard revisionism as a heresy. Revisionists openly declared that they wanted to transcend Marxism. Their theory was to be culminated in liberal socialism. And the essence of this modern, non-Marxist, socialism ought to be the civil society.⁵⁴¹

Among Marxism's serious faults is its failure to appreciate the so-called irrational factors such as nationalism. Moreover, it has mistaken the prologue for the entire course of development, and has given transitory phenomena long temporal duration.⁵⁴² Unlike Marx, for Rosselli

*Socialism is not socialization; it is not the proletariat in power; it is not even material equality. Socialism, grasped in its essential aspect, is the progressive actualization of the idea of liberty and justice among men: an innate idea that lies more or less buried under the sediment of centuries in the marrow of every human being. It is the progressive effort to ensure an equal chance of living the only life worthy of the name of all humans, setting them free from the enslavement to the material world and material needs that today still dominate the greater number, allowing them the possibility freely to develop their personalities in a continuous struggle for perfection against their primitive and bestial instincts and against the corruptions of a civilization too much the prey of the demons of success and money.*⁵⁴³

It follows then, that in Marx's terms Rosselli is an *idealist* rather than an *materialist*. But what should be stressed once more, is the similarities between

⁵⁴⁰ Rosselli, C. Liberal Socialism, ed. by N.Urbinati, trans. by W.McGuaig ,(Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), pp.122-3

⁵⁴¹ Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, introduction.

⁵⁴² Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 63-5

⁵⁴³ Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, p.78. Theses similar to Rosselli's were advanced by the "Revisionists". Since they are better known I will not discuss them here. See Bernstein, E. The Preconditions of Socialism, ed. and trans. by H.Tudor, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). Tudor, H. & Tudor, J.M. (ed.) Marxism and Social Democracy: the Revisionist Debate 1896-1898, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988). Tudor, H. Bernstein's Preconditions of Socialism: the first Crisis of Marxism, (Durham, Durham

Rosselli's ideas and those of Spinelli as he attempted to reform the working of the European Communities as expressed both in the *European Adventure* and the draft European Union Treaty.

Keane argued for a pluralist idea of equality that would work towards the abolition of large and permanent monopolies of privilege through the development of a less hierarchical but more elaborate relationship between citizens. Such a relationship would be mediated by the goods they produce and distribute among themselves according to criteria such as friendship, voluntary association, market exchanges, legislative decisions, etc. Thus,

*the democratic idea of complex equality recognizes that the gap between 'the haves' and 'the have nots' can be closed only by developing institutional mechanisms which distribute different goods to different people in different ways, and for different reasons.*⁵⁴⁴

He also called for the abandonment of undifferentiated concepts of liberty. The secret of the latter, the maximization of which requires the maximization of complex equality among citizens, is the segmentation of decision making powers into a number of institutions between the state and civil society, and within the latter. The maximization of citizen's liberty requires the increase of their choices. The road to socialism therefore, is democratization and it means the maintenance and redefinition of the boundaries separating the state from the civil society by means of expanding social equality and liberty, and reconstructing and democratizing the institutions of the state.⁵⁴⁵ Sovereign state power is a vital requirement for the democratization of civil society. Since pluralism tends to

Research Papers in Politics No.1, 1993). MacMullen, A.L. Belfort Bax: the Intellectual Formation of a Socialist Theorician, (Durham, Durham Research Papers in Politics No.2, 1993)

⁵⁴⁴ Keane, J. "The limits of state action", in Keane, J. Democracy and Civil Society, (London, Verso, 1988), p.12

generate anarchy, central planning is necessary, and as competing claims and conflicts of interest can only be settled by universal laws, a legislature, a judiciary, and a police force are necessary. A democratic civil society requires state power to defend its independence in the global system. Within this context, European socialism, for Keane, must break with its defensive and statist character, and to fight for the activation of civil society and the democratic reform of state power.⁵⁴⁶ Citizenship therefore is a vital component of the civil society. Citizenship can be taken to mean the recognition on the behalf of a legally instituted authority of somebody as a full member of a community, which in turn confers certain rights on the citizen. In this direction one can see the establishment by Article no.8 of the Maastricht Treaty of the concept of "citizenship of the European Union". Such a move, despite several shortcomings, such as the fact that the determination of Union citizenship rests with the Member States, is a major step in the right direction.⁵⁴⁷

Hirst has formed another alternative model which he calls *Associative Democracy*. He started from the premise that both Socialist and Liberal systems share a few common characteristics that generated a bureaucratic mass society. Representative democracy, instead of checking upon the centralized and bureaucratic government has become a means for its legitimization.⁵⁴⁸ The alternative is *associationalism* which, instead of big government that has grown at the expense of individual rights and freedoms, combines citizen choice with public welfare. At a time when the nation state is being exhausted and an elaborate multifocal politics is

⁵⁴⁵ Keane, "Limits of State", pp.13-5

⁵⁴⁶ Keane, "Limits of State", pp.21-5. On the need for a strong state for the transition to socialism see Bienefeld, M. "Capitalism and the nation state in the doc days of the twentieth century", and Panitch, L. "Globalisation and the state", both in Miliband and Panitch, Socialist Register.

⁵⁴⁷ Newman, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union, pp.153-6

unfolding, associationalism re-emphasizes the notion of a single effectively self-governing political community. And it

*makes accountable representative democracy possible again by limiting the scope of state administration, without diminishing social provision. It enables market-based societies to deliver the substantive goals desired by citizens, by embedding the market system in a social network of coordinative and regulatory institutions. It is a political idea that is big enough to offer the hope of radical reform, and to mobilize political energies in doing so, but it is specific enough to be developed within and added to our existing institutions. It requires neither a revolution nor the building of a new society, merely the extensive but gradual reform of the old at a pace directed by the realities of politics and the choices of citizens.*⁵⁴⁹

By advocating new types of institutions, a constituency wider than the traditional left can be approached. Moreover, without these new institutions and a state more agreeable to the creation of new communities the much talked about new movements will be restrained and ineffectual.⁵⁵⁰

The intellectual sources of associationalism can be traced back to Owen and Proudhon, Maitland and Figgis, Laski, Cole and his Guild socialism. And although it never formed a single coherent ideology, nor exercised power, it argued for a decentralized economy based on mutuality and cooperation, and it condemned the centralized sovereign state, offering radical federalism and political pluralism as an alternative. Its modern version does not endeavor to replace liberalism, but rather strives to extend and develop it. It attempts to amalgamate liberalist individual choice with collectivist public provision, without at the same time being a substitute form of the later. For associationalism, individual liberty and human welfare can be best served when more social affairs

⁵⁴⁸ Hirst, P. Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp.1-3.

⁵⁴⁹ Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp.12-3

⁵⁵⁰ Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp.13-4

are managed by voluntary self-governing associations. It works towards the harmonization of individual freedom and effective government, but renounces individualism because a purely competitive market society will deprive many people of the means to achieve their objectives, and consequently will result in bad government. Associations should be legally protected and, if necessary, publicly financed through taxation.⁵⁵¹

For Hirst the institutional changes that Associative democracy proposes are governed by three basic laws. Gradually, voluntary self-governing associations take over the democratic governance of economic and social matters. This becomes even more urgent as it is very difficult to restore liberal democracy in the modern states that cannot function as the exclusive spots of economic and social regulation. Power should be widely distributed to various authority areas according to functional or territorial criteria, and administration within these areas should be devolved to the lowest possible level. Thus associationalism challenges the state's claim to sovereignty and its centralization. Finally, there should be a continuous stream of information between the rulers and the ruled to facilitate the processes of consultation in a decentralized system.⁵⁵²

Unlike collectivism, associationalism gives individuals some purpose that they could not have otherwise unless they work together. And through this process they develop themselves as they are further individuated by associating with others. Associations are communities of choice, the right of exit is a basic one, and the primary general regulation of all associations is legal. Associationalism provides

⁵⁵¹ Hirst, Associative Democracy , pp.15-20

⁵⁵² Hirst, Associative Democracy , pp.20-39

for the self-interested and the resourceful, and takes on some of the competitive disciplines of the markets.⁵⁵³

Associative democracy has two fundamental distinctive features: that it bridges and transforms the division between state and civil society, 'pluralizing' the former and 'publicizing' the latter; second that it promotes the democratic governance of corporate bodies in both public and private spheres, aiming to restrict the scope of hierarchical management and offering a new model of organizational efficiency.⁵⁵⁴

Associationalism is more democratic than the other schools of economic governance as it attempts to include as many actors as possible, not as the objects of decision making, but as full participants in economic governance. Its goals are as follows. The adequate production of wealth to ensure, not the strict equality of income, but wide prosperity. Wealth though, is not the sole aim but in its production employment should be relatively secured. As many economic actors as possible have the highest level of control of the assets necessary to their livelihood. The interests of local communities, of consumers and of savers are represented in the decision making bodies.⁵⁵⁵ For Hirst, the closest existing example we can get to this model can be found in the major Japanese enterprises, and to a lesser extent in Italy and in the German institutions of national and regional coordination. Nevertheless, as he himself admits, they are difficult to copy and, if a common EC monetary system is developed, they would be difficult to maintain.⁵⁵⁶ The problem with the Japanese model is that it includes several characteristics such as the worshipping of the company etc. that make it unattractive to a number of people. Moreover, they do not seem to assist in the development of individuality which is a key component of associationalism.

⁵⁵³ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, pp.50-66

⁵⁵⁴ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, p.74

⁵⁵⁵ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, pp.97-8

Furthermore, they do not sound particularly socialist or left-wing since they glorify work for its own sake and therefore do not aim to the liberation of time. So characteristics like these would be more at home in the Thatcherite world.

Since, as we have said earlier, the capacities of the nation-state are limited and globalization and interdependence are irrevocable, then, Hirst believes, associationalism can meet the new demands more easily than the traditional state-centered doctrines. This is because of its commitment to federalism and self-government of the units of the federated authority. And

*then we should also conclude that a trade bloc like the European Community is one effective way of managing the most internationalized of the dimensions of economic policy, such as trade and monetary policy.*⁵⁵⁷

The Community's jurisdiction should include: monetary policy, eventually leading to a common currency; the common framework of general regulatory rules; and competition and technology and skills policies. It should also include some inter-regional re-distribution to meet common social and infrastructure requirements. And finally, it should include the provision of infrastructure common to the whole continent, such as air traffic control. Moreover, the old liberal objection to regulation, that it tends to multiply and become more complex will be met. This will be achieved by means of the federal mechanisms and organs which will restrain such tendencies.⁵⁵⁸ Again, one must notice the similarities between Hirst's federalism and Spinelli's federalism as discussed in chapter four.

Discussing welfare and its provision, Hirst called for the creation of conditions under which the consumers of welfare will have a great input in its provision.

⁵⁵⁶ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, pp. 125-8

⁵⁵⁷ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, p. 139

Associationalism offers extended government without big government, and at the same time offers thick welfare, but thin collectivism. Its means towards social justice, instead of the deceptive hope of equality of ends, is greater empowerment. And since the centrality of the nation state is more illusory than real, as it has lost many of its activities as regulator in the social and economic spheres, the only long run answer to this crisis is a federalist one. The recent crisis of the Italian state, and the electoral success of the Northern Leagues, is only another manifestation of the failure of national redistribution. In such a case the European Community in collaboration with national and regional governments will take over partial but definite welfare duties.⁵⁵⁹

Assessing the record of the Community's social policy, Newman has noticed that despite a number of failures and shortcomings it has made progress in some areas: it has facilitated networking and campaigns on particular issues; the ESF and the ERDF have funded some useful projects; and has maintained equal opportunities as a high priority.⁵⁶⁰ It follows then, that despite the above mentioned failures, the Community offers a tool that can be utilised in the struggle for social provision. Moreover, as Meehan has argued, the European Union can be regarded as an arena for the realization of democratic citizenship. It already offers the opportunity to act on the fact that people have more identities than their nationality. Its framework allows for the recognition of people who share such identities but who belong to different national groups. It also means that people can understand that their interests are best expressed by a combination of vertical channels through governments and of horizontal roots through common institutions. In addition, the

⁵⁵⁸ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, pp.140-1

⁵⁵⁹ Hirst, *Associative Democracy*, pp.168-71

⁵⁶⁰ Newman, *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*, p.96

European Union provides for the assertion, or reassertion, of local and regional identities. And this pluralism is a vital prerequisite for a modern radical politics.⁵⁶¹

So we can turn now to what became known as Market Socialism.

⁵⁶¹ Meehan, E. Citizenship and the European Community, (London, SAGE, 1993), pp.155-6

3.B. Market Socialism

The above mentioned radical departures from the established left discourses, such as political economy and history, to the more recent ones such as the culture of identity can be explained by the reformulation of the left's relation to capitalism. Instead of challenging and opposing capitalism, the left is trying to make some space in it. Capitalism is here to stay. This is the certainty, with which Wood disagrees, underlying all these theories.⁵⁶² It is clear it follows, that capitalism's cornerstone, the market as an institution has come a long way towards being accepted by a number of thinkers in the left as something not only tolerable, but sometimes vital, for the completion of their project.

Devine identified three interrelated areas of reassessment. One is the relationship between legal ownership, actual control, and exploitation. The orthodox socialist ground rules that exploitation would be abolished along with private ownership, an act which in turn would give direct producers control over the production process, have been rendered void by the Eastern Communist and Western Social democratic statist experiences. The second is the relationship between planning and the market. It has come to be accepted that, whereas centralized planning could be effective for a short time, the creation of some kind of *market economy* is necessary. The decentralized decision-making which is necessary for efficient resource allocation in a complex modern economy can only be coordinated through the market mechanism. Only it, in the form of market-determined prices, can communicate sufficiently detailed information to individual production units. Furthermore, only through the market can a system of incentives be operated to allow the production units to respond to the information available by producing

what society desires. And three, the question has arisen whether it is possible or not to devise a planning system which is not based on hierarchy and personal dependence. Moreover, in the light of the previously mentioned historical experience, the notion of economic independence in the sense of absence of economic dependence on the state has become more convincing.⁵⁶³

The discourse of Market Socialism is characterized by references to the now familiar themes of autonomy, choice, etc. that we have discussed before. In market socialism they can find their expression, their applicability in economic life. Consumer sovereignty is related to citizen sovereignty. Democracy in the political life is expressed by a variety of alternatives, a number of parties, and such a variety must be available in economic life. The ideological foundations of Market Socialism can be traced back to Duhring's idea of *economic communes* of 1876 and Hertzka's socialist utopia of a few years later, through to Oppenheimer's notion of the settlement-cooperative (1890) which formed the basis of the Jewish kibbutz. In the twenties both E.Heimann and Polanyi developed market socialist models, and in the thirties the English liberal socialist H.D.Dickinson worked towards the same end, while at the same time A.P.Lerner made a distinct contribution to welfare economics.⁵⁶⁴ At the same time, another model was devised by Breit and, especially, Lange in their joint publication of 1934 in the program of the young left-wing socialists associated with the group Plomienie. Two years later, in 1936, Lange produced a newer version of this model.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶² Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, p.2

⁵⁶³ Devine, P. "Self-Governing Socialism", in Tabb, *Future of Socialism*, pp.187-90

⁵⁶⁴ Blackburn, R. "Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash", in Blackburn, *After the Fall*, p.204

⁵⁶⁵ Chilosi, A. *The Right to Employment Principle and Self-Managed Market Socialism: A Historical Account and an Analytical Appraisal of some Old Ideas*, EUI Working Paper no.86/214, (Florence, European University Institute, 1986), pp.1-4. In this paper Chilosi compares the Breit and Lange 1934 model with Lange's 1936 one, and in turn he compares the first with Hertzka's original model of the late 19th century.

More recently, in the early eighties, Nove worked on the economics of what he called feasible socialism in a multiparty democracy with periodic parliamentary elections. By this, as he himself put it, he meant,

*a state of affairs which could exist in some major part of the developed world within the lifetime of a child already conceived, without our having to make or accept implausible or far-fetched assumptions about society, human beings and the economy.*⁵⁶⁶

The assumptions of political democracy feature prominently in Nove's work. Associated with this is the need for variety. If variety in political life requires pluralism, multiple identities and a vibrant civil society, correspondingly variety in production requires opportunities for individual and group initiative. If central government needs to be tamed and citizen rights to be reasserted, consumer preferences and user needs should correspondingly determine, to a great extent, what and how is produced. Instead of one type of producing unit, several are desirable. Citizens must be able to choose and then change their minds if they so wish. The variety in political terms which allows for the existence, at the same time, of states, communities, localities, unions of states etc. should be reciprocated in the economy. So, centralized state enterprises should be allowed to exist along state owned autonomous enterprises, co-operatives, small-scale private concerns, individuals, and even very large corporations. The dividing line between the state-centralized and the autonomous categories could be the line dividing the range of decisions that can be made at the production level and the corporation headquarters. It is clear that corporate giants such as Shell or IBM cannot be self-managed by the workforce. In turn the major differences between socialized and co-operative enterprises in a competitive environment would stem from the

⁵⁶⁶ Nove, A. The Economics of Feasible Socialism, (London, Unwin Hyman, 1983), p.197

difference in property relations, with means of production belonging to the workers in the latter who can freely dispose of its property. Finally, private property of the productive apparatus should be allowed, but with a limit on the number of employees, or on the value of capital assets of the concern.⁵⁶⁷ In Nove's model planning has still a number of functions to perform. It will be responsible for significant investments and for the monitoring of decentralized ones in order to avoid duplication and waste on unsound projects. The center will also be administering productive activities such as electricity, oil, and railways. Moreover, it will have to set the basic rules for the autonomous and free sectors with the right to intervene. Foreign trade will also be the responsibility of the center along with working practices and living standards. The same will be the case when *externalities* are likely to be considerable, like environmental protection, regional development, etc. It will have also to define the share of total GNP to be devoted to investment, and to balance the perspective plans by means of adequate savings and controlled inflation. Finally, the planners must make sure that a balance between present and future is kept. But the boundary between the market sector and the free provision of goods and services must be decided by a democratic vote.⁵⁶⁸ But to what degree is the above mentioned model a socialist one? For Nove, a society based on his principles would be characterized by the following. The absence of any large-scale private ownership of the means of production. The conscious planning of major investments by an authority responsible to an elected assembly. Central decision making will apply only in the cases that demand such an approach, i.e. economies of scale and major externalities. A preference for small scale to create a sense of belonging. With the exceptions of centralized or

⁵⁶⁷ Nove, Feasible Socialism, pp.197-207

⁵⁶⁸ Nove, Feasible Socialism, pp.207-8

monopolized sectors and the narrow domain of private enterprise, the managers should be responsible to the workers. Although production and distribution of goods and services must be determined by negotiations, the importance of competition for choice must be recognized. Workers must have freedom of choice between various types of employment and specializations. Market principles will not apply to sectors such as health and education, and the state will determine income policies, levy taxes, restrain monopoly power etc. Inequalities will be consciously limited, but some degree of inequality is unavoidable. Finally, barriers to abuse of power must be built and maximum democratic consultation must be promoted, although the distinction between governors and governed cannot be eliminated completely.⁵⁶⁹

In Britain, following Labour's disastrous performance at the 1983 general election the lack of an ideological foundation was blamed for the predominance of the so-called *new right*. It had to be acknowledged that often there was a rational substance to its critique, revealing some real substantive problems that were not created but only addressed by Thatcherism. The left had to address them as well, and in the process of doing so it has to answer some very difficult questions. A major one is the problem of the fiscal crisis of the welfare state.⁵⁷⁰

While the accepted socialist forms of economic organization were perceived, East and West, as failures and the old socialist values, such as collectivism, were under severe attack by the emerging individualist principles, the Labour party had to offer only a statist defense of the status quo and a return to the tested (and found lacking) wisdoms. This led to a reexamination of socialist economics, resulting in a new version of market socialism. The traditional view that economic growth and

⁵⁶⁹ Nove, Feasible Socialism, pp.227-8

a fairer society would be achieved by means of state control of the economy came to be questioned in the light of the British post-war economic and political record, and the analysis of the communist economies.⁵⁷¹ An attempt has been made to combine markets and socialism and to reorientate socialist thinking by understanding that the market is the most effective way of coordinating decentralized economic decision-making.⁵⁷² Market socialism sets itself against both nationalization and privatization, while markets are seen as providing a society wide sense of overall community. According to Forbes,

*instead of the iron fist of the state, the velvet glove of participatory democracy envelops the invisible hand of the free market.*⁵⁷³

Although more than one *market socialism* models are available, for the purposes of the present thesis I will concentrate on what I would term the *Fabian* model, which is based on Nove's above mentioned ideas.⁵⁷⁴ The basic assumptions behind this notion are the admissions that the market is not a single entity, that it is not diametrically opposed to planning, and that it is legitimate. Markets are an efficient way of producing and distributing a variety of common items, they give their participants a certain kind of freedom, and they tend to disperse personal power.⁵⁷⁵ Although the borderline between market and non market provision is a fluid one, it is important to remember that labour and capital markets differ from

⁵⁷⁰ Hall, *Hard Road* , p.276

⁵⁷¹ Nolan, P. & Paine, S. (ed.) *Rethinking Socialist Economics: A New Agenda for Britain* , (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986) , Preface, p.2

⁵⁷² Le Grand, J. & Estrin, S. (ed.) *Market Socialism* , (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) , p.1

⁵⁷³ Forbes, I. (ed.) *Market Socialism: Whose Choice?* , Fabian Tract 516, (London, Fabian Society, 1986) , intro. p.2

⁵⁷⁴ Another model which allows for a greater degree of central planning than the Fabians do, by means of a central bank, is the one advocated by Ignacio Ortuno Ortin, J.E.Roemer and J.Silvestre, in their "Market Socialism", Working Paper no.355, Department of Economics, University of California at Davis. For a more recent exposition see Roemer, J.E. *A Future for Socialism* , (London, Verso, 1994). It is a model based on Lange's mechanism of subsidizing investment through preferential interest rates. This model is more suited to the North American conditions and because of this I am not discussing it here.

markets in most products. Investment decisions, on the one hand, require a high degree of expertise and have substantial social consequences. Workers, on the other hand, cannot divide their labour among various options and hand over to the employer a big part of their lives. Market socialism therefore, advocates a free market in products but a well regulated market, at most, in these two domains. The idea of capital-labour partnership may be a way of combining the benefits of self-management with those of the traditional capital firm.⁵⁷⁶ Market socialism does not advocate the complete *rolling back of the state*, but the use of its power efficiently in order to successfully perform the duties no one else can. Its socialist advantages lie in the fact that it involves ordinary people in the running of their enterprises, distributes income in a more egalitarian way, and brings capital, a major source of power, under popular control. It allows for the combination of market and non-market elements in a way to facilitate the expression of individual desires and communal loyalties.⁵⁷⁷ The major works that I am considering here are those of Plant, Forbes, Le Grand and Estrin, and above all Miller (1990).

The first exposition of this model was provided by a group of academics who got together under the auspices of the Fabian Society in 1983. Their initial treatment of the subject was published as a book in 1989. Estrin and Le Grand noted that socialists have failed to distinguish between ends and means and that there is nothing inherent in planning that implies equality and nothing inherent in markets that prevents it. Markets are an excellent way of processing information, encouraging innovation, and dispersing economic power.⁵⁷⁸ As Miller observed, nineteenth-century socialism was a morally inspired vision of society which

⁵⁷⁵ Miller, D. and Estrin, S., "Market socialism: a policy for socialists", in Forbes, Market Socialism, pp. 3-4

⁵⁷⁶ The limitations of co-operatives are discussed later in this chapter.

⁵⁷⁷ Miller and Estrin, "Market socialism: a policy for socialists"

⁵⁷⁸ Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism, pp.2-3

rejected the offensive characteristics of capitalism, partly drawing on the preindustrial communities which capitalism had destroyed.⁵⁷⁹ Plant argued that market socialism denies the link between socialism and outcomes and accepts the liberal idea that people should be allowed to decide for themselves what *good* is.

Market socialism argues for equality at the beginning and not equality at the end, i.e. equality of opportunity. It needs a theory of distributive justice, equality, and community to distinguish it from neo-liberalism. It also calls for a central role for the state as market socialism can not solve the problems of government. And as market socialist views about the market have sought to empower individuals and groups in the market, so in relation to the state they must empower the individual by means of extended democracy and accountability in political structures and bureaucracies.⁵⁸⁰ For socialists equality is the tool for the extension of individual freedom and the safeguarding of fraternity. Here it should be noted that the socialist notion of equality differs from that of equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity takes the established structure of inequality for granted and is only bothered about recruitment to it. The socialist notion of equality is concerned about outcome in terms of income, wealth and welfare. Nevertheless, at this point, it can be said that it is not clear how real this difference is in practical terms. The task of market socialism therefore is the development of a theory of legitimate inequality.⁵⁸¹ The failure of the traditional statist-socialist model is that it, in its welfare state form, strove to tackle the symptoms instead of the causes of inequality.⁵⁸² For Abell equality, freedom, and efficiency should be incorporated into the socialist doctrine, as they are missing from the traditional socialist

⁵⁷⁹ Miller, D. "Why Markets?", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism, p.27

⁵⁸⁰ Plant, R. "Socialism, Markets, and End States", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism

⁵⁸¹ Plant, "Socialism, Markets, and End States", pp.24-6

⁵⁸² Plant, "Socialism, Markets, and End States", p. 27

principle from each according to ability to each according to ability, and subsequently need.

The failures of central planning as an argument for market socialism have been used by Estrin and Winter who observed that in a command economy the economy functions only because of the emergence of black and gray markets. For them the use of markets as the main economic mechanism does not exclude the use of planning where necessary. France, and Japan especially, offer the prime example of an exercise in systematic state intervention to achieve particular targets in a few sectors of the economy, without regard to the consequences for the allocation of resources as a whole. Markets are not an end in themselves but means by which certain economic activities are carried out. There can be no objection to their use provided their operation is consistent with a society which combines freedom, efficiency and fairness. Market socialism entails the rolling back of non-market provision to allow competitive forces to increase efficiency and choice and to do away with monopolistic abuse. State intervention is required in the case of natural monopolies, to introduce market relations whenever non-market provision has emerged in pursuance of monopoly power, in the case of goods with spillover effects, in the capital market, to dampen price fluctuations and the associated effects on incomes while directly stimulating quantitative changes in sectors where supply adjustments to demands are relatively slow. A planning agency is needed to produce acceptable results. Central planning suffers from infeasibility, tautness, and the incoherence and inefficiency that follows, but

also suppress and damage the market mechanism.⁵⁸³ Indicative planning, on the contrary,

*offers a decentralized and potentially democratic version of planning which can improve the functioning of markets, without threatening to displace them as the principal allocation mechanism. Its primary contribution is intended to be improving economic efficiency, rather than directing economic activity. It operates through the provision of information, and its effectiveness in large part depends on the sophistication and usefulness of the data made available. The contribution of indicative planning to economic welfare may appear small to traditional socialists, who compare it with the directive organs of central planning. Viewed from the perspective of a market economy, the contribution of indicative planning is much larger.*⁵⁸⁴

Winter sees exploitation in modern capitalism as arising from the differential ownership of productive assets, and from the fact that people bring different skills to the labour market. Socialism is mainly concerned with the first kind of inequality. Nationalization, traditionally seen as the principle means of tackling this problem almost always involves a separation of ownership from control and fails to satisfy either the workers or the customers. Changing the legal framework that supports the capitalist society is the only way of reforming it. A socialist economy must renounce the private ownership of the means of production as the primary form of ownership in the economy. Rigorous inheritance taxes, curtailment of privately owned companies' size, and the use of market to allocate labour skills are necessary. After the implementation of these changes the need of a large government bureaucracy will disappear.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸³ Estrin, S. & Winter, D. "Planning in a market socialist economy", in LeGrand and Estrin, Market Socialism, pp.100-138

⁵⁸⁴ Estrin and Winter, "Planning in a market socialist economy", p.119

⁵⁸⁵ Winter, D. "Market socialism and the reform of the capitalist economy", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism

Le Grand examined the relationship between market socialism and welfare. After dismissing full-scale privatization, he proposed a serious experiment with a discriminatory voucher scheme to determine whether they were dangerous right-wing nonsense or a potentially appropriate tool for achieving socialist ends. Moreover, he advocated a *user tax*, a charge for services incorporated into the tax system to that could promote the socialist objectives of efficiency and fairness. He also championed the idea of introducing a lifetime capital receipts tax. A so called *poll grant*, a capital grant to everyone on reaching the age of majority, will be financed by the revenues of the above mentioned tax.

*The combination of a developed system of wealth taxation with a poll grant would go a long way towards the redistribution of resources that is an essential requirement for the kind of egalitarian market socialist economy discussed in this book.*⁵⁸⁶

Probably the most important book on Market Socialism is *Market, State and Community* by Miller. In it he provides market socialism with a theoretical justification. In the book's first part Miller shows that the libertarian ideas of freedom, justice, and efficiency cannot justify laissez-faire capitalism. But at the same time he proves that the pro-market arguments are convincing enough. In the second part he defends the market from socialist attacks. When consumer sovereignty is concerned he proves that there is no known alternative to it. Although exploitation is still possible, market socialism evades the systematic exploitation of capitalism. And if agencies of government can be constructed to express the general will, economic relations can acquire an instrumental, competitive, and spontaneous character, without at the same time losing their

⁵⁸⁶ Le Grand, J. "Markets, welfare, and equality", in Le Grand and Estrin, Market Socialism, p.211

human co-operative and planned character. Thus alienation, the market's great disadvantage for Marx, can be countered.

Miller offers a detailed theoretical justification of Market Socialism. For him social-democratic strategy suffers from a number of limitations. It is no longer clear that Keynesianism can be used in the desired manner to secure full employment, the effect of fiscal measures on the overall income and wealth distribution has so far been limited, and finally, the welfare state has not been a very successful vehicle for general equality. The aims of market socialism can be summarized as follows: obtaining the efficiency advantages of the markets in goods' and services' production, confining the state's economic role in order to make democratic government feasible, protecting the workers' autonomy both as individuals and as members of self-managed enterprises, and bringing about a more equal distribution of primary income.⁵⁸⁷

The discussion of the politics of democratic socialism requires a reexamination of the socialist notions of community and citizenship. Individuality has been seen as an essential part of socialism by Marx, Morris and Kropotkin, and they sought to accommodate, rather than extinguish, individual self-development and communal solidarity. This requires a looser form of community in which direct communal ties are not the only human relations, but allow for others forms such as market ones. If all members of the community are to participate in shaping the world in which they live to fit common ideas and aspirations, communal identification must occur at national level where most major decisions affecting the shape of the society are taken. Smaller scale communities, although valuable, will be inadequate. Justice can only be guaranteed by a national distributive mechanism.

Since the collective identities that people currently possess are overwhelmingly national ones, the nation is where the promise of overall community will be fulfilled. But as socialism has traditionally rejected this identity source, nationality must be reexamined if this aim is to be achieved. The very conjunction of nation and state allows national communities to come close to self-determination and distributive justice since only a politically organized community can hope to determine its fate and to distribute justice to all its members according to their needs.⁵⁸⁸

*All particularist loyalties create at least the potential for objectionable behaviour towards outsiders, but to conclude that we should never pledge ourselves to anything less than humanity as a whole is to overlook everything that is valuable in these special commitments.*⁵⁸⁹

Nations are the only possible form in which overall community can be realized, and it is here that the right kind of political organization is needed for the achievement of socialism. This remark contradicts the Marxist idea that it is only the class that matters and that the workers have no homeland. If community needs a common vocabulary, a collective memory and a set of values, these are to be provided by the nation. And this is a statement that sounds nationalistic, since it resembles the idea of nation as we saw it in the first chapter of the present thesis. But then again we have to remember that the idea of the "actor" is common to both ideologies, socialism and nationalism. They both need the actor, it is the class for the first, and it is the nation for the second. So, this is for Miller where nationality meets citizenship. The first furnishes the common identity necessary for people to think of defining their world together, and the second provides them

⁵⁸⁷ Miller, D. Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.8-10

⁵⁸⁸ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.227-240

with the tools to do so.⁵⁹⁰ Normally, the independence of action that people enjoy in market environments is compatible with citizenship's requirement of some political involvement and taste differences. Citizenship symbolizes an equality of status, thus meeting the radical idea of egalitarian community, while providing a moral foundation for distribution according to needs, as well as the practical means for fulfilling this ideal on a society-wide basis.⁵⁹¹ I believe that his treatment of the nation-state is Miller's major contribution to current socialist thinking. He introduces in socialism something that was hitherto missing with disastrous consequences as we have seen. The problem is that in times of globalisation the nation-state is losing its importance. But that does not mean that we have to throw the baby with the bathwater. If old nation-states, traditionally understood, are not capable any more new forms might emerge. Instead of the old nation-states, new ones will be created, based in the case under consideration, on the emergence of a new European nation (it is doubtful though whether Miller would accept the EU as a nation-state equivalent). A new nation that will be the result not of wars of conquest, and domination, but of mutual understanding and consent, and that will provide for the proliferation of a number of multiple identities. The process of European integration and the building of a European identity in the future will provide us with a new platform. This concept can be traced back to the federalist aspirations of Spinelli. So, once more, we can see the relevance of Spinelli to today's discussions about the future of the left and its relation with the process of European integration.

Where politics is seen as the aggregation of interests the political system remains a piece of external machinery. Decision legitimization is based on the procedure

⁵⁸⁹ Miller, Market, State, and Community, p.241

followed rather than the outcome itself and as such faces several difficulties. All interests must be pressed with equal force, the interest's strength, rather than its quality is what counts, and it is widely assumed that it is not possible to find an acceptable aggregation procedure. The alternative model is politics as dialogue, and the socialist idea of citizenship

*exerts powerful pressures towards the form of legitimation that politics as dialogue promises to provide. Where dialogue succeeds, the citizen's rational capacities are respected, and he is able to align himself with the decisions that are reached.*⁵⁹²

Questions about everyday consumption and questions of personal belief and morality are excluded from dialogue. But the dialogue could proceed to identify interests, and means of realizing them, common to all members of the collectivity in question, and to award competing claims to resources in terms of agreed justice standards. This type of dialogue takes place among the citizens of a nation-state which are bound together by a common public culture. And despite the fact that ethical traditions are heterogenous, and capable of being interpreted in opposing ways, the interpretations offered stem from something common among all members of the community. This community must be big and loose enough to allow for the separation of political and personal relationships as required by an impersonal type of dialogue, thus justifying the representative model.⁵⁹³

Discussing toleration, Miller noted that the question of how to respond to cultural diversity presents a major difficulty. Ethnic divisions offer a narrower focus of loyalty and nourish a factionalized form of politics. The solution is an overarching

⁵⁹⁰ Miller, Market, State, and Community , p.245

⁵⁹¹ Miller, Market, State, and Community , pp.245-251

⁵⁹² Miller, Market, State, and Community , p.260

⁵⁹³ Miller, Market, State, and Community , pp.252-275

socialist sense of identity which is more vital to all communities than their individual subcultures.⁵⁹⁴ Toleration, nevertheless, ought to be valued when freedom of speech and the realm of private culture (religious beliefs, sexual relationships, etc.), when not generating demands on the state for special forms of support, are concerned.⁵⁹⁵ In developing the sense of citizenship a crucial role is going to be played by the institutions of politics and by the educational system. A citizen must understand the history of the collectivity to which he belongs if he is to perceive his fate as connected with that of the rest of his fellow citizens and therefore to develop a sense of common citizenship.⁵⁹⁶

In this outlined socialist model the state will have five functions. A protective function, safeguarding people and the assets and benefits they have accumulated. A distributive function, allocating and reallocating resources according to the principles of distributive justice in both economic justice and personal welfare. Economic management, the regulation of economy in order to work efficiently. The provision of public goods. And finally, self-reproduction, supporting present, and preparing future citizens for their role.⁵⁹⁷ Such a state should be an "apparatus whereby the popular will is translated into effective policy".⁵⁹⁸ Such a state though must solve the problems of bureaucracy and scale. Each one of us needs a protected sphere free from state intervention. When local issues are at stake it is difficult to apply Macpherson's 'pyramidal system'.⁵⁹⁹ Some decisions involve specialist knowledge. Some cases involve conflicts of interest. In some cases

⁵⁹⁴ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.279-284

⁵⁹⁵ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.284-287

⁵⁹⁶ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.287-293

⁵⁹⁷ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.295-298

⁵⁹⁸ Miller, Market, State, and Community, p.298

⁵⁹⁹ This system, as outlined by Macpherson, C.B. in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977) is one based on local assemblies electing delegates to communicate their opinions to regional and national assemblies. Thus, higher level decisions are a sum total of primary direct decision making.

single majority decisions when added up together could result to a poor policy overall. For all these reasons decisions should not be made by simple majoritarianism. And since there is no sovereign in Hobbes' sense and decision making is divided, the need for a constitution determining the competence of the various state constituting political and administrative bodies, as well as a constitutional court arises. The socialist state should embody the rule of law, assist the assertion of human individuality, and protect human rights by means of a bill of rights. On the economic domain the main task is to find the institutional framework that can reconcile political monitoring with market freedom. Banks, free from undesirable political control, should be given the task of creating enterprises, investment should be sensitive to local needs while individual enterprises should be protected from the lending agencies. The state's success in performing such a function depends on the prevailing public and political culture. Discussing the state's role in welfare provision Miller argued that a public system comes closer than any other to distributing the goods in question according to relative need, although this should not substitute a wider commitment to equality. Medicine and education require a public system allowing for consumer choice, whereas in housing for example public authorities should play a complementary role to the markets.⁶⁰⁰

Market socialism is a pluralistic system based on the market economy and the state, the first producing most goods and service within a state established and enforced framework. Citizenship provides the means by which people determine their future in a new participatory form of political system. The socialist state shares the liberal features of its liberal counterpart, but it employs a more

⁶⁰⁰ Miller, Market, State, and Community, pp.298-319

democratic way of formulating basic policies.⁶⁰¹ Feminist, environmentalist, and other concerns cannot substitute for socialism as the world of work remains of key importance to the vast majority of the population.⁶⁰²

Critics have pointed out that a problem with Market Socialism is that the idea of having a market to allocate produced goods and services, while removing the financial rewards and sanctions which normally determine quality and quantity, is bizarre. If a hard working successful individual can only draw the same rewards as a less motivated one, motivation and ambition will disappear thus reducing the society's wealth as a whole. It is utopian to believe that self-interest can be eliminated entirely. Moreover, starting gate equality requires an extensive welfare state with large police and confiscatory powers, thus rendering itself incapable of substituting for end state equality.⁶⁰³ Here it can be said that these critics have somehow missed the point. Market socialism does not advocate the complete elimination of unequal rewards. They still do exist, but not as great as in *laissez-faire* system.

From a left wing point of view, Beuret and Coole saw the pursuit of markets as antithetical to genuine socialism. First, although temporary balances may be struck, markets display certain structural imperatives which are likely to remain more powerful than any rational socialist control system bent on constraining or co-ordinating them. If we are to move beyond possessive individualism and a semi-Hobbesian view of human nature, a more radical program is required. Secondly, market socialism suffers from tendency to economic reductionism which relegates questions about other aspects of life to a secondary position.

⁶⁰¹ Miller, Market, State, and Community , pp.321-323

⁶⁰² Miller, Market, State, and Community , pp.324-325

Thirdly, the market is equipped more to profit maximization than meeting needs. As a result, research and development are oriented not in socially useful directions. Furthermore, production decisions, even in the democratic workers' co-operatives, will not into account the concerns and needs of those outside the organization. Fourthly, members of workers' co-operatives are bound together by self-serving interests rather than solidarity. The reduction of socialism to market-socialism represents a *failure of courage and imagination*. Socialism must not be reduced to a radical version of J.S.Mill's liberalism.⁶⁰⁴

Mandel offered a more traditional orthodox left-wing criticism of market socialism. He argued that efficient *market regulation* is absurd. It is impossible to have an extensive market economy without bankruptcies and mass unemployment. And as total resources are always limited, any use of them by the public sector or for non-market purposes of direct need satisfaction automatically reduces their availability for market-oriented production. The history of capitalist free enterprise is the history of more and more people deprived of the necessary means of producing their livelihood on their own account. For Mandel market relations could be eliminated for all goods whose elasticity of demand is falling towards zero or has even become negative. And although market socialism is born out of opposition to bureaucracy it will lead to a repressive and detached state. The debate is not about the greatest possible economic efficiency but about the greatest possible freedom for individuals. They themselves, rather than markets or experts, should have the right to make these decisions freely.

⁶⁰³ De Jasay, A. Market Socialism: a Scrutiny 'This Square Circle', Occasional Paper 84, (London, The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990)

⁶⁰⁴ Beuret, K. and Coole, D. "Rethinking the present", in Forbes, Market Socialism, pp.18-21.

*That is what human freedom is about. That is what socialist planning is about.*⁶⁰⁵

Generally speaking, market socialism as outlined fails to address the problem of how an incoming socialist government committed to reform is going to overcome the substantial obstacles that its opponents are going to put up. As R. Miliband noticed, this points to a general failure on the part of many socialist thinkers to appreciate the existence of a substantial power structure in capitalist democratic regimes, and the degree to which people are prepared to fight for its preservation.⁶⁰⁶ Other criticisms can be directed against market socialism. It is not clear why co-operatives for instance pursuing their narrow self-interest within a regulated socialist market amount to a different system than the one in which private enterprises follow their narrow self-interest within a regulated capitalist market. And even if it can be argued that such a system would be more just, it does not follow that it will be more stable and more subject to social control. Market socialism is based on nondiscriminatory regulation by the center. But this fails to address the problem of local self-interest, which will do its best to avoid regulation bargaining and the regulator game. Moreover, even the outcome of nondiscriminatory regulation will appear arbitrary to some who would not accept its outcome. And although the regulators might reflect democratically agreed national preferences, the compulsion of the market reinforces and reproduces alienation since the narrow self-interested consciousness is sustained by material incentives.⁶⁰⁷ But despite its failures, market socialism is a first step in the right direction since socialism seems to be coming into terms with its own mistakes and attempts to correct them. There is still a lot of work to be done but we are on the right track. Again, it must be made clear that, as we saw in the previous chapter,

⁶⁰⁵ Mandel, E, "The Myth of Market Socialism", New Left Review, no. 169 (May/June 1988), pp. 108-120

there is an echo of market Socialism in Spinelli's thought. And Market socialism can be seen as bringing together all the recent ideas about socialism with the notions of choice, democracy etc. figuring prominently in it, alongside the market.

It can be said that Market Socialism brings together the diverse European models such as the pluralism of national and regional communities that operate under the European framework. At the European level, Market Socialism commits to certain values such as democracy, the rule of law and social solidarity, and a degree of commitment to redistribution. Moreover, it promotes a policy of ecologically sustainable growth and of alternative action in areas like science and technology where there are economies of scale, as well as presence in the international arena.

Finally, it can be said that for socialists that want to operate at a European level, Market Socialism provides the link and the justification for such an action. From the Treaty of Rome onwards, the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Communities (EC), and the European Union (EU), all have been characterised by a strong commitment to Markets. The Single European Act (SEA) has underlined this process. Without market Socialism the accommodation of European integration, and Europe, into the socialist project would have been impossible.

⁶⁰⁶ Miliband, R. *Socialism for a Sceptical Age*, p.163

⁶⁰⁷ Devine, "Self-Governing Socialism", pp.196-7

CONCLUSION

The present thesis has demonstrated that the relationship between nationalism and socialism has been a troubled one. This can be explained by the fact that the founding fathers of scientific socialism had relegated nations and nationalism to the superstructure. So, the lack of a coherent legacy left the followers of Marx-Engels without a solid base upon which to construct a proper theory of nationalism. Even attempts by Gramsci and Bauer were incapable of breaking completely free of this straitjacket. It can be said that the reason for this failure is to be found in their preoccupation with economic factors and with the state and political structures. This preoccupation can explain the failures of the Internationals in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. The working class became attached to the nation-state and in times of crisis it felt that there was something worth defending in it.

After the end of the Second World War, the process of integration in the western half of the European continent gathered pace. This was a new phenomenon that in many ways affected the power and the role of the nation-states. The examination of the German SPD and the French PS/SFIO has shown that both dealt with this development in accordance with perceived interests emanating from the two nation-states rather for specifically socialist reasons. They produced a confused policy as they were caught between the need to appeal to a domestic electorate, the responsibilities of running the state whenever they happened to be in power, the realities of the international environment, and the internal party balance of power.

Needless to say that this confusion was best manifested in the vocabulary and the rhetoric used.

It would have been expected that socialist thinkers would have managed to avoid these pitfalls. But unfortunately this was not the case with the three types of socialist theoreticians, and their approach towards the process of European integration, that have been examined. Even Galtung and Mandel, freed from the responsibilities and the constraints of practical politics, failed to provide a satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism and the way integration in Western Europe was developing. And, although to a lesser degree, this was also the case with the French Rocardians. They all ignored nationalism and remained preoccupied with statism.

The notable exception to this failure was Altiero Spinelli. Spinelli was in the unique position of being both a thinker and a practitioner. But above everything else, he was a convinced Europeanist. And, throughout his long career spanning almost five decades, he had the opportunity to have an inside view of the way the major Community institutions work. The underlying current of his thought has remained federalism which he encountered through L. Einaudi. At the same time, he was a non-doctrinaire socialist who distinguished between Marxism and socialism, and who managed to appreciate the importance of nationalist feelings. To a degree his career and thinking were determined by the fact that he was an Italian and Italy was the country of Eurocommunism and coalition politics.

Spinelli, spent his last years in the European Parliament working towards the draft European Union Treaty, and died in 1986. Soon afterwards the so called "existing socialism" came to an abrupt end in the eastern half of the continent. Meanwhile, the

post war Social-Democratic project was undergoing a major crisis on the countries of western Europe with the economic crisis and the advances of the new right. The left project was in a desperate need of redefinition. A major debate is going on about the future of socialism in a comprehensive way. This debate evolves around the central themes of the unit of socialist change, the agent of socialist transformation, and the socialist theory and practice.

With regards to the unit of socialist change the topics of discussion include the ideas of national sovereignty and the state. This discussion touches upon both the process of European integration and socialism. Sovereignty is central upon any discussion of integration in Europe. At the same time sovereignty, seen as the location of power in the state has been essential to socialism. Nowadays, the idea of national sovereignty is being challenged in a number of ways, both internally and externally as a result of the growing interdependence and globalization. It follows then that the state is not an effective tool for any government that find its hands tight in its attempts to pursue its policies. For socialist parties, which have traditionally attempted to utilize the state mechanisms in order to put into practice their policies, this has been an unpleasant surprise. Meanwhile, though the nation-state remains the focal point of popular imagination.

At the same time the working class can not be seen as the agent of socialist transformation. The old paramount conflict between proletarians and capitalists that had shaped the traditional socialist project has been replaced by a number of other conflicts and, correspondingly, new multiple identities have replaced the single working class one. People are now defined by their sex, their colour, etc. These has led to a proliferation of new movements such as regional and environmental to

mention but a few, that have led to the emergence of new forms of political radicalism.

All these demand a new synthesis of socialist values if the left is to regain popular support and escape from the corner that the so-called new right had put it in the last two decades since the usage of the state mechanisms in both east and west had failed to produce the desired results. Such a synthesis is constructed around the notion of democracy and includes the issues of choice, rights and autonomy, and citizenship. Directly connected to these is the new theory of Market Socialism which can be seen as the application in economic terms of the democratic notions of choice, autonomy etc.

In a way market socialism is the epitome of the whole discussion as it brings together the connects of the nation-state impotence, of multiple identities and democracy, and of European integration. We have to remember here that if socialists are to utilize the opportunities offered by a united Europe, they must first accommodate the market since from the Treaty of Rome onwards European integration has primarily been an exercise in free market.

It is here therefore that Spinelli's ideas become very topical. Most notions dominating the above mentioned discussions are to be found in Spinelli's thought. He broke free from marxist economism, and he advocated ideas of market socialism long time ago. He campaigned for more power for the representative bodies, for more power to the regions and he was concerned about the environment and the provision of welfare. Moreover, he emphasised popular participation, accountability, constitutionalism and

citizenship. And all these, since he was a federalist, at the European rather than the national-state level.

For over a hundred years the socialist movement all over the world has faced a dangerous dilemma. The working class has been organized in movements based on the idea of the people. This has been the result of the division of the world system in states. The nation-state has been glorified by both, socialists and nationalists. As Habermas put it, its great historical success can to a great degree be explained by the fact that the modern state has turned out to be the most effective vehicle for the accelerating modernization of society.⁶⁰⁸ The great achievement of the West European nation-state was the linking of accountability, loyalty and legitimacy with power and authority, to tie political community to state power. But as we have seen in the course of the last quarter of the century this link is now loosening. The nation as a social and political community is gradually becoming distant from the state as security and welfare provider.⁶⁰⁹ And as the nation-state is being challenged by the multicultural differentiation and the trends towards globalization the European Union is the only, at present, available substitute for the traditional nation-state.

It cannot be said that the European Union is panacea. Nor that it will be successful. What I am saying is that in a number of fronts such as the environment, equality, citizenship etc. the European Union can be utilised to further the socialist cause. There are several shortcomings and failures. But some possibilities can be exploited.

⁶⁰⁸ Habermas, J. "The European Nation-State - Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) Mapping the Nation, (London, Verso, 1996) p.282

⁶⁰⁹ Wallace, W. "The Nation-State - Resque or Retreat?" in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. (ed.) The Question of Europe, (London, Verso, 1997) p.45

Of course there is still work to be done in this direction. Although member-state citizens are greatly affected by Union decisions and are subject to its legal norms, the European Parliament for instance has very little say in issues like this. This democratic deficit has to be corrected. One here must remember Spinelli's great contribution to this effort. His ideas should be the guideline for any attempt to redress this imbalance. But some important positive steps should not be ignored. For example the European Parliament has actively been involved in fighting racism in the Community for a long period. And although the Union's member states are responsible for the determination of Union citizenship, the very fact that such a concept has been introduced is remarkable and it opens a window of opportunities for the left.

But as we have seen national identity is still an important issue. People become attached to their nationality and make sacrifices for it. It follows then that if the European Union is to become the focus of popular support, the need for the elaboration of a European national identity is pressing. As Miller has observed, it is valuable from a universal point of view for people to have the moral power to bind with each other into special relationships with ethical contents. The nation provides the communal ties that are necessary for the effective operation of the market. Moreover, a European welfare arrangement must be based on communities the members of which recognize obligations of justice to one another. To have a national identity one does not have to be a nationalist in the doctrinaire sense, and there should be no friction between someone's nationality and their identity as for example a woman.⁶¹⁰ Nationalism can stimulate the move from private subject to citizen.

⁶¹⁰ Miller, D. On Nationality

The construction of a European identity presents us with a challenge. How it can be done? This is not an answer that can be given within the limits of the present thesis. But we can agree with A.D.Smith when he says that the official formula of “unity in diversity” is not the right one. Instead what is needed is a new formula of a “family of cultures” resembling Wittgenstein’s concepts of “family resemblances” and of the “language game”, which features a variety of elements, not all of which feature in every example of the game.⁶¹¹

The socialist failure can be explained by the fact that nationalism is not a concrete unified doctrine. Nationalism is a Janus faced doctrine. It has two faces. One, the exclusive, and another, the inclusive. The first, is based on the element of race or other factors that nationalists claim to be objective. It defines the nation as an aggregation of people that share some common biological characteristics. National identity in this case is a hereditary characteristic, something you are born with and you can not escape or acquire. One is born Greek or German. No one else can join such a national community. The second, is what I call inclusive nationalism. Here national identity is a characteristic one can acquire in the process, one that does not exclude the other, one that is based on tolerance, equality and respect. In this case one is not born Greek or German but if they so wish, they can become Greeks or Germans. In the ancient Greek way, Greek is whoever has the Greek *paideia*, the Greek education. The ancient Greek formula allowed for people to share multiple identities as one could be Athenian and Greek, or Spartan and Greek at the same time. One could say that the modern example of such a nationalism is the American one. The big melting pot has produced a nation that has managed to incorporate a variety

⁶¹¹ Smith, A.D. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, *International Affairs*, Vol.68, no.1, (1992), pp 70-1.

of cultures and origins. A nation that most of the times has been at ease with its past and a nation that despite several drawbacks has managed to achieve, and maintain, a dominant position in world affairs.

So, the socialist failure is to great extent to be explained by the inability to understand this duality in the nature of nationalism. Not all nationalisms are deplorable and dangerous. What is even more important is the fact that some of the aspects of this so-called inclusive nationalism are of vital importance to any socialist attempt to correct the ills of society. The nationalist idea of community and belonging can be the main allies of any socialist effort for redistribution in society. And at a time when socialism feels the need to exploit the possibilities of common action with the new movements ideas like these can provide the platform for a mass mobilisation and rallying behind these new values.

The construction of this new European identity within the process of building a new Europe is a difficult one. But it is the only route available to us.

*The European Community, with all its warts, is thus a step in the right direction, not least because it seems bound to enshrine, at some new level, the principle of multiculturalism - not as a congeries of irritable narcissisms, but as a rational integration of local cultural solidarities within, but sharply distinct from, the supra-ethnocultural "republican" state-idea that was born from the Enlightenment. This stance permits Habermas to speak about the possibility, emerging from the kinds of international meetings held recently on global issues in Geneva, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo and Beijing, of what he calls "world domestic politics"*⁶¹²

⁶¹² Anderson, B. "Introduction" in Balakrishnan, Mapping the Nation , p.15

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